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The railway serves people as a significant means of transport since the mid-19th century. Its
development has passed through different stages, from intensive growth at the time of the
Industrial Revolution, the role of dominating means of transport in the first half of the 20th
century, certain collapse in the second half of the 20th century connected with effective com‐
petition from road transport, to characteristic renaissance in passenger transport, resulting
from appearance of high-speed trains, and persevering tries to rebuild importance of the
freight transport, e.g., through the introduction of multimodal transport, at the end of the
20th and the beginning of the 21st century.
In all these periods, engineers and researchers paid a lot of attention to improvement of ef‐
fectiveness in broad terms, safety, comfort of travel, and unification of transport means and
infrastructure. The imposed increase in traveling speed, by competition of air transport
among others, put before designers very high and qualitatively new demands, both in terms
of technical performance, particularly the speed, as well as safety and comfort. The realiza‐
tion of these objectives was possible to a high extent thanks to the intensive development of
the technology in general and computer technology in particular, which includes both the
hardware and the software and their contribution into our lives in the second half of the
20th century.
While talking about railways development, the economic issues cannot be ignored. The pay‐
back period of investment expenditure for the modern railway infrastructure, including the
most modern traffic control and command systems, and also for the modern rolling stock is
long. Besides, the benefits from investments in railway development are often difficult to
determine precisely. Due to these reasons, only the developed countries can afford new in‐
vestments. The other countries face difficulties in dealing with these issues and sometimes
simultaneously even with maintaining what they already have. In spite of that, it has to be
admitted that the present times are the good period for railways, when looking at it global‐
ly.
This book focuses on selected research problems of contemporary railways. The first chapter
is devoted to the prediction of railways development in the nearest future. The particular
areas of intensive development at specific geographic locations for them are defined. The
next two chapters are focused on the problems of safety. The first of these chapters discusses
the safety and security problem in general, precisely from the system point of view. In the
second one, both the general approach and a particular case study of a critical incident with
regard to railway safety are presented. In the fourth chapter, the question of railway infra‐
structure studies is presented, which is devoted to track superstructure. Both the experimen‐
tal results and numerical calculations are of interest in the chapter. In the fifth chapter, the
modern system for the technical condition monitoring of railway tracks is discussed. The
compact on-board sensing device and the diagnosis software are presented. The last chapter
focuses on modeling dynamics of the railway vehicle, taking the numerical approach. Also,
two example research issues of the vehicle dynamics are resolved with the use of numerical
simulation, where the dynamical models are exploited.
The content of the book comes mainly from offers for the book chapters received by the edi‐
tor from the authors while organizing the book project under the working title “Railway” In
fact, the influence of the editor on this content is negligible. The scope of this book is quite
broad. Despite the eclectic content of the book and the limited number of chapters, the edi‐
tor hopes that many readers will find this book interesting and useful.
Prof. Krzysztof Zboinski
Faculty of Transport
Warsaw University of Technology
Poland
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Railways in Renaissance — Review of Achievements and
Reflection on Prospects
Dave van der Meulen and Fienie  Möller
Additional information is available at the end of the chapter
http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/61273
Abstract
The authors introduce railway renaissance by considering the rail mode's inherent
strengths, energy frugality, and developmental role. They address the research ques‐
tion: Does a new post-renaissance normal now prevail? The research progresses a multi‐
variate design that they developed to a case study approach as proliferation of private
railway operators as a consequence of renaissance has constrained access to formerly
public information. The study examined four countries, Brazil, Russia, India, and Chi‐
na, and one region, the Gulf Cooperation Council States, whose railways have ad‐
vanced substantially in recent years through implementation of high speed, heavy
haul, heavy intermodal, and urban rail. It also examined the migration of countries
from the previously identified Fortuitous and Insecure railways clusters to the En‐
lightened, Progressive, and Assertive clusters. It found advances in institutional learn‐
ing with respect to design of interventions to achieve renaissance, ownership and
funding, market structure, as well as networking and expanding strategic horizons. It
concluded that countries that have embraced the railway renaissance have been able
to reposition their railways to play a substantial role in their economies and societies,
and that a new normal has emerged, with the rail mode now a formidable contender
in high-speed, high-volume, heavy-traffic corridors.
Keywords: Energy, intervention design, new normal, strategic horizon, railway ren‐
aissance
1. Introduction
1.1. Manifestation of railway renaissance
From their origin in the Industrial Revolution, first-generation railways grew to dominate land
transport, ultimately peaking in the late 1940s. Thereafter, they declined in the face of disrup‐
© 2015 The Author(s). Licensee InTech. This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution,
and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
tive competition from other transport modes that had flourished on the momentum of the
World War II technology boom. Why did rail not get onto the same bandwagon? By then most
countries had either nationalised or regulated their railways, to restrain their monopolistic
power, and they had become too unresponsive to technology and market opportunities to get
in on the action.
Nevertheless, railways have experienced renaissance in an increasing number of countries in
recent decades. The authors have researched the associated phenomena, and published their
findings in [1–7]. This chapter continues that research stream, and addresses two additional
considerations that have arisen since it started, namely, the transition from finite to renewable
energy sources, and the revival of the rail mode's developmental role in economic geography.
While the image of global railway renaissance originally appeared pixelated, every incremen‐
tal investment in one of the four market spaces where railways can compete vigorously has
increased the resolution and clarity to a level where it is appropriate to once again review
achievements and reflect on prospects for the future.
Railways manifest renaissance by having exploited their three genetic technologies, support‐
ing (the ability to carry heavy loads), guiding (the ability to travel at high speed), and coupling
(the ability to connect many vehicles together), that set them apart from other transport modes.
The three genetic technologies and the four market spaces that they support, namely high
speed (passenger), heavy haul, heavy intermodal and urban rail, have been described in detail
in [1–4, 6], so this chapter will only recapitulate as necessary to introduce its content. Together,
they have turned railways around from grave decline and set them on new growth curves in
each of the four market spaces mentioned. They have realised new opportunities by taking
markets away from air over medium distances, from road and maritime transcontinental and
intercontinental container movements, and created new markets in rampant urban rail.
1.2. Rail's inherent strengths
Rail's inherent strengths have been explained before in the references mentioned in subsection
1.1. What follows is, therefore, a brief recapitulation with emphasis on subsequent learning.
By comparison with other transport modes, such as air that offers three degrees of freedom of
movement (longitudinal, lateral, and vertical) at relatively high cost, and road that offers two
degrees of freedom of movement (longitudinal and lateral) at moderate cost, the rail mode is
constrained to a single degree of freedom of movement (longitudinal) by its guideway, back
and forth on a predetermined, inflexible route. To compete effectively against transport modes
that take advantage of more degrees of freedom of movement to get closer to the ideal of
ubiquitous access, railways must offer compensating advantages. Fortunately, a guideway
endows railways with three genetic technologies that at once distinguish it from, and offer
advantages over, all other transport modes. The rail mode's inherent competitiveness resides
in its genetic technologies, and it must draw on them for competiveness and sustainability in
the aggressive global logistics and mobility markets.
A pair of flanged wheels on an axle running on a pair of rails fixed to the ground precisely
defines the spatial relation between rail and wheel. The three genetic technologies that stem
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from this relation are first, the supporting genetic technology, or the ability to carry heavy
loads. The application path of the wheel load to the rail is precisely known and it is therefore
possible to design the wheel-rail system to carry much heavier axle loads than can road
vehicles. The highest heavy haul railway axle load in current operation is 40 tonnes in the
Australian Pilbara, with aspirations to 42 tonnes. By contrast, vehicles on the rail mode's major
land transport competitor, road, are driven autonomously; one cannot define the application
path of the wheel load to the road precisely, but must design the entire road surface to accept
the applied load. Consideration of economic relations among the amount of traffic and capital
and maintenance expenditure has converged permissible road vehicle axle loads in the 8–9
tonne range around the world. Interestingly, where one can define the vehicle path more
precisely and design the road structure accordingly, higher axle loads are possible: Thus, bus
rapid transit axle loads can go as high as 12½ tonnes on specially designed runways. What
about maritime transport, also a form of surface transport that can carry heavy loads? Vessels
displace their own mass of water, hence their draught increases in proportion to their mass
until buoyancy and deadweight forces are in equilibrium. Thus, while their cargo deadweight
might be several times higher than the payload of a heavy haul train, they are nevertheless
also subject to physical constraints such as limited draught, while hull drag in a medium more
viscous than air incurs higher energy consumption than railways except at very low speeds,
but more on that in the next section.
Second, the guiding genetic technology endows ability to travel at high speed. Once again, by
contrast to its major land transport competitor, railway vehicles are precisely guided by wheel-
rail forces, and can therefore safely attain much higher speeds than road vehicles that are still
generally guided by humans exercising control through road-to-tyre friction forces. Freight
and passenger vehicles are generally limited to no more than 120 km/h on public roads,
whereas entry level on standard gauge track is 160 km/h with the ultimate maximum com‐
mercial service currently at 380 km/h. Railways can therefore generally service destinations
faster and further than road, and at medium distances can also offer credible competition to
aviation.
Third, the coupling genetic technology endows the ability to connect multiple individual
vehicles to deliver high freight and/or passenger throughput capacity. The rail mode is
therefore able to scale capacity to match demand within wide limits. For comparison, the
number of trailers in Australia's commercial road trains is expressed by only a single digit; the
number of barges in a single tow on the Mississippi river may be expressed by two digits; but
no transport mode other than rail expresses its vehicle combinations by three digits, as for
example South Africa's Sishen-Saldanha iron ore trains at 342 wagons, currently the longest
in the world, and many other three-digit heavy haul train lengths around the world. For
passenger traffic, coupling railway vehicles together essentially reduces the headway between
them to zero. Thus, for example, single railway cars carrying say 200 passengers at two-minute
headway would carry 6,000 passengers per hour per direction. Coupling ten of them together
in a multiple unit train increases throughput to nearly1 60,000 passengers per hour per direction
on the same infrastructure. Other modes do not support this magnitude of capacity scalability,
while some modes do not scale at all, for example, aviation.
Railways in Renaissance — Review of Achievements and Reflection on Prospects
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After a post World War II pessimistic interlude, during which sceptics questioned the rail
mode's future and many stakeholders lost faith in it, optimism returned when appreciation of
its genetic technologies stimulated vigorous new growth curves, in high-speed intercity
starting in 1964 in Japan; heavy haul when mineral railways around the world recognised
North American heavy freight standards in 1972; heavy intermodal or container double
stacking when railroad deregulation in the United States released pent-up competitive forces
in 1980;, and contemporary urban rail spontaneously around the world from the start of
economic globalisation in 1989. These events are widely acknowledged as having launched a
global railway renaissance that would position the mode as inherently competitive against
other modes in high-volume corridors.
1.3. Energy's vital role
Although rail is known to be an energy-efficient transport mode, it is nevertheless valuable to
contextualise this attribute to develop an appreciation of what role railways should fulfil in an
energy-scarce future.
Rail's energy efficiency essentially spins off from its genetic technologies. The supporting
genetic technology requires a strong wheel-to-guideway interface to sustain heavy axle loads,
and rail's steel-on-steel system provides just that. The wheel and rail deflect minimally to
develop a small contact patch between them, and steel-wheel-on-steel-rail rolling resistance
and associated energy consumption, is therefore very low. By contrast, a rubber pneumatic
tyre on a road deflects much more to develop a contact patch sufficiently large to sustain the
load, which increases rolling resistance by comparison with rail and hence also the associated
energy consumption.
The guiding genetic technology supports high speed, which in turn allows more potential
energy to be converted to kinetic energy and vice versa by widening a train's actual speed
range over undulating grades, thereby reducing both energy consumed during traction and
energy dissipated during braking. High speed also reduces journey times, and hence reduces
the period during which auxiliary services such as heating, ventilation, air conditioning,
lighting, and catering must operate. Consequently, high speed passenger trains actually
consume less energy per passenger for a given journey than conventional passenger trains [8].
The coupling genetic technology averages grades under a long train, thereby reducing traction
energy input and braking energy dissipation by comparison with a short train, particularly for
heavy freight trains that are limited to comparatively low speed, which in turn limits the
acceptable speed variation range over crests and sags and hence also the quantum of kinetic
energy that can be converted to potential energy and vice versa. Coupling also reduces
aerodynamic resistance because the frontal area of a train in relation to its length is small
compared to any other transport mode; for example, the ratio of the frontal area to vehicle
length for a TGV Duplex train is one-tenth that of an Airbus 380 aircraft, both double deckers.
1 Increasing the number of cars on a train increases its length, and hence the time it takes to clear signals for a following
train. Capacity therefore scales at slightly less than in direct proportion to the number of cars.
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The rail mode, therefore, occupies an energy consumption sweet spot that other transport
modes cannot match. All other things being equal, propulsion energy consumption is a
function of total resistance to motion, whether due to aerodynamic, hydrodynamic or me‐
chanical phenomena, and speed. Railways essentially undercut the resistance to motion,
expressed in Newtons per tonne, of all other transport modes. Relative to pipeline, railways
have lower resistance from speeds higher than ≈3 km/h. Relative to maritime in displacement
mode where resistance rises exponentially with speed, railways have lower resistance from
speeds higher than ≈20 knots (≈40 km/h). In addition to being faster, railway routes can also
be materially shorter, for example Beijing to Athens Piraeus is 8,500 km overland, but 16,000
km by sea. In the same way that high speed trains consume less energy because the journey
time is shorter, freight trains consume less energy when the journey distance is shorter. Relative
to road trucks, railways always have lower resistance, ≈50% at low speed, increasing to ≈80%
at 100 km/h [9]. Relative to aviation, railways always have lower resistance, although it cannot
match aviation's top speed. Nevertheless, railways can be attractive even on relatively long
centre-city to centre-city journey times, e.g., the fastest current Beijing to Wuhan schedule
averages 285 km/h over 1,229 km, a performance that aviation would be hard put to beat when
accounting for time to commute to the airport, check in, check security, reclaim baggage, and
commute to destination in addition to the scheduled flying time.
Relatively low braking and traction adhesion inhere in the rail mode's steel-wheel-on-steel-
rail technology. Whereas contemporary high-performance passenger trains use a high
proportion of motored axles and therefore accept comparatively steep grades despite low
adhesion, exploiting the coupling genetic technology with locomotive-hauled trains, freight
or passenger, results in heavy trailing loads that generally require comparatively flatter grades
than rubber-on-road technology to balance braking or tractive effort against total resistance
and gravity component. The flatter a ruling grade, the more long-wave topography influences
it and the longer the distance between grade sign changes. Thus, in a given terrain, railway
grades tend to be longer and flatter than road grades. Where the downgrade gravity compo‐
nent exceeds mechanical plus aerodynamic resistance, any vehicle generates instantaneously
surplus energy, which needs to be dissipated or stored on board, or exported to where it can
be consumed or stored. Road vehicles, singly or even in combination, have higher aerodynamic
resistance than long trains, so on their comparatively short down grades they generate less
instantaneously surplus energy to be stored, and hybrid road vehicles with on-board energy
storage have become workable. However, current on-board storage technologies are totally
inadequate for line-haul railways, particularly for heavy haul but also for heavy intermodal
with its progressively higher rolling resistance: Therefore such trains need to dissipate
instantaneously surplus energy on board, or conduct it off-board for consumption or storage
elsewhere [5, 7].
Because railway rolling resistance is very low, its instantaneous traction and braking power
requirements are largely determined by grade undulations. The resultant wide swings
between demand and regeneration make it desirable to exchange energy in both directions
with its environment. Railways and renewable energy are thus natural symbionts, particularly
when railways are linked to a sizeable grid that can also store instantaneously surplus energy
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when necessary. Railways can then both consume and regenerate energy without restraint.
For scale, locomotives and wind-turbines are of similar size, in the range of 2½–6 MW. While
electrification infrastructure is an expensive way for railways to exchange energy with their
environments, guided transport in general has the advantage that electrification need be
confined only to routes defined by the guideway. Hence the emergence of inductive recharging
of catenary-free light rail vehicle batteries or capacitors during dwell time halts.
It is common cause that railways are more energy efficient than other land transport modes,
and at the higher speeds of which it is capable, it is also more energy efficient than waterborne
transport. Nevertheless, since the first major oil crisis four decades ago, despite technological
progress, potential for cost-effective energy efficiency improvements and policy efforts, the
transport system has not fundamentally changed [10]. Nevertheless, recently published
research has found that despite technological advances, there are still situations where freight
railways do not achieve the best energy efficiency that they can [7]. Thus, while heavy freight
baseline diesel traction uses comparatively expensive, but nevertheless available fuel, holds
no systemic interaction surprises, and readily scales throughput, electric traction can decouple
railways from on board power generation and facilitate access to other electricity generators
and consumers. However, to realise its full potential, electric traction would require matching
vertical alignment to locomotive performance characteristics: providing graduated release
train braking; providing catenary, transformers, and feeder lines; providing high-capacity,
low-latency, long-lived energy storage; and implementing net metering to render transactions
transparent. Where a smart grid is within reach, the storage should come with that, and
renewable energy would likely be available. There is still some way to go.
1.4. Rail's developmental role
When railways dominated land transport during their initial growth phase, they shaped the
development of countries and continents, peaking in that role around mid-20th century.
Thereafter, road and air transport together came to own the market until high speed railways
commenced new growth in the 1960s, heavy haul in the 1970s, heavy intermodal or double
stacking in the 1980s, and finally contemporary urban rail in the 1990s, thus establishing the
four sub-modes of the railway renaissance. Railways in renaissance offer high capacity with
high efficiency and low cost in well-defined high traffic volume corridors. After changing the
economic geographies of Japan and France by means of high speed trains, developing remote
regions throughout the world by means of pit-to-port heavy haul operations, shifting sub‐
stantial traffic from road to rail in double-stack container trains, and supporting rapid urban
rail growth in developed and developing countries, it is evident that the rail mode is once more
stimulating widely dispersed economic and social development through each of its four new
growth curves.
While the rail mode's initial growth phase spawned monolithic railways that introduced the
first motorised transport ever with minimally differentiated offerings, renaissance has
encouraged railways to do what they do best in particular market spaces in the face of strong
competition from other modes. Renaissance rail is therefore always a high-capacity, high-
performance transport mode in well defined corridors. Its initial investment is relatively
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and at the higher speeds of which it is capable, it is also more energy efficient than waterborne
transport. Nevertheless, since the first major oil crisis four decades ago, despite technological
progress, potential for cost-effective energy efficiency improvements and policy efforts, the
transport system has not fundamentally changed [10]. Nevertheless, recently published
research has found that despite technological advances, there are still situations where freight
railways do not achieve the best energy efficiency that they can [7]. Thus, while heavy freight
baseline diesel traction uses comparatively expensive, but nevertheless available fuel, holds
no systemic interaction surprises, and readily scales throughput, electric traction can decouple
railways from on board power generation and facilitate access to other electricity generators
and consumers. However, to realise its full potential, electric traction would require matching
vertical alignment to locomotive performance characteristics: providing graduated release
train braking; providing catenary, transformers, and feeder lines; providing high-capacity,
low-latency, long-lived energy storage; and implementing net metering to render transactions
transparent. Where a smart grid is within reach, the storage should come with that, and
renewable energy would likely be available. There is still some way to go.
1.4. Rail's developmental role
When railways dominated land transport during their initial growth phase, they shaped the
development of countries and continents, peaking in that role around mid-20th century.
Thereafter, road and air transport together came to own the market until high speed railways
commenced new growth in the 1960s, heavy haul in the 1970s, heavy intermodal or double
stacking in the 1980s, and finally contemporary urban rail in the 1990s, thus establishing the
four sub-modes of the railway renaissance. Railways in renaissance offer high capacity with
high efficiency and low cost in well-defined high traffic volume corridors. After changing the
economic geographies of Japan and France by means of high speed trains, developing remote
regions throughout the world by means of pit-to-port heavy haul operations, shifting sub‐
stantial traffic from road to rail in double-stack container trains, and supporting rapid urban
rail growth in developed and developing countries, it is evident that the rail mode is once more
stimulating widely dispersed economic and social development through each of its four new
growth curves.
While the rail mode's initial growth phase spawned monolithic railways that introduced the
first motorised transport ever with minimally differentiated offerings, renaissance has
encouraged railways to do what they do best in particular market spaces in the face of strong
competition from other modes. Renaissance rail is therefore always a high-capacity, high-
performance transport mode in well defined corridors. Its initial investment is relatively
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expensive, and particularly, infrastructure needs therefore to be long lived. While it is possible
to implement rail solutions in already highly developed settings, for example, deploying
monorail in the air space above existing roadways as the only remaining option to introduce
urban-guided transit, the rail's combination of high performance and low energy consumption
are best exploited by positioning it as the foundation on which other transport modes should
build to support integrated intermodal solutions. Thus, particular building-block solutions
have emerged that spatial and transport planners can customise and assemble as required.
Consider domestic and international airports connected to their catchment areas by urban,
regional, and high speed rail; mixed-use, transit-oriented development that maximises both
access to public transport and interchange with non-motorised transport; dedicated high-
speed corridors that bring agglomeration benefits to otherwise disconnected communities and
conurbations; logistics parks that add value to line-haul rail service through integration with
intermodal facilities and distribution centres; dedicated heavy haul railways that link ore
bodies with ports; and dedicated freight corridors that convey double-stacked containers from
ports to their hinterland; all competitive, effective, and efficient solutions.
Renaissance rail's contemporary developmental role is nowhere more evident than in the BRIC
(Brazil, Russia, India, China) countries, which are playing an increasingly influential role in
the global economy [11], and who are positioning railways as the backbone of their transport
systems in fulfilment of projections that they will, in due course, join the world's major
economies. This chapter will examine them and the Gulf Cooperation Council States in more
detail in Section 3.
2. The research approach
2.1. New research questions
One could hypothesise that, half a century after its launch, the railway renaissance might have
completed its mission, and that for railways a new normal prevails. The hypothesis is impor‐
tant, because not all railways have experienced renaissance. What then is to become of the
stragglers? The research stream underlying this chapter initially identified a suite of technol‐
ogies that encouraged the rail mode to enter vigorous new growth curves in the high speed,
heavy haul, heavy intermodal, and urban rail market spaces. The logical research question at
this time must then be: What outcome has the railway renaissance facilitated in countries that have
purposefully embraced it?
The research question then is: Does a new post-renaissance normal now prevail, and as a
corollary, does there seem to be any viable alternative?
2.2. Recap of variables used
The following groups of variables, used to examine positioning of railways in relation to their
setting, have been carried over from previous research [2, 4], with comment here on their
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continued relevance, and the need to introduce new ones to address the changed global setting
in which railways now find themselves.
Business Group represents the way in which line haul railways deal with their task (variables:
Infrastructure Operator Diversity, Train Operator Diversity, Information Technology Leverage, and
Total Road Network, Motorways and Paved Roads Percentage).
Competitiveness Group represents the way in which railways position themselves to compete
in their chosen or allotted market spaces (variables: R&D Level, Relative Maximum Axle Load,
Relative Maximum Speed, Distributed Power Presence, Heavy Haul Presence, High-speed Intercity
Presence, Heavy Intermodal Presence, Motive Power Type, and Attitude to Competition). Nowadays
pre-competitive research is undertaken at the country or industry level, while competitive
research is undertaken within industries, hence latest technologies are freely available in a
global market and the R&D level has been deleted.
Contribution Group describes the railways’ contribution to their host society (variables:
Network Coverage, Transport Task—Freight and Passenger Traffic Volume, Employment Created, and
Initiative Source, except that the latter has been redefined as Initiative Direction, with scale poles
Authority Initiative and Market Initiative).
Networkability Group describes the extent and gauge of track, and the contiguous network
beyond a country’s borders (variables: Narrow, Standard, and Broad Gauge; Networkability; and
Strategic Horizon).
Ownership Group describes the industry structure (variables: Infrastructure-operations Separa‐
tion, Infrastructure and Rolling Stock Ownership Locus, and Infrastructure and Rolling Stock
Commitment Horizon).
Society Group describes the railway setting (variables: Country (Name), Economic Freedom
Index, Population, Gross National Income, Physical Size, Determinism, and Climate-change Posi‐
tion, except that Determinism has been deleted in favour of the redefined Initiative Direction,
and Climate-change Position has been superseded by the more comprehensive Presence of
Renewable Energy Sources, Ability to Regenerate Energy, and Availability of Smart Grids).
Sustainability Group describes adaptation and fit (variables: Infrastructure and Rolling Stock
Investment Capacity, Stakeholder Satisfaction Level, Service Reputation, Safety Reputation,
and Subsidy Influence). Note, however, that subsidies and social obligations may be obscured
to the public domain. It is therefore proposed that Subsidy Influence is no longer relevant, and
that Infrastructure and Rolling Stock Investment Capacity are adequate proxy measures for
sustainability. Likewise, Presence of Independent Railway Safety Regulator and Presence of
Automatic Train Protection should supersede Safety Reputation.
Guided Urban Transit Group also describes adaptation and fit (variables Metro Population,
Population Growth, World Cities Score, Green Cities Index, Smart Card Application; and in respect
of each of the sub-modes Light Rail and Tram, Light Metro, Heavy Metro, Monorail, Auto‐
mated Guided Transit, and Bus Rapid Transit: Inaugural Year, Operators, Status of Project,
Network Coverage, Rolling Stock Fleet, Passenger Journeys, Routes, and Stations or Stops. In
addition, driverless or automatic train operation, which maximises throughput capacity and
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minimises human shortcomings is gaining market share and should be recognised by the
variable Presence of Automatic Train Operation).
Time Group represents passage of time, a prerequisite for longitudinal research (variable:
Calendar Year).
2.3. Further research design
The country as basis for defining cases is still valid in most instances, but one needs to be
sensitive to larger groupings. One example is Europe, where the tortuous passage of the Fourth
Railway Package through the European Parliament illustrates that, despite significant shared
interests, member states also have significant own interests. Another is the Community of
Independent States (CIS), whose commercial behaviour reflects the broad gauge track that they
share among themselves but not with their neighbours.
The authors originally followed a multivariate statistical approach. Not unexpectedly,
renaissance has changed much of the global railway industry structure. Despite uncontested
broad socio-economic benefits, increasing private sector participation has constrained the
amount of commercially sensitive financial and operational performance data available to
researchers in the public domain. Unsurprisingly, the railway operators' corpus in several
countries now resembles that of other diversified and fragmented transport modes, with
information dissemination restricted to legal minimum requirements. Thus, despite its
limitations, a case study approach now appears to be more workable and has therefore been
adopted in this chapter. The cases were selected by virtue of their extraordinary commitments
to progress towards positioning railways as the backbone of their national or regional transport
systems, in Brazil, Russia, India, China, and the Gulf Cooperation Council States, or of their
urban transport systems in the world's cities-with-railways as a group.
As before, the authors used content analysis of trade periodicals and associated marker events
to identify countries and market spaces in which positive shifts relative to their previous
positioning have taken place. Notwithstanding adopting the case study approach, the authors'
ultimate objective, the scientific method, rests on measurement and hypothesis testing. Hence
this chapter will serve as a spinoff to identify additional variables intended to be used in a later
round of statistical research.
3. The cases
3.1. Brazil
To revitalise its freight railways, Brazil initially implemented reform-led intervention through
long-term concessions (30 years renewable for another 30 years) on its freight railways in the
mid-1990s. This resulted in vertically integrated concessions over a total of twelve regional
freight railways, which have since grown traffic by 117% [12]. Heavy haul operations on both
broad and narrow gauge, as well as general freight on broad gauge networks have flourished,
attaining creditable densities of 81 million tonne-km/route-km for Vale's dedicated heavy haul
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operations, and 37 million tonne-km/route-km in heavy general freight. However, Brazil’s
narrow gauge general freight railways achieve less than 2 million tonne-km/route-km [13]. It
is therefore evident that the inherent competitiveness of Brazil’s narrow gauge general freight
railways is low and that their performance falls short by comparison with its BRIC peers
reviewed in the next three sections.
Lease income from concessions and taxes on concessionaires have become a source of revenue
for the Brazilian government. However, investment in rail services other than heavy haul has
been meagre, and notwithstanding its economic upswing, high logistics costs characterise
Brazil. They are estimated at ≈20% of the gross domestic product (GDP) and thus double the
average in OECD countries. The high costs are attributed to regional differences in the state of
infrastructure, even though the organisation of the Brazilian transport sector has improved
substantially since the 1990s. The national rail network lacks investments and modernisation,
while high harbour fees further contribute to high logistics costs. The logistics sector is highly
dependent on the highway network, transporting 60% of total freight volume.
However, the network remains restricted, hindering economic growth. Although rail freight
increased its logistics market share from 17% to 25% in 2013, the government would prefer a
share above 50%. To achieve this, it envisages expanding the network from the present 30,000
km to 50,000–60,000 km [12]. Brazil, therefore, recently changed to an investment-led inter‐
vention, the Logistics Investment Program, a strategic project of the Brazilian State [14]. The
primary intervention was to invest in railways, to raise their inherent competitiveness so that
they can support economic development, and while elements of reform are still present, that
is no longer the prime objective. It has connected its formerly isolated northern and southern
broad gauge networks, albeit with breaks of gauge, by means of the new North-South Railway,
which runs the length of the country. It is following up with two more priority freight rail
projects of more than 1,000 km—the East-West line and the Trans-Northeastern Line—to open
the interior of the country to development. Funding will partly be by public-private partner‐
ship (PPP), involving USD 121 billion over 30 years.
Importantly, Brazil is changing the way the new railways will operate to break monopolies in
provision of rail services. Instead of awarding a single concession to operate and maintain a
railway, a concessionaire will construct and maintain a line, as well as control train movements
on it for a period of 35 years. State agency VALEC will manage the demand risk through the
government guaranteeing to purchase the full capacity and then on-selling access to the whole
new rail network to private rail freight operators, with an individual operator able to purchase
up to 30% of the capacity of a particular line. This unique development in the railway world
is something to follow closely. Thus far, observers feel that the significant sunk costs of building
or improving a railway seem to have deterred more private investment. The federal govern‐
ment has filled the gap and observers expect that continued government investment in
railroads is needed in the long term. Nevertheless, the World Bank considers that several steps
could improve private investment in railways, among them enhancing interconnectivity
between railways—Brazil operates on different track gauges, and the sheer lack of physical
interconnectivity between the lines slows return on investment [15].
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Brazil is working on a high speed railway in the Rio de Janeiro-São Paulo-Campinas corridor,
to be implemented by PPP, although after two false starts, tendering has been postponed to
give prospective bidders sufficient time to prepare. Rio de Janeiro-São Paulo is eighth on the
list of the world's top 50 busiest passenger air routes. The envisaged concession period is 40
years, with commercial operation projected to start in 2020.
Brazil's cities have benefited from renaissance in urban rail: Since it started in 1989, heavy
metro, light rail and monorail projects have been under construction or completed in Brasilia,
Fortaleza, Porto Alegre, Recife, Rio de Janeiro, Salvador, Santos, and São Paulo [13].
Brazil has thus contemplated or implemented three of the four railway renaissance sub-modes,
the outstanding one being heavy intermodal or double stacking. Loading gauge on some routes
is restricted, and this state possibly reflects the concentration of heavy industry in the south
and southeast of the country. Brazil is oil self-sufficient and insignificant routes are electrified
outside urban areas.
3.2. Russia
The Russian Federation is the sole shareholder in Russian Railways (RZD). It exploits its
strategic location to take full advantage of its key geographical position by fully integrating
the Russian railway system into the Eurasian transport network [16]. RZD's strategy for
developing rail transport up to 2030 envisages significant expansion of the rail network in two
stages.
The first stage involves modernisation from 2008 to 2015 to ensure necessary capacity on key
routes, fundamental renewal and upgrading of existing infrastructure, and the beginning of
planning and surveying work for expansion, as well as starting construction of some high-
priority lines. Among the company’s top priorities were reconstruction and technical en‐
hancement of existing main lines along with construction of new lines to remove
infrastructural limitations to Russia's economic growth. RZD already operates high speed
passenger trains in the upgraded St Petersburg–Moscow–Nizhny Novgorod corridor. The next
focus was on the Baikal-Amur Main Line as an investment in Russia's future that will sub‐
stantially increase transportation of oil products and exports to the East, a more intensive
development and exploitation of raw materials in its Far Eastern region, and an increase in the
line’s share of East-West transit traffic. The latter's catchment area stretches from China, South
Korea, and Vietnam in the East, and to Estonia, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania,
Poland, Romania, and Slovakia in the West. A further priority was the construction of
dedicated freight lines to tap natural resources and develop new industrial zones in Western
Siberia. Around 13,800 route-km were upgraded for heavy axle loads to reduce the cost of bulk
freight shipments.
The second stage from 2016 to 2030 will involve large-scale expansion, creating infrastructure
to develop new economic growth areas across Russia's vast territory, deploying world-class
technology and improving the competitiveness of the country’s rail system on the global
market [17]. This includes the North-South International Transport Corridor in strategic
partnership with countries to the south, initially India and Iran, while Belarus, Kazakhstan,
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Oman and Tajikistan have subsequently opted in, and requests to join from Syria, Azerbaijan
and Armenia are under consideration [18]. It also includes ambitions to build a 104-km tunnel
under the Bering Strait to connect the Asian and North American continents. The recent
Ukraine imbroglio has, however, dampened Russia's ability and aspirations to network
railways on continental and intercontinental scale. Hot off the press, in March 2015, RZD called
for tenders to undertake surveys, project development, and route planning for the proposed
770-km Moscow–Kazan dedicated high speed line. One of the benefits Russia attributes to this
high speed line is simply an increase in the country's prestige, since in the modern world no
economically developed country will remain without a system of high-speed railways in the
coming years.
Because of limits on State funding, RZD is financing its investment programme through PPPs,
in the ratio 46% generated by RZD, 30% met by the private sector, 19.5% provided by the
Russian Federation, and 4.5% from regional governments. Raising outside capital is done in
accordance with the company’s Loan Programme, which provides for various instruments to
finance its operations, including syndicated and bilateral loans, rouble bonds and Euro bonds,
as well as leasing and others. Key focus objectives for RZD are the interests of shareholders
and partners, as well as increasing efficiency and speed of management decision-making and
improving transparency of the group’s activities [19].
RZD was separated from ministry control in 2003 to become a public company responsible for
operational and commercial functions. Separate daughter operating companies are being or
have been set up for freight and passenger activities as a possible prelude to a sale of shares.
It has commenced unbundling the former monolithic entity into, among others at time of
writing, Eurosib, which runs container services linking Russia's ports with central Russia and
Siberia; Federal Passenger Company, a subsidiary that manages long-distance passenger
operations; Freight One, a subsidiary that offers cargo and intermodal shipment using its own
fleet of hired wagons, and offers rolling stock leasing; Freight Two, a second freight subsidiary
that will lease or acquire new and modernised wagons; Globaltrans, a rail freight operator and
freight forwarder; JSC High Speed Rail Lines, a subsidiary to promote development of high
speed lines including HSR1 from Moscow to St. Petersburg, and HSR2 from Moscow to Kazan
and Yekaterinburg; RailTransAuto JSC that handles a range of commodities including finished
motor vehicles [13].
RZD achieves line densities of 23.6 million tonne-km/route-km plus 1.6 million passenger-km/
route-km in operations where block-load freight rather than dedicated heavy haul trains share
the same infrastructure with passenger trains.
Russia has lagged its BRIC peers since urban rail renaissance started in 1989. Projects com‐
pleted or under construction include only three metro lines in Chelyabinsk, Kazan, and
Moscow, as well as metro extensions and a new monorail line in Moscow [13]. RZD owns and
maintains infrastructure and rolling stock, which it leases to suburban companies, and receives
a subsidy from the state for providing infrastructure services at a reduced rate. The primary
institutional weakness is unprofitability due to ticket revenue failing to cover expenditure and
insufficient compensation from state authorities. Thus, ageing and under-maintained rolling
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stock is gradually being withdrawn from service and not being replaced [20], to the extent that
systems in two cities have ceased service.
Russia has, therefore, contemplated or implemented two of the four railway renaissance sub-
modes, the outstanding two being heavy intermodal or double stacking, and urban rail.
Russia's main east-west and north-south and railway routes, which among others, convey
substantial amounts of container traffic are extensively but not completely electrified using
80% non-coal sources. The overhead contact wire would need to be raised to accommodate
double-stacked container trains.
3.3. India
A railway budget presented to Parliament by the Railway Minister has traditionally funded
Indian Railways (IR). The Ministry of Railways has a dedicated financing entity, Indian
Railway Finance Corporation Ltd (IRFC), whose objective is to raise funds from the market to
part finance the planned outlay of IR. Money so provided is used to acquire rolling stock and
to meet other IR developmental needs. Rolling stock funded by IRFC is leased to the Ministry
of Railways, which pays lease rentals to the corporation. IR also operates a Wagon Leasing
Scheme to encourage shippers and private operators to invest in rolling stock, but it has
continued to flounder. It appears that politicised relations between IR and the government,
and the consequent apparent lack of strategic direction, deterred private participation. To
overcome these obstacles in moving its railways into renaissance, IR has adopted the special
purpose vehicles, described in the next two paragraphs.
First was the Dedicated Freight Corridor Corporation of India Ltd (DFCCIL) in 2006 under the
Ministry of Railways administrative control, to plan, develop, fund, resource, construct,
maintain, and operate Dedicated Freight Corridors (DFCs). Building DFCs across the country,
to operate double stack container trains and/or heavy haul trains, marked a strategic inflexion
point in IR's history, which has traditionally run mixed freight and passenger traffic across its
network. DFCs will enable IR to improve customer orientation and meet market needs more
effectively. Creation of rail infrastructure on such a scale—unprecedented in independent
India—is expected to drive the establishment of industrial corridors and logistic parks along
its alignment. Currently under construction, the Eastern DFC is being funded in three different
ways: the Ludhiana-Mughalsarai section by the World Bank through an International Bank
for Reconstruction and Development loan; the Mugalsarai-Sonnagar section by the Ministry
of Railways directly; and the Sonnagar-Dankuni section by PPP. Also currently under
construction, the Western DFC is funded through foreign direct investment by the Govern‐
ment of Japan who provided a Special Terms of Economic Partnership Loan to finance
construction and procure locomotives. The Ministry of Railways will bear a remaining portion
of the project construction cost as equity funding to the DFCCIL. Thereafter, construction of
four more DFCs is slated to complete India's Golden Quadrilateral that connects Delhi,
Kolkata, Chennai, and Mumbai, as well as its two diagonals.
Second was High Speed Rail Corporation of India Ltd in 2013, on directions of the Ministry of
Railways to develop technical standards, undertake project-related studies, as well as prepare
financial and implementation models. It appears that a 540-km dedicated high speed line
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between Mumbai and Ahmedabad could be first, followed by five other projects during the
next ten years to connect major metropolitan centres Delhi-Amritsar, Delhi-Chennai, and
Chennai-Mysore. Two of the projects are set to serve portions of the Delhi-Mumbai corridor,
currently tenth on the list of the world's top 50 busiest passenger air routes. The recently elected
government has implemented a fast track, investment-friendly and predicable PPP mechanism
to modernise and revamp the railways and implement expensive projects such as high speed
rails [21].
India's networking aspirations have, thus far, not pursued a strategic horizon much beyond
the 1,676 mm broad gauge that it shares with neighbours Bangladesh and Pakistan, as well as
Sri Lanka's island network. It is incompatible with the two other major track gauges in Asia,
China's and Eurasia's standard gauge, and the CIS' 1,520 mm broad gauge, so it is beholden
to transloading containers, bogie changing or gauge-changing, which would dampen net‐
working enthusiasm unless there were major traffic flows at stake.
India's cities have also benefited from renaissance in urban rail. Since urban rail renaissance
started in 1989, projects completed or under construction include 17 metro lines in Bangalore,
Chennai, Delhi, Gurgaon, Hyderabad, Kolkata, Mumbai, and Navi Mumbai, as well as a
monorail line in Mumbai [13]. Interestingly, Delhi's three Phase 1 lines are the same 1,676 mm
broad gauge as its national network, while its four Phase 2 lines are standard gauge, to benefit
from lower prices in the larger standard gauge market. This practice subsequently spread to
metros in Bangalore, Chennai, Gurgaon, Hyderabad, Mumbai, and the planned metro in Pune.
India has in quick succession rolled out metro systems in major cities, started construction of
dedicated freight corridors, and recently announced a cooperation agreement with China to
develop a high speed network. It is a member of the International Heavy Haul Association,
and already operates double-stacked container trains. IR achieves creditable overall line
densities of 10.9 million tonne-km/route-km plus 16.6 million passenger-km/route-km in
operations that at present include freight and passenger trains sharing the same infrastructure.
Approximately 67% of freight and 50% of passenger traffic is hauled by electric traction [22].
It has positioned itself strongly in all four of the railway renaissance market spaces.
3.4. China
China’s railway financing system is based on the government taking the leading role, diver‐
sified investment, and market orientation. Joint ventures are the major vehicles for new railway
projects. By the end of 2008, RMB 300 billion had been committed from outside the Ministry
of Transport. Major financing channels include the Railway Construction Fund, contributions
from local governments and cooperative agreements between Ministry of Railways and 31
provincial governments, treasury bonds and budget from the central government, strategic
investors such as power plants, coal mines, ports, insurance groups (either public or private),
the Dedicated Construction Fund from operation revenue, restructuring railway assets to
initial public offering, issue of Railway Construction Bonds, and domestic and foreign bank
lending. Implementation rests on a clear vision, a good plan, an efficient implementation
mechanism, and a creative financing system.
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China recently opened its third heavy haul line, the 1,216-km public private partnership Shanxi
South Central Railway from Watang in Xingxian County to the port of Rizhao in Shandong
Province. It follows construction of the original 653-km Datong–Qinhuangdao coal railway
completed in 1992 and the 1,040-km Shenmu–Huanghua Railway, all with nameplate capacity
200 million tonnes per year.
China Railways commenced high speed service as recently as 2007, and today operates the
largest and most heavily used high-speed railway network in the world.
China's cities have benefited since urban rail renaissance started in 1989. Projects completed
or currently under construction include 107 metro lines in Beijing, Changchun, Changsha,
Chengdu, Chongqing, Dalian, Dongguan, Foshan, Fuzhou, Guangzhou, Guiyang, Hangzhou,
Harbin, Hefei, Kunming, Lanzhou, Nanchang, Nanjing, Nanning, Ningbo, Qingdao, Shang‐
hai, Shenyang, Shenzhen, Shijiazhuang, Suzhou, Taiyuan, Tianjin, Ürümqi, Wenzhou, Wuhan,
Wuxi, Xi'an, Xiamen, Xuzhou, and Zhengzhou; nine light rail lines in Changchun, Nanjing,
and Suzhou; six rubber- or steel-tyred automated light metro lines in Macau and Wuhan; two
monorail lines in Chongqing; and two suburban lines in Wenzhou [13]. China also operates
bus rapid transit systems. Its urban-guided transit catalogue thus includes the full range of
three steel-tyred solutions, namely, heavy metro, automated light metro, and light rail; and
three rubber-tyred solutions, namely, automated light metro, monorail, and bus rapid transit.
It is therefore able to nuance solutions for particular city requirements.
China currently sets the world pace for railway expansion and performance. It achieves a
creditable 26.9 million tonne-km/route-km plus 8.89 million passenger-km/route-km on a
network that at present includes dedicated freight lines (heavy haul) and dedicated passenger
lines (high speed), as well as extensive mixed traffic heritage infrastructure that has been
progressively upgraded. It participates in all four of the railway renaissance market spaces,
although the height of double-stacked containers is limited by overhead electrification, and
has developed means to finance huge railway expansion in support of its rapid economic
growth. It is a strong role model for driving railway renaissance through investment in
inherently competitive railway technologies.
One aspect of China's railway development elevates it above its BRIC peers, and indeed all
other railway countries of note, namely, its global railway network ambitions and the progress
that it is making in this regard. Its Silk Road Economic Belt and Maritime Silk Road initiatives
embrace countries situated on the original Silk Road through Central-, South-, Southeast- and
West Asia, the Middle East, and Europe, as well as Oceania, and North and East Africa. They
call for integration of the region into a cohesive economic area through building infrastructure,
increasing cultural exchanges, and broadening trade [23]. China's railway strategic horizon
thus reaches out from its 107,000-km standard gauge home network to surrounding and
remote regions, e.g., the entire Asia, North America, Western Europe, and Africa. The
following examples start from the north and proceed clockwise to show the magnitude of
China's ambitions to open up transcontinental and intercontinental standard gauge trade
routes.
• Connecting into broad-gauge Mongolia to support the latter's mineral exports.
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• Strengthening linkages with Russia through additional border crossings, including lines
from China's northern provinces to Russian ports Pos’et and Slavyanka on the Sea of Japan.
• Cooperating with Russia to build a 7,000 km high speed line from Beijing to Moscow.
• Reaching out to North America, together with Russia. Counter-intuitively, the great circle,
i.e., shortest, route from, say, Chinese manufacturing city Chongqing to the western United
States is not across the Pacific Ocean, but overland via the Bering Strait between the Asian-
and North American continents.
• Routing rail traffic from standard-gauge North and South Korea through China to Europe,
at present routed through Russia and Belarus.
• Connecting China's southern cities Nanning and Kunming to Vietnam, Laos, Thailand, and
Myanmar, by re-gauging from narrow gauge to standard gauge in the countries mentioned,
with ultimate vision to connect to Singapore through Malaysia.
• Connecting Xigaze railhead in Tibet over some 1,700 km along China's south-western border
to Kashi railhead in Xinjiang Autonomous Region. This will springboard links among other
to Bhutan, India, and Nepal under Mount Everest by 2020; through Pakistan to the Arabian
Sea; and through Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan to Herat in Afghanistan, soon to be the
easternmost outpost of the Eurasian standard gauge network.
• Leveraging its existing connection with Kazakhstan's broad-gauge network via two border
crossings west of Ürümqi, one to the northwest, and one to the southwest.
• Upgrading lines from the port of Piraeus in Greece through the Balkan states to Hungary,
to access Western Europe.
• Promoting new standard gauge railways in several equatorial African countries: China has
encouraged standard gauge ambitions and initiatives in Cameroon, Chad, Mali, Nigeria,
Senegal, and others. This topic is addressed in more detail in sub-subsection 4.1.3 in respect
of schemes that have already borne fruit.
To be fair, China is not having it all its own way. While its propositions may appear attractive,
smaller countries, nevertheless, seem wary of a longer term agenda. Some would like to
leverage China's overtures to their own benefit. Negotiations can take a long time. Several
disputed territories mark its south-western border, so political challenges are likely to equal
technical challenges. But ultimately, high performance rail has become the backbone of choice
for integrated, multimodal freight and passenger transport in an energy-scarce world.
Countries that cannot achieve that by their own means will likely eventually accept what is on
offer.
3.5. The Gulf Cooperation Council States
The countries of the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf, commonly called the
GCC States, are arguably the world's current railway investment hotspot. The GCC comprises
United Arab Emirates, the Kingdom of Bahrain, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the Sultanate
of Oman, Qatar, and Kuwait.
Railway Research - Selected Topics on Development, Safety and Technology16
• Strengthening linkages with Russia through additional border crossings, including lines
from China's northern provinces to Russian ports Pos’et and Slavyanka on the Sea of Japan.
• Cooperating with Russia to build a 7,000 km high speed line from Beijing to Moscow.
• Reaching out to North America, together with Russia. Counter-intuitively, the great circle,
i.e., shortest, route from, say, Chinese manufacturing city Chongqing to the western United
States is not across the Pacific Ocean, but overland via the Bering Strait between the Asian-
and North American continents.
• Routing rail traffic from standard-gauge North and South Korea through China to Europe,
at present routed through Russia and Belarus.
• Connecting China's southern cities Nanning and Kunming to Vietnam, Laos, Thailand, and
Myanmar, by re-gauging from narrow gauge to standard gauge in the countries mentioned,
with ultimate vision to connect to Singapore through Malaysia.
• Connecting Xigaze railhead in Tibet over some 1,700 km along China's south-western border
to Kashi railhead in Xinjiang Autonomous Region. This will springboard links among other
to Bhutan, India, and Nepal under Mount Everest by 2020; through Pakistan to the Arabian
Sea; and through Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan to Herat in Afghanistan, soon to be the
easternmost outpost of the Eurasian standard gauge network.
• Leveraging its existing connection with Kazakhstan's broad-gauge network via two border
crossings west of Ürümqi, one to the northwest, and one to the southwest.
• Upgrading lines from the port of Piraeus in Greece through the Balkan states to Hungary,
to access Western Europe.
• Promoting new standard gauge railways in several equatorial African countries: China has
encouraged standard gauge ambitions and initiatives in Cameroon, Chad, Mali, Nigeria,
Senegal, and others. This topic is addressed in more detail in sub-subsection 4.1.3 in respect
of schemes that have already borne fruit.
To be fair, China is not having it all its own way. While its propositions may appear attractive,
smaller countries, nevertheless, seem wary of a longer term agenda. Some would like to
leverage China's overtures to their own benefit. Negotiations can take a long time. Several
disputed territories mark its south-western border, so political challenges are likely to equal
technical challenges. But ultimately, high performance rail has become the backbone of choice
for integrated, multimodal freight and passenger transport in an energy-scarce world.
Countries that cannot achieve that by their own means will likely eventually accept what is on
offer.
3.5. The Gulf Cooperation Council States
The countries of the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf, commonly called the
GCC States, are arguably the world's current railway investment hotspot. The GCC comprises
United Arab Emirates, the Kingdom of Bahrain, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the Sultanate
of Oman, Qatar, and Kuwait.
Railway Research - Selected Topics on Development, Safety and Technology16
Saudi Arabia is a relative newcomer to railways, the first line having been built in 1951 to
indirectly connect the port of Dammam on the Gulf of Persia with the capital Riyadh. A direct
line followed in 1985. Saudi Railways Organization operates double-stack container and
passenger trains on these lines. As the spectre of peak oil approached, Saudi Arabia established
the Supreme Economic Council in 1999 to formulate and better coordinate economic devel‐
opment policies in order to accelerate institutional and industrial reform and diversify its
economy beyond petroleum. Several key railway projects followed. First is the Saudi Land‐
bridge, a 950-km, mixed traffic link from Riyadh to the port of Jeddah on the Red Sea to convey
double-stack container trains at 120 km/h and passenger trains at 220 km/h. Scheduled for
completion in 2021, the Public Investment Fund will finance it with operations contracted out.
Second is the North-South Railway, a 1,400-km heavy haul route from mineral deposits in the
north-western region to the Gulf port of Ras Az Zawr, completed in 2013. Saudi Railway
Company, whose shares may put to subscription, administered construction, while Saudi
Arabian Mining Company has a concession to operate the line. A 500-km link to Riyadh is
under construction, to enable passenger and freight services to run between the capital and
the Jordanian border. Third is the 320-km/h Haramain High Speed Rail linking Makkah,
Jeddah, and Madinah, currently under construction. Fourth is the GCC railway, a new 2,177-
km, 200-km/h double track international freight and passenger railway currently under
construction to link the six abovementioned countries and integrate them with the railways of
Saudi Arabia. It will follow the Gulf coast from Kuwait's border with Iraq to Salalah in southern
Oman, with branches to Bahrain and Qatar, linking all six states and sharing the cost in
proportion to the length of the main line in each country. The first phase was delivered in 2014
with completion expected in 2017. Fifth is Jeddah, with a joint venture of the Jeddah Munici‐
pality and the Jeddah Urban Development Company set to open three light metro lines in 2020.
Sixth is Makkah, with an elevated metro to carry Hajj pilgrims opened in 2010 and four further
regular metro lines approved in 2013. Seventh is Riyadh, with a university campus automated
light metro opened in 2012, and an automated six-line metro, for which Arriyadh Development
Authority has placed turnkey contracts for completion in 2018, and a monorail under con‐
struction to serve the financial district. Eighth is Dubai, which opened its first line in 2009, It
currently operates two metro lines plus a tram line.
Saudi Arabia and its GCC fellow members have in around one decade moved from few or no
railways to one of the world's most comprehensive systems. It includes all four of the railway
renaissance sub-modes, high speed, heavy haul, heavy intermodal, and urban rail. The GCC
example illustrates how quickly a committed authority can establish renaissance rail by
selecting industry-leading practices in each of the previously mentioned sub-modes.
3.6. Urban rail
The following paragraphs are built on previously reported research [3, 4], including all urban-
guided transit with the exception of bus rapid transit. Urban rail applications are too many to
detail, therefore this section takes a necessarily highly aggregated view of the global urban rail
and urban guided transit situation. The observations include all operations that qualify for
inclusion in the Railway Directory's City Railways section, using the ten years spanned by the
Railways in Renaissance — Review of Achievements and Reflection on Prospects
http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/61273
17
2006 and 2015 issues [13]. Table 1 below presents their pertinent statistics in a way that brings
out their significance.
During the nine years to 2015, the number of cities that have implemented urban rail or have
it under construction has increased from 120 to 487 (32.7%). Of cities with existing urban rail,
47.7% increased their network size accounting for 23.3% of growth, which together with 13.4%
growth in cities that previously had no urban rail of any description, resulted in 36.7% total
network growth in nine years. This is exceptional growth by railway standards, and it is
evident that urban railway renaissance has responded rapidly to the global megatrend
migration of people to cities. Note that while the increased network size is mainly attributable
to greenfield sites, there are a few brownfield sites where operations have been extended on
existing, upgraded, or disused infrastructure of others, for example some tram-train projects.
Decrease No change Increase New Decrease No change Increase New
2006 367 29457 36 156 175 -1589 27868 6859
2015 487 38675 119 3948
Change, % 32.7 31.3 9.8 42.5 47.7 32.7 -5.4 94.6 23.3 13.4
Observations Analysis




Table 1. Analysis of global urban rail growth over time.
Two concurrent trends underlie the net change in global urban rail network size. The first is
obviously the dominant expansive and new growth mentioned above. Notwithstanding that,
36 cities recorded an aggregate network decrease of 1,589 km. There are many reasons for this
change including the ups and downs of economic growth; shifting relative economic and
political power from country to country; population migrations; failure or inability to renew
assets; the rise of alternative transport modes; changing social preferences; inappropriate
institutional arrangements; redefined jurisdictions, usually by combining and sometimes by
separating them; rationalising pre-existing networks as agglomerations develop; extending
routes to tram-train applications on conventional networks; increasing intermodal integration
among modes; and many others. This chapter reports on global shifts that generally favour
rail, hence the foregoing phenomena are outside the present research scope and no grounded
position is offered. They could justify substantial research in their own right.
Previous research has found that although Heavy Metro remains unchallenged in the highest
capacity rail applications, rubber-tyred guided transit modes have challenged rail’s former
unquestioned status in the light-axle-load, low-speed market space [3]. One would therefore
expect Light Rail and Light Metro to be more vulnerable to competition from rubber-tyred
systems. Notwithstanding that potential weakness, their good green credentials attract smaller
cities that value inherent environmental friendliness over the expediency of simply moving
people under the weight of popular demand. Automated Guided Transit and Monorail
nevertheless seem well-positioned to drive a wedge between the heavy and light poles of urban
rail. Note, therefore, that Automated Light Metro, Automated Guided Transit, and Monorail
are already present in 26 of the world's 487 cities with urban guided transit solutions.
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4. Key results
4.1. Settling in of the renaissance
4.1.1. Selected country outcomes
The following comments on outcomes are confined to those countries that achieved significant
positive repositioning relative to their baselines in the Insecure, Fortuitous, Enlightened,
Progressive, and Assertive clusters published in 2008 [2], the countries being mentioned in the
same order as in that publication. This chapter, therefore, records a parting of ways between
countries that have embraced railway renaissance and those that have not yet. The strong entry
of new countries that have recently built their first railways, such as most of the Gulf Coop‐
eration Council states, has demonstrated the major impact that renaissance rail can make on
the transport dispensation in a country or region. It also does not necessarily mean the end of
the track for countries in the Insecure cluster. As mentioned under China in section 3.5, its
expanding influence is also set to change the fortunes of several countries in that cluster.
4.1.2. The fortuitous cluster
Recall that that this cluster subsumed standard or broad gauge state railways, whose redeem‐
ing quality was an axle load sufficiently high to support a modicum of competitiveness [2]. In
this cluster, Israel has undertaken substantial urban rail expansion and rolling stock procure‐
ment, including opening its new Jerusalem Light Rail Transit in 2011. Lithuania and Latvia,
together with Estonia that is a member of the Enlightened and Progressive super cluster, are
participating in Rail Baltica, a European Union (EU) sponsored project to integrate them into
the European Union [24]. Landlocked Mongolia has recently started exploiting its mineral
resources, connecting with consumer markets through China and Russia by means of heavy
haul railways. Turkmenistan, together with Iran and Kazakhstan, has inaugurated a line
linking all three countries. Azerbaijan and Georgia have joined forces with Turkey to complete
missing links in a railway from Kars in Turkey to Baku on the Caspian Sea in Azerbaijan, to
facilitate networkability [25]. Azerbaijan is also pursuing a north-south railway to leverage its
position between Russia and Iran. Saudi Arabia is investing heavily in the full range of
renaissance sub-modes, namely heavy haul, high speed, double stacking, and several variants
of urban rail. Panama re-gauged its broad gauge Pacific Ocean–Gulf of Mexico line to standard
gauge and now operates double-stack container trains under a 30-year concession. It also
opened Panama City Metro in 2014. These countries are leveraging variables such as Relative
Maximum Axle Load, Relative Maximum Speed, Heavy Haul Presence, High-speed Intercity Pres‐
ence, Heavy Intermodal Presence, Networkability, Climate-change Position, Market Initiative,
Infrastructure and Rolling Stock Investment Capacity to rise from the Fortuitous cluster.
4.1.3. The insecure cluster
This cluster subsumes predominantly narrow gauge railways that generally rated low on all
variables [2]. The World Bank considers that Africa's many concessions perform poorly [26],
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not surprisingly because they are inherently uncompetitive. Insecure railways that aspire to
elevate themselves therefore initiate interventions predictable from the factors Positioning
Passenger Rail, Exploiting Opportunities, Positioning Freight Rail, Exploring Horizons, Pursuing
Competition, Aligning Assets, Greening the Image and Constraining Downside identified in [2].
For example, Morocco is implementing a high speed line from Casablanca to Rabat, currently
suspended due to expropriation issues. Iran has expanded its network to exploit its valuable
geographic location to provide through routes to neighbouring countries, north-south between
its Persian Gulf ports and Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan, as well as a planned route to Russia
through Azerbaijan, and in the east between Herat in Afghanistan, and the rest of the Eurasian
standard gauge network in the west. Jordan is set to replace its isolated narrow gauge railway
with a standard gauge one that can network with the standard gauge railways of the Middle
East. Ethiopia-Djibouti's and Kenya's new standard gauge railways are under construction,
the latter as an element of a larger agreement that includes the other East African Community
states Burundi, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda with the prospect of South Sudan also linking
up. Colombia has entered the bulk mineral business and is now the fifth largest coal exporter
in the world [27]. Guinea is constructing a high-capacity standard gauge heavy haul railway
to export iron ore from its Simandou deposit. Indonesia is seeking private investors to build
standard gauge heavy haul coal export railways in Kalimantan and Sumatra. Southeast Asia
has standard gauge initiatives in Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, and Thailand's Legislative
Assembly recently decided to proceed with a standard gauge railway from the Laotian border
to the port of Rayong on the Gulf of Thailand, with a branch to Bangkok. A matching link
through Laos to China is under negotiation. Peru has commenced operation on the entire Lima
Metro Line 1, and has commenced construction on Line 2. Mozambique is opening up its
minerals exporting potential, and has taken the first steps to upgrade some of its lines to convey
export coal. Longest of these is the 910-km Nacala Logistics Corridor from mines at Moatize,
a joint venture between Brazilian mining and logistics entity Vale and national rail and port
operator CFM [28]. The Malaysian government has approved establishment of a state-backed
project delivery company to manage Malaysia’s share in the Kuala Lumpur–Singapore high
speed project.
These railways are leveraging variables such as Relative Maximum Axle Load, Relative Maximum
Speed, Heavy Haul Presence, High-speed Intercity Presence, Attitude to Competition, Network
Coverage, Market Initiative, Networkability, Infrastructure-operations Separation, Infrastructure- and
Rolling Stock Ownership Locus, and Climate-change Position to lift themselves out of their inherent
uncompetitiveness and hence to enjoy railway renaissance. The outlook for railways that
remain in the Insecure cluster is bleak. Their significance is dwindling, e.g., narrow gauge
freight tonne-km are down to less than 3% of the global total, while long-distance passenger
services are generally moribund and, due to small market size, rolling stock has become more
expensive than for standard gauge while its performance is inherently inferior.
4.1.4. The enlightened and progressive super cluster
All but five members of the Enlightened and Progressive clusters were either longstanding
member states of the EU, joined during the 2002–2007 duration of data acquisition, or acceded
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Metro Line 1, and has commenced construction on Line 2. Mozambique is opening up its
minerals exporting potential, and has taken the first steps to upgrade some of its lines to convey
export coal. Longest of these is the 910-km Nacala Logistics Corridor from mines at Moatize,
a joint venture between Brazilian mining and logistics entity Vale and national rail and port
operator CFM [28]. The Malaysian government has approved establishment of a state-backed
project delivery company to manage Malaysia’s share in the Kuala Lumpur–Singapore high
speed project.
These railways are leveraging variables such as Relative Maximum Axle Load, Relative Maximum
Speed, Heavy Haul Presence, High-speed Intercity Presence, Attitude to Competition, Network
Coverage, Market Initiative, Networkability, Infrastructure-operations Separation, Infrastructure- and
Rolling Stock Ownership Locus, and Climate-change Position to lift themselves out of their inherent
uncompetitiveness and hence to enjoy railway renaissance. The outlook for railways that
remain in the Insecure cluster is bleak. Their significance is dwindling, e.g., narrow gauge
freight tonne-km are down to less than 3% of the global total, while long-distance passenger
services are generally moribund and, due to small market size, rolling stock has become more
expensive than for standard gauge while its performance is inherently inferior.
4.1.4. The enlightened and progressive super cluster
All but five members of the Enlightened and Progressive clusters were either longstanding
member states of the EU, joined during the 2002–2007 duration of data acquisition, or acceded
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after 2007, the last year included in the database. Norway, as member of the European Free
Trade Association, is aligned in all pertinent respects with EU railways. Two more, Serbia and
Turkey, are candidate countries. These clusters were neighbours in the icicle plot from which
they were derived, and under the European Union's Regional Policy as well as its-railway
specific directives, they can for the purpose of the present analysis be considered to have
melded into one. The cluster includes only two non-European countries, Japan and the
Republic of Korea, but despite geographic separation, their railways happen to be statistically
aligned with those of the EU.
Developments in this super cluster have leveraged rail's inherent competitiveness in the high
speed and urban rail market spaces. Its major challenge is that freight rail development has
not followed economic development. The comparatively small size of Japan's linked islands
opposes the heavy and/or long hauls that railways do well, and rail freight has therefore
consistently declined over the last nine years [13]. Rail freight has similarly stagnated since
railway reform in 2005 in South Korea [29], also a small country whose railways are currently
politically constrained from networking with neighbours. However, while such constraints
are absent in the EU, its rail freight performance is nevertheless cause for concern [30]. While
railways in the EU rated highly on most variables, there is no evidence of them leveraging
variables such as Relative Maximum Axle Load, Heavy Haul Presence and Heavy Intermodal
Presence, which are fundamental to competitive and sustainable freight rail positioning. Note,
however, that the recently completed EU-sponsored 1,500-m freight train Marathon project
[31] has explored the value of Distributed Power Presence to support operation of long freight
trains. This effort parallels that of other railways that are constrained by low axle load while
high speed is not critical for business success. The only remaining genetic technology that can
come to the rescue is coupling, which has led to commercial operation of trains conveying
more than 300 wagons on Brazilian and South African narrow gauge heavy haul lines.
4.1.5. The assertive cluster
In line with expectations, members of this cluster have increased their commanding lead in
several respects. Mexico follows North American practices and standards, so it is already
strongly positioned in freight rail. In pursuing another of the railway renaissance growth
curves, it awarded a contract for a 210-km high speed line from Mexico City to Querétaro in
2014, but subsequently cancelled the deal to maintain probity. It reopened bidding in January
2015, expecting to announce the preferred bidder in July 2015 [32]. Switzerland is exploiting
its strategic location, having opened the 35-km Lötschberg Base Tunnel in 2007, and expecting
to open the 57-km Gotthard Base Tunnel in 2016. Their objective is to increase total transport
capacity across the Alps especially for transit freight between Germany and Italy, to shift
freight from road to rail to reduce fatal accidents and environmental damage by ever-increas‐
ing numbers of trucks passing through Switzerland, and to cut passenger train journey times
[33, 34]. Australia has taken the lead in heavy haul by increasing axle load on an iron ore export
line in its Pilbara region to 40 tonnes, currently the world's highest. Canadian National, which
despite its name is a private company, has from its traditional east–west Canadian transcon‐
tinental network extended its strategic horizon to the Gulf of Mexico through acquisition of
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US north–south railroads. The United States has extended its across-the-board lead by
commencing construction of the California High Speed Rail project that is set to link San
Francisco with Los Angeles, with later extensions to Sacramento and San Diego.
Brazil, India, China, and Russia are making extraordinary progress in all or most of the four
sub-modes of the railway renaissance, and have therefore been given special treatment in
sections 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, and 3.4 respectively. No more will be said here. South Africa's Passenger
Rail Agency in 2014 awarded the world's largest current order for electric multiple units,
namely 3,600 cars. Its Transnet Freight Rail State-owned company also awarded orders for
more than 1,000 locomotives in that year. However, noting that high speed and heavy
intermodal (double-stacked containers) are not possible on narrow gauge, and that heavy haul
needs standard gauge to maximise its performance, it will be interesting to follow its long-
term sustainability.
These countries are generally leveraging variables such as Relative Maximum Speed, High-speed
Intercity Presence, Attitude to Competition, Network Coverage, Passenger Traffic Volume, Employ‐
ment Created, Broad Gauge, Networkability, Strategic Horizon, Rolling Stock Ownership Locus, and
Infrastructure and Rolling Stock Investment Capacity to round out their already strong Assertive
positioning.
4.2. Institutional learning
4.2.1. Interventions to achieve renaissance
Two railway revitalisation intervention mainstreams are evident in section 4.1, competition-
led and investment-led. Although introducing competition to revitalise railways seems to
enjoy top-of-mind awareness among many stakeholders, it is not appropriate in all settings.
In developed countries, where standard or broad gauge track and adequate axle load, speed
and train length parameters may already have made existing railways inherently competitive,
introducing competition among service delivery functions may be desirable, and may indeed
be the only available revitalisation lever. Thus, countries in the Enlightened and Progressive
Railways super cluster have generally embraced competition to leverage maximum good from
their investments in expensive long-lived railway assets.
However, competition alone is not the only remedy. For example, railways that operate, or
contemplate operating, freight and passenger trains on the same network cannot concurrently
optimise the train–infrastructure interface for both types. Thus, light-axle-load high-speed
passenger trains require wide curves but tolerate steep gradients, while heavy-axle-load long
freight trains require easy gradients, but tolerate tight curves. Optimising the interface for one
train type unavoidably sub-optimises it for the other. Freight rail in the Enlightened and
Progressive super-cluster (European Union plus Japan and the Republic of Korea) is a case in
point. Its train–infrastructure interface is optimised for the dominant passenger traffic, thereby
precluding concurrent optimisation for freight trains. Consequently, the latter are inherently
uncompetitive and have, unsurprisingly, not responded positively to competition-led inter‐
vention, and currently face a bleak future.
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Similarly, where inherent competitiveness is inadequate and new investment is required to
make it good, it is futile to introduce competition and/or private sector participation only.
Typically by way of operating concessions, such interventions risk reluctance to invest and
even asset stripping as concessionaires find they need to subsist on stagnant or declining
income. To illustrate, in Sub-Saharan Africa the World Bank found that few passenger train
services cover above-rail operating costs, that few concessions generate significant profits for
their operators and certainly not enough to fund long-term track renewals; and that govern‐
ment oversight of railway concessionaires is inconsistent with good business practices, which
all result in expectations not being met [35]. Competition should, therefore, be introduced only
in settings where inherent railway competitiveness is sufficient to sustain all operations that
are present—freight and passenger.
4.2.2. Ownership and funding
Countries and railways that have participated in railway renaissance have of necessity
invested in one or more of the Heavy Haul, High-speed Intercity, Double Stacking, and
contemporary Urban Rail market spaces, to transition from the terminal decline phase of their
first growth curve to new renaissance growth curves. Except for the privately-owned railways
in the United States and Canada, as well as heavy haul railways around the world that mining
houses have funded integrally with their mining investments, governments in many countries
have traditionally led requisite railway investments. However, as contending claims on their
funds have constrained the quantum available for railways, public and private sectors have
increasingly come to share responsibility for railway investment, in such a way that each sector
bears the risk for investments to achieve its objectives, developmental for the public sector,
and productive for the private sector.
Opportunities for private sector participation in railways have stimulated a plethora of
solutions. Outsourcing of routine maintenance work has been a mutually acceptable starting
point that allows the two sectors to size one another up without deep commitment. However,
the latter is required to establish the mutual respect and deeper trust that is the foundation of
longer-term relationships.
It has been customary for private participation to fund moveable assets, which may be
redeployed elsewhere if the project runs into difficulties. Rolling stock has traditionally filled
that role. There are many opportunities, but they tend to start with special-purpose freight
wagons that have limited redeployment opportunities. They are nevertheless a valuable way
to cement a relationship, because they limit a customer's transport options, and signify strong
commitment to rail with a high exit barrier. In recent years, it has become common to purchase
multiple unit passenger stock with long term 30–35-year life cycle maintenance contracts that
require a much deeper level of mutual understanding and commitment. Private participation
in infrastructure has taken a long time because the exit barriers can be very high. That part of
funding has, therefore, traditionally been left with the authority initiating the project. A tunnel
in the ground has limited alternative deployment opportunities if a project runs into difficul‐
ties. Nevertheless, infrastructure is also slowly entering the private sector arena. Typically the
authority needs to accept the demand risk for the asset, which can be done through it agreeing
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to purchase all the capacity over the life of the agreement, and then selling it to users. This has
become a model for funding infrastructure, where a long route may be divided into portions
funded by different agreements, as in the case of India's dedicated freight corridors. Initially,
there was resistance to foreign participation, but there again India has broken ground on
foreign direct investment, also on a dedicated freight corridor. In reality, long-term relation‐
ships bring stability by binding participants. Concessioning is frequently used for such
schemes, where a concessioning authority owns an opportunity and needs market initiative
to develop it.
Such interventions have stimulated a range of regulation models that reflect the developmental
and socio-economic objectives of particular countries, as well as the quantum and diversity of
funding sources that they can assemble. In the first instance, a railway economic regulatory
function is required, either implicitly by way of coherent political will during the early stages
of reform, or later explicitly by way of a statutory regulator, to ensure that railways are enabled
and encouraged to contribute appropriately and fairly to the broad economic and social
objectives of a country in a competitive setting. Thereafter, safety regulation also needs to be
introduced in settings where multiple entities come to operate trains to ensure the establish‐
ment and maintenance of a safe operating environment.
4.2.3. Market structure
Railway systems may offer single or multiple routes between origin and destination. Multiple
routes originated in the early days of railways, for example the railways of Britain prior to
railway nationalisation and establishment of British Rail in 1948, the railways of the North
American Free Trade Agreement that preserve alternative routings, and parallel railways from
an ore body to the coast, as in the Australian Pilbara. Railway offerings can be competitive or
monopolistic. This yields four quadrants. Notwithstanding the structure of an industry, many
governments consider it desirable to preserve competition in all industries, even those that are
essentially vertically integrated. Thus they tend to require regulated access by third parties, to
ensure the presence of competitive operators.
Throughout the world, railway renaissance has been achieved only by investment in assets
that have increased rail’s inherent competiveness against other transport modes. This is true
for railways competing against other transport modes in domestic markets, or supporting
competition against other countries in export markets, as well as for railways cooperating in
intermodal alliances, particularly with road carriers. Appreciate that for freight, heavy
intermodal goes beyond simply transferring a load unit (container or swap body) from one
mode to another, such as between road and rail and vice-versa. When rail is involved, the axle
load of container wagons needs to be increased to the heavy haul domain, by double stacking
containers, to exploit the competitive strength of rail's heavy-axle-load genetic technology,
supporting.
Regarding competition between rail and road, appreciate that logistics service providers and
passengers incline naturally toward the more aggressive competitor, and will choose road until
rail comes up with a superior offer, either alone or in cooperation with road carriers. Inherent
competitiveness is thus an important element of railway positioning because as long as
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logistics service providers and passengers have a choice, rail is competing with road, either
over the entire distance where it can offer such a service, or for the long-haul portion where
customers want a door to door service and rail needs to complement its offer with feeder and/
or distribution service by another mode.
4.2.4. Networking and expanding strategic horizons
Consolidation of rail's strengths in the four renaissance market spaces foretells even greater
rail significance in future national, international, continental, and intercontinental transport.
The authors' earlier research identified networkability as a factor in positioning railways for
competitiveness and sustainability [1], and several large-scale international initiatives have
confirmed that finding. In transposing Metcalfe's Law, that network value increases as the
square of the number of nodes [36], to the railway industry, the UN-led Trans-Asian Railway,
mooted pre-renaissance in 1960, and the EU-led multilateral development of the Transport
Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Asia in 1998 are examples. On the smaller-scale are Russian
Railways' extensions eastward to North Korea (implemented) and westward to Vienna
(planned), and the Bosphorus rail tunnel completed in 2009, Asia-Europe's first standard gauge
connection. However, they progressed slowly until recently, primarily due to track gauge
incompatibilities. Now Chinese rail ambitions have morphed earlier plans by others into wider
strategic horizons, including freight services into Europe, a 7,000-km Beijing-Moscow high-
speed line, and connection to North America under the Bering Strait. China's bold railway
diplomacy is turning challenge into opportunity, with Premier Li promoting Chinese railway
technologies around the world as advanced, secure, reliable, and cost-competitive [37]. The
Jamestown Foundation [38] recommended the world should pay attention to a telling sign of
things to come on global scale.
Great circle overland rail routes can be shorter and faster than maritime passages. For context,
by weighting their latitude and longitude coordinates by their GDP, and calculating the
weighted average, the author found the economic centre of Earth's top 100 cities by GDP to be
in western Iran. All Europe, most of Asia, and much of Africa, lie within some 7,000–8,000 km
radius thereof, less than the Trans-Siberian railway's 9,288 km benchmark. Note that this
exercise excluded Australia, because it is more than 1,200 km from the nearest land (the island
Java) that could conceivably link into a global railway network.
It seems axiomatic that political differences should be separated from traffic flows. Even the
European Union has experienced push-back since publishing its first Council Directive on
development of the Community's railways in 1991. Similar challenges have been experienced
in consigning containers by rail from China through Kazakhstan, Russia, and Belarus into the
European Union. Although they seem eventually all to be resolved, the time it takes allows
other modes to entrench themselves at the expense of the rail mode.
4.3. Emergence of the new normal
Renaissance has passed. The first Japanese Series 0 Shinkansen train that started it all more
than fifty years ago is already a display piece in the National Railway Museum in York,
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England. Railways have settled into a new dispensation. From a position of strength, their
abilities stretch from heavy-duty urban transport across continents to distant strategic
horizons.
The 14th–17th century Renaissance, or rebirth, provides a fitting archetype of the 1964–1989
quarter-century railway renaissance. Looking back to 1989, it is evident that the following
quarter century to 2014 has been a period of settling railways into their four inherently
competitive sub-modes high-speed intercity, heavy haul, heavy intermodal, and contempo‐
rary urban rail. The Enlightenment, the period that followed the Renaissance and exploited
the intellectual freedom that it had let loose, has inspired this section.
The know-how of the railway renaissance has been captured in a myriad of publications
and widely dispersed railway industry institutional knowledge. Now freely available, it is
being applied to position railways for an energy-scarce future. Global consensus seems to
be  building  around  the  year  2050  as  the  date  by  which  the  shift  from  a  fossil-fuelled
economy  to  a  renewables-powered  economy  should  be  largely  in  place.  The  timing
recognises the need to wear out the present fleet of transport vehicles—planes, ships, and
trains—and to adapt, construct, or renew infrastructure and rolling stock. The exact year
is not important. What is important is the form that transport systems will take at that time.
The European Commission's [10] Transport White Paper, for example, provides valuable
perspectives on that time by envisioning:
• An efficient core network for multimodal intercity travel and transport with greater use of
buses and coaches, rail and air transport for passengers and, for freight, multimodal
solutions relying on waterborne and rail modes for long-hauls.
• New transport patterns emerging, according to which larger volumes of freight and greater
numbers of travellers are carried jointly to their destination by the most efficient (combina‐
tion of) modes.
• A global level playing field for long-distance travel and intercontinental freight in which
(high speed) rail should absorb much medium distance traffic.
• Clean urban transport and commuting where a higher share of travel is by collective
transport, and the interface between long distance and last-mile freight transport is organ‐
ised more efficiently.
The realisation of integrated, optimised, multi-nodal networks featuring urban rail within
densely populated, commercialised, and industrialised areas, and regional rail within larger
agglomerations and corridors, is already visible in several countries. Consider the example of
Verkehrsverbund Rhein-Ruhr in Germany, serving a conurbation of eight million inhabitants
in a 7,300 km2 area. Formerly isolated light rail networks of individual local authorities have
been connected to one another, going so far as to regauge some from metre gauge to standard
gauge to promote networkability. This has in turn made acquisition of new 160 km/h regional
trains sensible, to reduce journey times over longer distances. At national and international
scale, long distance, high-speed passenger and heavy freight trains are common in Europe and
North America, respectively. Dedicated freight and passenger corridors, where traffic volume
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is sufficient to separate freight and passenger trains, have been realised in China and India.
China's One Belt, One Road framework takes rail-based corridor development to an unprece‐
dented level. So the building blocks of the Railway Enlightenment or New Normal exist: What
should now follow is expansion of application to countries that are earnest about road-to-rail
shift to reduce congestion and the dependence on fossil fuels and the accompanying pollutant
emissions.
4.4. Further research
Despite the difficulty of obtaining requisite data, the authors, nevertheless, continue seeking
substitute sources that could support multivariate statistical analysis of post renaissance
railway positioning. Substantial movement within the clusters is evident, so it is expected that
changes in the composition of the variables used, and of course a different time period, could
possibly identify new, more refined factors and clusters. Having established the benefits of
achieving renaissance, it would now be useful to understand how to further optimise the role
of railways in societies that are progressing well in their transition to an energy-scarce future.
5. Conclusions
For convenience, the research question repeated from section 2.1 is: Does a new post-renaissance
normal now prevail, and as a corollary, does there seem to be any viable alternative?
Rail is to be observed doing the transport heavy lifting in countries that have embraced railway
renaissance, as it should do by virtue of strong positioning in its inherently competitive market
spaces and its comparative energy efficiency. Transcontinental and intercontinental hauls at
higher speed and lower energy consumption than waterborne transport are emerging.
Regional rail is expanding around the world, frequently with double-deck trains. High speed
finds favour as an effective economic and social development intervention. Urban rail is
standardising on standard gauge, even in non-standard gauge countries such as Brazil and
India, to economically deliver high capacity in burgeoning cities. Urban guided transit scales
capacity offerings from rubber-tyred light solutions for small cities to heavyweight metro
solutions for densely populated cities. No solution other than heavy haul comes to mind to
move large tonnages of bulk minerals over long distances. Double-stack container trains are
able to wrest high-value, low-density goods from road hauliers. Overall, railway renaissance
has aligned customers and suppliers around what works and what does not work in a global
market, enabling suppliers to produce widely acceptable products and solutions at competitive
prices.
It is now evident that the answer to the research question is that countries that have embraced
railway renaissance have been able to reposition their railways to play a substantial role in
their economies and societies. In the sense that the Enlightenment exploited the intellectual
freedom that it had let loose, yes, that is happening today in the post railway renaissance
period. In present colloquial language, the Enlightenment would more likely be called the New
Normal. And that is just what has happened over the five decades since 1964. It is once again
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business as usual, the material difference being that the rail mode is a now a formidable
contender in the High Speed, Heavy Haul, Heavy Intermodal and Urban Rail market spaces.
The authors therefore argue that the hypothesis has not been disproved.
Regarding the corollary to the research question, there is no evidence of railways emerging
from the Fortuitous an Insecure clusters other than by following one or more of the renaissance
growth curves through appropriate investment.
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business as usual, the material difference being that the rail mode is a now a formidable
contender in the High Speed, Heavy Haul, Heavy Intermodal and Urban Rail market spaces.
The authors therefore argue that the hypothesis has not been disproved.
Regarding the corollary to the research question, there is no evidence of railways emerging
from the Fortuitous an Insecure clusters other than by following one or more of the renaissance
growth curves through appropriate investment.
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Abstract
This chapter approaches the concerns over safety and security of modern mainline
and light railways from a systems perspective. It addresses the two key concerns from
the view point of systemic emergence arising from the interaction between all the
principal constituents of the railway system, namely infrastructure, rolling stock, en‐
ergy and human element comprising workers, passengers and the neighbours of the
railways.
It presents a system level perspective on the requirements of the railways that impact
on all design, development, operations, maintenance and upgrades. It offers a classifi‐
cation system for the requirements that includes safety and security concerns amongst
in excess of twenty other requirement categories. The chapter subsequently covers a
whole railway safety study carried out in the United Kingdom that is the only exam‐
ple of such analysis globally and will give an overview of the findings of this holistic
safety study that may provide a reference for all international mainline railways.
Finally, the chapter reviews the trends in railway safety and security, and the impact
of new control and command technologies on the safety performance of railways in‐
cluding a view of the emerging issues.
Keywords: Railway safety, Railway security, Railway system, Requirements, Emergence
1. Introduction
Modern railways have moved a long way from the slow, noisy, polluting and poor safety
record of their earlier ancestors and offer speed, comfort, convenience and enhanced safety
approaching those of air travel these days. This is largely driven by incorporation of many
modern innovations into the infrastructure, rolling stock and operations comprising advanced
computing on-board and track side, high-speed communications, energy efficient traction
© 2015 The Author(s). Licensee InTech. This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution,
and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
systems and new track materials. These evolutionary changes have rendered railways a highly
attractive mode of transportation in today’s world.
2. A Life-cycle Perspective
The systematic safety assurance of a product, system or process (PSP) requires the considera‐
tion of key activities at each phase of the development and deployment. This is referred to as
the life-cycle perspective and constitutes the backbone of the most standards and codes of
practice.
The generic PSP safety life-cycle comprises 12 phases as follows:
1. Concept Definition
2. Detailed Definition and Operational Context
3. Risk Analysis and Evaluation
4. Requirements (including Safety Requirements) Specification
5. Architecture and Apportionment





11. Operation, Maintenance and Performance Monitoring
12. Decommissioning.
The life-cycle concept constitutes the backbone of the systems engineering practice and the
most system safety processes, standards and codes of practice. It exists in a variety of forms
and detailed stages depending on the source. One old reference from railway safety standards
[1,2] depicts this as a 12–14 phase process by separating many of the later stages such as
monitoring and modification into distinct phases as depicted in Figure 1.
3. System Level Requirements and Classifications
The starting point of a comprehensive understanding of a desired or existing system is the so-
called system level perspective. Once a level of interest in the hierarchy is stated, then the clear
description of the system is the principal starting step.
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3.1. System Level Perspective
The question of perspective and level is quite fundamental to understanding the system, its
constituents, the topology, interfaces and dynamic behaviour. The so-called ‘top-level’ system
perspective is a vision and representation that includes four classes of constituents, namely
 








































































































































































































































































































Figure 1. System Safety Life-cycle According to CENELEC Standards
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a. People comprising users, operators, suppliers and the public (the latter category is
relevant to the safety and security issues) that is sometimes referred to as stakeholders,
b. Control and automation system that performs functions based on embedded logic and
algorithms in machines of mechanical, electro-mechanical or electronic nature,
c. The infrastructure that supports the functioning of the system. This includes supporting
systems and the host environment that surrounds the system including the energy supply,
major interfaces with neighbouring or supporting systems/sub-systems, etc.,
d. Processes and rules that govern the interactions between people, automation and the
infrastructure. These are a broad range of operational, legal, commercial and emergency
response conventions that create a common understanding for all system stakeholders.
The socio-economic setting within which a system is realized and operated can also be
considered as a part of the environmental rules and constraints that influence the functions
and behaviours of the systems.
A general view of the broad system composition is depicted in Figure 2 as the so-called top-
level system perspective.
Figure 2. Top-level Railway System Constituents Perspective
The system of interest exists within such a setting and delivers a utility function or service as
part of a larger natural or socio-economic system. However, the systematic study and analysis
of the most systems requires the forms of conceptualisation, representation and formalisation
that provides a backdrop for the study and understanding of the system properties.
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Most system studies start with a ‘rich-picture’ representation that places the system in its host
environment and where possible, includes many of the four classes of information detailed
above. One such illustration is given in Figure 3 for the safety study of a school within the
proximity of a railway environment.
 
Figure 3. Rich-picture Representation of a Top-level System Perspective 
 
The rich-picture representation and associated often pictorial forms of top-level system 
representation are largely employed in requirements capture and safety studies at the 
early phases of the life cycle. 
3.2  System Level Requirements 
In the life-cycle perspective, especially the one depicted in Figure 1 above, the specification 
of requirements including the safety requirements commence in phase 4 of the system life 
cycle. This in practice is unreal and untrue. Most system requirements and indeed some 
high-level safety requirements are known at the start of the life cycle. These are broadly 
derived from a number of sources comprising: 
1. Past experience of similar or reference systems, 
2. Customer and stakeholder expectations, 
3. Contractual documents, 
4. Operational principles known in the domain and derived or represented in the 
concept of operation (ConOps), 
5. Regulations, standards, rules and codes of practice. 
 
It is worth noting therefore that the system performance requirements are not strictly the 
matter for a specific time or phase in the life cycle and can predate the system. It is also an 
evolutionary and iterative process that gains more details the further development moves 
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It is worth noting therefore that the system performance requirements are not strictly the
matter for a specific time or phase in the life cycle and can predate the system. It is also an
evolutionary and iterative process that gains more details the further development moves
down the life-cycle phases. The derivation of system level requirements (SLR) is depicted in
Figure 4.
Figure 4. Derivation of System Level Requirements
The feedback loop from later phases of the life cycle such as the system integration phases back
to the SLR is quite normal and in the same sense that system safety properties evolve in terms
of understanding and detail, requirements, especially at system level may emerge much later
than desired. This is a natural consequence of complexity of requirements, expected functions
and behaviours as well as the evolving understanding or operational expectations of the client
that may impose additional expectations on the system after the early phases of the life cycle.
3.2.1. Classification of SLR
Given the diversity of stakeholders and forms of requirements, it is constructive to classify a
large list of requirements into distinct and verifiable classes. These classes are often chosen
from performance point of view of stakeholder groupings to make reference and satisfaction
arguments simpler and more efficient. The typical classes for such groupings of requirements
within a railway context constitute a broad range as depicted in Table 1:
Item Requirement Class Scope and Observations
Technical/functional
Throughput, speed, headway, energy usage, capacity, configurability,
size, weight, features, gauge, ...
Commercial/economic Costs, finance, social benefit, return on investment,...
Environmental Temperature, humidity, vibration, shock, water ingress, rapid cycles, ....
Integrity Reliability, availability, maintainability and associated metrics
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Item Requirement Class Scope and Observations
Safety
The exposure of people especially clients, operators, service provider and
the public to the harmful effects, system failures and accidents, expected
level of safety, norms, ...
Security
Immunity of the system to malicious intent in physical and cyber spaces
including surveillance, espionage, attacks, contamination by CBRN,...
Quality
Relating to system’s materials, construction, assembly, installation,
ambience, feel, appearance, comfort, ...
Sustainability
Energy optimization, use of renewables, impact on emissions to the
environment, use of rare materials, waste disposal, ...
Service
Ease of use, alighting & egress, ride quality, HVAC, lighting levels,
seating, standing support, passenger density, ...
Operational
Operational modes, operational principles & rules that have to be
observed, trains per hour, door operations, dispatching and station
management, degraded operations, emergencies & evacuation, ...
Usability
Accessibility issues for the elderly and disabled, lifts, support staff, ramps,
steps, hand rails, ...
Social
Scope of service, pricing, user affordability considerations, potential for
suicides, ...
Regulatory
The rules, regulations, targets and standards applicable to the design,
development, installation, testing, commissioning and full passenger
service, ...
Temporal
The timing and speed of execution of the project, delivery in staged
phases, operational constraints, dwell times, service periods, ...
Contractual/legal
The obligations of the supply chain in delivering the requirements both
legal as well as contractual, penalties and loss limitation, staged
payments, operation and maintenance considerations, force majeure
conditions, ...
Performance monitoring
Proactive and reactive monitoring of system performance based on
credible systemic predictors/indicators, identification of critical system
states, avoidance of down times and accidents through intelligent
supervisory systems, ...
Human resource
The numbers, types and essential knowledge, experience and seniority of
the human resources required to operate, monitor and maintain/upgrade
the system including resources from the supply chain and temporary
staff, organisational structure, reporting, health and safety issues, control
and command, necessary licensing, ...
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Item Requirement Class Scope and Observations
Training and competencies
The initial training for the different classes of operators, maintainers,
support and auxiliary staff to bring them to the minimum level of
competence for operational readiness and continued maintenance of the
knowledge in the event of system change and upgrades, ...
Business continuity
Full consideration of maintaining a service level in the event of natural or
manmade disasters and major disruptions, redundancy and operational
contingencies in such circumstances, ...
Operational readiness
Consideration of a minimal configuration of the system, supporting sub-
systems, human resources, infrastructure, timing, time tabling and
response arrangements that render a new system or one recovering from
failure or degradation ready for full service operations, ...
Expected life and life-extension
The client’s expectation of the utility and continued functionality of the
system in terms of normal operational life, obsolescence, necessary
upgrades and maintenance activities and decision criteria for
decommissioning and disposal of the system including safety and
sustainability considerations, ...
Special interest
Requests, needs and expectations of various social and formal groups
who will be affected by the operation of the system including proximity,
noise and vibration levels, EMC, disturbance, working hours,
contingencies in the event of major accidents and catastrophes, ...
Table 1. Classification of System Level Requirements for a Railway Context
Any PSP may have an impact or specifically fit within one or more of the above classes. In this
spirit and contrary to the immediate focus on a technical system, the classifications depicted
in Table 1 should be used as a check-list to capture potential impact of any PSP on wider classes
of requirements than mere technical and safety dimensions.
4. System Level Safety and Security Requirements
Safety is a system level emergent property and can best be understood and assured through
a systems and high-level perspective. The highest level of perspective for the railways the so-
called ‘top-level’ is the entire railway as a system comprising the constituents detailed in
Section 3.1. Understanding of the total railway system safety performance requires a system‐
atic study of the system level interactions between the system constituents and people exposed
to the machinery, infrastructure and operations of the railway system. The CENELEC Tech‐
nical Report TR50451 [3] developed to support EN50129 developed in 1998 details a perspec‐
tive on the whole railway safety in which three key stakeholders collaborate to understand,
analyse and communicate the principal requirements. The principal active stakeholders are
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called ‘top-level’ is the entire railway as a system comprising the constituents detailed in
Section 3.1. Understanding of the total railway system safety performance requires a system‐
atic study of the system level interactions between the system constituents and people exposed
to the machinery, infrastructure and operations of the railway system. The CENELEC Tech‐
nical Report TR50451 [3] developed to support EN50129 developed in 1998 details a perspec‐
tive on the whole railway safety in which three key stakeholders collaborate to understand,
analyse and communicate the principal requirements. The principal active stakeholders are
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the infrastructure manager (IM) and the railway undertakings (RU) who operate the services.
The third key stakeholder involved is the safety regulator, often a government appointed
entity. The proposed perspective is for the principal stakeholders who understand the
operational railway, that is the RU and IM, to conduct safety analysis, identify system level
hazards, conduct risk analysis and determine the tolerability level for the key system level
hazards that they manage. This is referred to as the determination of the tolerable hazard rate
(THR). The concept is depicted from CENELECTR50451 in Figure 5.
Figure 5. Collaborative Approach to Railway System Safety, Stakeholders and Responsibilities
The tolerable rate for a hazard (THRH) and the derivation of safety integrity level (SIL) are
presented in Figure 5 in the relative order and ownership.
The manufacturers, service providers and supply chain are expected to employ the published
THRs to determine what hazards relate to their services/products and determine their share
of the hazards affected and SIL applicable to their PSP/service. This is principally a collabora‐
tive approach to the achievement of system safety that is likely to render more benefits to the
industry than the current disjointed and market driven approach.
4.1. Product Level Safety Requirements Specification
The system safety life cycle as depicted in Section 2 implies that the specification of the system
requirements, especially the safety requirements for a PSP commences after system risk
analysis, that is in phase 4 and well after the start of a project or programme. Whilst many of
the detailed safety requirements emerge from the identification of the product/system
behaviours that lead to hazardous states, in a similar manner to the general system require‐
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ments, many of the safety requirements are known at a high level of detail at the start of a
project or programme. These come from a multiplicity of sources, standards, rules, reference
products/systems, regulations, customer needs, existing operational safety performance data,
existing operational principles, safety functions and finally, any industry level set of safety
hazards. This is depicted in Figure 6. These are all recorded in the product/SLR as detailed in
Table 1 and the system level safety requirements (SLSR) that constitute a subset.
In principle, if the national level safety data in terms of principal railway hazards and the THRs
are known, then these can used together with a causal analysis and apportionment to derive
the safety requirements for a complete PSP. Alas, in the absence of such desirable data, the
process depicted here is the next best alternative solution to the identification of PSP safety
requirements.
Figure 6. Derivation of System Level Safety Requirements for a PSP
It is also customary to initiate safety activities at the outset of a project or programme through
conducting high-level hazard studies. The preliminary hazard studies that lead to an under‐
standing of the potential system hazards are referred to as PHA. These often employ a system
representation in the form of rich-picture or Process & Instrumentation Diagram (P&ID) and
lead to the identification and capture of hazardous states arising from system composition,
placement or the environment since at this stage, not much is known about the total system
functionality or design. The PHA is then followed by IHA/OHA/SHA/SSHA at later stages of
the life cycle as the design and development, integration and construction progresses.
The relationship between safety studies and the life-cycle phases is depicted in Table 2.
Item LC Phase Principal Safety Activity
1 Concept definition ⋅ Hazid of system concept representations
⋅ Hazid of system composition, topology, placement, interfaces & Comms
⋅ Verify against industry hazards
⋅ Verify against ref system hazards
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Item LC Phase Principal Safety Activity
⋅ Conduct PHA
⋅ Establish hazard log and capture all identified system level hazards
2 Detailed definition and
operational context
⋅ Evaluate past experience data for safety
⋅ Establish safety plan (overall)
⋅ Hazop of Ops Scenarios
⋅ Specify system functions and tag the safety related functions
⋅ Identify safety protection functions
⋅ Conduct SHA and develop core hazards
⋅ Conduct IHA &SSHA on the Comms and sub-systems
⋅ Hazard log capture
3 Risk analysis and
evaluation
⋅ Determine the risk acceptance principles and criteria
⋅ Perform system risk analysis based on core hazards
⋅ Perform risk evaluation
⋅ Determine THRs




⋅ Specify top-level system safety requirements
⋅ Define safety acceptance criteria for the system
⋅ Define safety-related functional requirements
⋅ Determine SIL for safety functions
⋅ Establish safety validation plan
⋅ Hazard log capture and update
5 Architecture and
apportionment
⋅ Apportion system safety targets & requirements
⋅ Specify sub-system and component safety requirements
⋅ Allocate safety functions to sub-systems
⋅ Define sub-system and component safety acceptance criteria
⋅ Update safety plan and safety validation plan
⋅ Hazard log capture and update
6 Design and
implementation
⋅ Implement safety plan by review, analysis, testing and data assessment
⋅ Implement safety functions in line with relevant SIL guidelines in reference
standards
⋅ Ensure hazard control and risk mitigation solutions are designed in
⋅ Justify safety-related design decisions
⋅ Undertake project control covering:
⋅ Safety management
⋅ Control of sub-contractors and suppliers
⋅ Develop test scripts
⋅ Prepare generic product safety case
⋅ Hazard log update with all hazard control options implemented
7 Manufacture/production ⋅ Implement safety plan for production activities
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Item LC Phase Principal Safety Activity
⋅ Hazard log update
8 System integration ⋅ Verify safety functions and interfaces
⋅ Derive safety-related application conditions
⋅ Hazard log update
9 Validation ⋅ Implement commissioning programme
⋅ Implement validation plan
⋅ Conduct Safety Validation tests, analysis
⋅ Prepare specific application safety case
⋅ Seek safety approvals
⋅ Hazard log update with test results, new hazards
10 Acceptance ⋅ Assess specific application safety case
⋅ Detail all safety-related application conditions (SRACS) in the O&M Manuals
⋅ Close out all hazard-related actions
⋅ Ensure operational readiness




⋅ Undertake on-going safety centred maintenance
⋅ Assess the safety impact of any system upgrades and conduct risk analysis
before implementation
⋅ Perform on going safety performance monitoring and hazard log maintenance
⋅ Implement SRACs
⋅ Collect, analyse, evaluate and use performance & safety statistics
⋅ Capture any emerging hazards in the hazard log
12 Decommissioning ⋅ Establish Decommissioning Safety Plan (DSP)
⋅ Perform hazard analysis and risk assessment for decommissioning activities
⋅ Implement DSP
Table 2. LC Phase-related Principal Safety Activities
In principle, safety requirements of a composite system comprise functional and non-func‐
tional categories. The automation and control systems generally deliver algorithmic safety
functions hence largely satisfy functional safety requirements (FSaR) even though any product,
system, process/service may additionally have non-functional requirements that affect its
safety performance.
The FSaR category is depicted in the class definition in Table 3.
The non-functional category largely relate to operating and environmental conditions, health
and safety issues, materials, packaging and manufacturing aspects of a PSP and are not treated
in this guidance. The non-functional safety requirements (NFSaR) are depicted in the class
definition in Table 4.
Railway Research - Selected Topics on Development, Safety and Technology44
Item LC Phase Principal Safety Activity
⋅ Hazard log update
8 System integration ⋅ Verify safety functions and interfaces
⋅ Derive safety-related application conditions
⋅ Hazard log update
9 Validation ⋅ Implement commissioning programme
⋅ Implement validation plan
⋅ Conduct Safety Validation tests, analysis
⋅ Prepare specific application safety case
⋅ Seek safety approvals
⋅ Hazard log update with test results, new hazards
10 Acceptance ⋅ Assess specific application safety case
⋅ Detail all safety-related application conditions (SRACS) in the O&M Manuals
⋅ Close out all hazard-related actions
⋅ Ensure operational readiness




⋅ Undertake on-going safety centred maintenance
⋅ Assess the safety impact of any system upgrades and conduct risk analysis
before implementation
⋅ Perform on going safety performance monitoring and hazard log maintenance
⋅ Implement SRACs
⋅ Collect, analyse, evaluate and use performance & safety statistics
⋅ Capture any emerging hazards in the hazard log
12 Decommissioning ⋅ Establish Decommissioning Safety Plan (DSP)
⋅ Perform hazard analysis and risk assessment for decommissioning activities
⋅ Implement DSP
Table 2. LC Phase-related Principal Safety Activities
In principle, safety requirements of a composite system comprise functional and non-func‐
tional categories. The automation and control systems generally deliver algorithmic safety
functions hence largely satisfy functional safety requirements (FSaR) even though any product,
system, process/service may additionally have non-functional requirements that affect its
safety performance.
The FSaR category is depicted in the class definition in Table 3.
The non-functional category largely relate to operating and environmental conditions, health
and safety issues, materials, packaging and manufacturing aspects of a PSP and are not treated
in this guidance. The non-functional safety requirements (NFSaR) are depicted in the class
definition in Table 4.
Railway Research - Selected Topics on Development, Safety and Technology44
Item Class: Non-Functional Safety Requirements
Attributes Is a positive statement of desirable safety feature, e.g. electrical, EMC immunity etc.
Relates to a user/environment/operational need
Can be classed as Mandatory or Desirable
All Mandatory NFSaRs shall be met
Operations NFSaRs translate into features that need to be realised
Has varying risk control/mitigation capability
Satisfies one or more classes of Stakeholders
Is traceable to system level requirements (SLR and SLSR)
Influences environmental, safety, health and welfare, materials, packaging and manufacturing
aspects
Table 4. Non-Functional Safety Requirements Class
It is also important to note that the apparent overlap between various hazard studies from
PHA to SHA is matters of perspective and detail. What is identified at PHA is largely very
high level and coarse issues akin to core hazard concept developed in the UK system level
study and later adopted by ETCS, the European Train Control System. The more detailed
hazards identified at the system and sub-system level often fit within these Core Hazard
categories hence no repetition of the effort or waste of energies should occur in subsequent
hazard studies.
Item Class: Functional Safety Requirements (FSaR)
Attributes ⋅ Is a positive statement of desirable safe performance to be achieved
⋅ Relates to ensuring the control or supervision of an undesirable system hazard to be avoided
⋅ Relates to a user/environment/operational need
⋅ Can be classed as Mandatory or Desirable
⋅ All Mandatory FSaRs shall be met by the design
⋅ Has a hierarchy from function to HW, SW and PW
Operations ⋅ FSaRs translate into real algorithmic action/activity that has to be performed by SW, HW, PW or
System
⋅ Has direct control/protection/supervisory role in system
⋅ Has varying risk control/protection capability
⋅ Has different levels of confidence defined by SIL
⋅ Satisfies one or more classes of Stakeholders
⋅ Is traceable to system level requirements (SLR and SLSR)
⋅ Has to be specified in a specific level of safety attainment to reduce costs of implementation
Table 3. Functional Safety Requirements Class
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5. System Level Safety Study–UK National Railways
To this date and since the initial publication of the CENELEC TR-50451 [3] initially published
as R009-004 in 1999, only one system level study of the whole railway infrastructure and
operations has been conducted in the United Kingdom, largely designed and implemented by
the author and the supporting team at Railtrack plc in 1996.
The so-called risk profiling of UK Railways attempted to study the whole railway system from
the view point of safety risks posed to three key groups, namely:
1. The Passengers,
2. The Workers and Employees,
3. The General Public and the railway Neighbours.
This national level study was scoped at the level of the whole UK national railway system and
after three years resulted in identification, verification and publication of three hazard logs
relating to the three groups studied and an integrated quantified safety and environmental
risk model.
The idea of core hazard was devised to classify and group hazards with similar root, causation
or synergy into larger classes and avoid dealing with many tens of detailed issues identified
in the course of the national level study. The core hazards and the detailed hazards are the
basis of determining the system level safety requirements (SLSR) for the entire railway.
However, since the hazards and the requirements are system level properties that are heavily
influenced by the national culture, it is not possible or indeed could be misleading to adopt
the SLSR safety requirements from another country. In reality, each nation state needs to
conduct their own studies to arrive at a current and culture sensitive nature of the safety risks
of their national railways to the population.
The risk profiling of Railways project employed a detailed scenario-based scrutiny of the
exposure of each group of people to the operational and infrastructure hazards of the national
railway. The scenarios were themed around a ‘Day in the Life of...’ each group and took three
years to complete. The hazards identified through the study were verified against a number
of sources by a number of independent engineering safety consultancy organisations. After
verification and checks for coverage and completeness, the identified hazards were modelled
employing a systematic framework comprising causal, consequence and loss evaluation stages
[4] in order to establish the risks and strive towards generating a safety risk profile for the
national railways. The outcome was the first total railway system level integrated risk model
that was capable of being employed to assess the impact of various changes, technologies and
innovations on the safety performance of the national level railway or aspects of it. It also
generated THRs for all the published groups of hazards for use in the supply chain. This study
influenced TR-50451 [3] and the approach to collaboration in railway safety.
In principle, a national level railway Hazard Portfolio for each of the three affected groups,
followed by determination of the risk tolerability level for the occurrence of these hazards is
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the only systematic approach to understanding system level safety issues and apportioning
these products, systems and processes/services in a traceable, realistic and meaningful manner.
5.1. Passengers group
The national level safety study of the passenger group was planned and conducted over a
number of workshops with diverse participants from many of the stakeholder groups. A series
of pictographics and photos were taken and composed into ‘A Day in the Life of a Railway
Passenger’ that covered most credible scenarios that a typical passenger would interact with
the railways. This comprised entering a railway station, using the facilities, going to a platform,
boarding a train, travelling, reaching their destination, alighting and eventually leaving the
railway premises. The rich-picture representations were employed as the backdrop to a
creative Hazop style process to identify all deviations from the normal behaviour that could
result in a hazardous state to which a passenger was exposed to.
By the end of the national level workshops, 101 hazards had been identified [5] for the
passenger group taking into account variations in age, conditions and luggage handling. The
identified hazards were shared with the participants for offline verification and completeness
checks. Through a further review, all hazards with common causality or synergy were grouped
as a cluster under a core hazard. For the passenger group, each core hazard was tagged with
a H for Hazard, P for Passenger and a unique number that represents the relative proximity
of the hazard to an accident scenario. The core hazards for the passenger group, relating to the
exposure scenarios throughout a railway journey are depicted as follows.
5.1.1. Core Hazard: HP500 – Abnormal or Criminal Behaviour
The HP500 addresses the range of abnormal and criminal behaviours that are known to take
place within the railway infrastructure. This does not, however, address abnormal working
practices of railway personnel, with the exception of train drivers and senior conductors. This
cluster comprises a number of lower level hazards that were identified at the stakeholder
workshops, namely
HP425 Irresponsible behaviour
HP426 Destructive behaviour (all forms)
HP427 Crossing line at station
5.1.2. Core Hazard: HP502 – Crowding
The causal model for HP502 represents the range of factors that potentially could cause a
crowding situation to arise (e.g. a special event causing an increase in passengers, or an incident
causing panic amongst an otherwise manageable number of passengers).
The consequence model for HP502 represents the development of a crowding situation to a
level at which injuries or loss of balance (see HP506) could occur. This hazard cluster comprises:
HP502 Crowding
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5.1.3. Core Hazard: HP503—Loss of Passenger Compartment Integrity During Movement
The scope of this core hazard includes the following:
• Doors opened early on stopping slam shut or CDL trains, potentially resulting in passengers
and workers on the train falling out of the train or passengers and workers on the station
platform being struck by open doors.
• Slam shut or CDL trains departing with a door open, potentially resulting in passengers and
workers on the station platform being struck by the open door or the open door being struck
by a passing train.
• Doors opened during train movement, potentially resulting in passengers or workers falling
out of the train.
• Doors on the wrong side of the platform unlocked (on trains with sliding or CDL doors) or
opened (on trains with slam shut doors), potentially leading to passengers or workers
getting off the train on the wrong side, or falling out of the train onto the track. Also included
here are incidents where doors which are on the same side of the train as the platform but
which are not adjacent to the platform (e.g. when a train is longer than the platform) are
unlocked or opened and passenger or worker leaves or falls out of the train.
• Train carriage decoupling during movement, potentially leading to passengers or workers
falling off the train.
• Doors failing to open at a station are included within this core hazard in the causal analysis
for consistency with earlier work but consequence barriers are not modelled as it is consid‐
ered that there are no safety implications within the scope of this core hazard associated
with doors failing to open. Train doors are barriers to consequence escalation for other core
hazards, for example HP507 ‘Onset of fire/explosion’, but failure of train doors to open does
not in itself present a hazard. This cluster comprises:
HP503 Loss of passenger compartment integrity during movement
5.1.4. Core Hazard: HP504—Passengers in Path of Closing Train Doors
This hazard encompasses ‘passenger in path of closing train door’ (HP504) and ‘worker in path
of closing train’ (HW503). The scope of this core hazard includes
• Passenger or worker hit by closing door.
• Passenger or worker caught in door of stationary train, potentially leading to the train
moving off, dragging the person along the platform.
• Passenger or worker trying to board a moving train, potentially leading to apparel being
caught on the door and dragged along the platform or opening the door then falling and
being hit by the door or caught up in the door.
The cluster comprises;
HP504HP504 passenger/apparel in path of closing train door
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5.1.5. Core Hazard: HP506—Loss of Balance
We have excluded from this core hazard falls to trespassers and falls occurring on level
crossings. The scope of passengers has been enlarged to include all persons in a railway station.
We also excluded a few falls that were suicide attempts, but included some where there was
no clear determination. We have excluded passengers falling as a result of trying to enter or
leave the train, while it is still moving. This cluster comprises
HP413 Loss of balance on the ground
HP414 Loss of balance on stairs and escalators
HP415 Loss of balance getting on and off trains
HP416 Loss of balance whilst in a train
5.1.6. Core Hazard: HP509—Inappropriate Separation between Running Railways and Passengers
The HP509 Core Hazard for inappropriate separation between running rail and passengers
has been developed to include those situations where the distance between the running rail
and people is not sufficient to ensure the safety of passengers.
This core hazard does not include Core Hazard HN501 failure of level crossing to protect the
public from passing trains. This model also does not include incidents of inappropriate
separation between running rail and passengers resulting from suicide. Finally, this model
does not include incidents of inappropriate separation between running rail and people caused
by derailment. This cluster comprises:
HP509Inappropriate separation between rail & passengers
5.1.7. Core Hazard: HP510—Inappropriate Separation between Un-insulated Live Conductors and
Passengers
The scope of ‘Inappropriate separation between un-insulated live conductors and passengers’
includes the following:
HP417 Occurrence of DC power arc
HP418 Existence of touch potential
HP419 Inappropriate separation from DC conductor rail
HP420 Structure in contact with live conductor rail
HP421 Inappropriate separation from OHL
HP422 Structure in contact with OHL
HP423 Occurrence of AC power arc
HP424 Inappropriate separation from OHL induced voltage
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5.1.8. Core Hazard: HP512—Passenger Protruding Beyond Train Gauge During Movement
Core Hazards HP512, passenger protruding beyond train gauge during movement, have been
developed to include all situations in which a person is protruding outside the gauge of a
moving train.
The model excludes incidents resulting from suicide or attempted suicide— these are assumed
to be covered under HP500 Abnormal or Criminal Behaviour. The cluster comprises
HP512 Passenger protruding beyond train gauge
5.1.9. Core Hazard: HP513—Unsecured Objects at Height
This core hazard falls within the generic grouping of ‘Objects Falling from Height’ affecting
passengers (HP513) which includes the following:
• Objects falling from height within stations (HP513, HP512) as a result of degradation (e.g.
falling glass) or maintenance or construction work.
• Objects thrown at trains (HP513, HW512).
• Falling luggage stored at height on trains and falling train furniture (HP513).
• Dropped crane loads (HW512).
The cluster comprises
HP513 Unsecured objects falling from height
5.1.10. Core Hazard: HP515—Inappropriate Separation between Passengers and Moving Vehicle
(Other Than Rail Vehicle)
The scope of this core hazard is concerned with inappropriate separation between passengers
(HP515) and moving vehicles (not rail vehicles). This encompasses the following:
• Accidents involving road vehicles in collision with pedestrians, other vehicles or structures
in the vicinity of stations and work sites (including workers at level crossings in local control
mode).
• Accidents involving non-road motorised vehicles, push trolleys and catering trolleys.
• Accidents involving overturned machinery and inadequate control of wheel set movements.
The cluster comprises:
HP515 inappropriate separation between passenger and moving vehicle (non-rail)
5.1.11. Core Hazard: HP516— Handling Heavy Loads
The hazard is defined to assume some error had occurred in handling a heavy load since
otherwise the estimated number of incidents would be so high to be meaningless as a hazard.
Various scenarios were identified, including strain injuries from carrying and lifting luggage,
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luggage falling on to other passengers usually inside trains and cases of luggage falling down
escalators and stairs.
The cluster comprises:
HP516 Error in handling heavy load
5.1.12. Core Hazard: HP517—Incompatibility of Train and Structure Gauge
The HP517 (incompatibility of train and structure gauge) have been developed to include those
situations where the clearances between trains and infrastructure have been compromised.
This hazard includes events where the train or its load extend beyond the specified gauge due
to errors in loading, equipment failures or damage; movement errors leading to the train going
onto the wrong route; track defects/misalignment; failures or damage leading to civil structures
compromising the clearance. This core hazard does not consider events which have resulted
in objects on the line (HP511), railway construction/ maintenance works, unsound structures
(HP514) or unsecured objects at height (HP513). The cluster comprises
HP517 incompatibility of train and structure gauge
5.1.13. Core Hazard: HP600—Abnormal Deceleration
The risk model for HP600 ‘Abnormal deceleration’ has been developed to strictly model only
those instances of a train’s slowing sharply when not actually as a part of a derailment or
collision scenario. The consequences of the abnormal deceleration part of derailment and
collision scenarios are assumed to be included in the loss estimation for those events. The
cluster comprises
HP600 Abnormal Deceleration (super-set of HP518 &HW516)
5.1.14. Core Hazard: HP601—Uncontrolled Approach to Buffer
In the causal model, malicious or reckless behaviour on the part of the driver of the relevant
train has been assumed to have been included in the data for ‘Driver error’. The causal model
has been populated using the SMIS database and data from Health and Safety Executive (HSE)
reports.
The consequences of this hazard have been taken forward only to the point of the accident’s
occurring, that beyond is assumed to be calculated by loss modelling. Therefore, the incidence
of fire due to buffer-stop collision has not been separately developed in the consequence model.
The consequences have been assumed to fall into three bands: collisions at speeds at or below
that for which the buffers have been designed; collisions at speeds greater than that for which
the buffers have been designed; and collisions with siding buffer-stops. The effects of TPWS
and ATP have been ignored, as they were fitted in only a small minority of cases at the time.
The consequence model has been populated using expert judgement. The cluster comprises
HP601 Uncontrolled approach to buffer (HP501 &HW501)
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5.1.15. Core Hazard: HP602—Loss of Train Guidance (Passenger Trains)
The risk model for HP602 ‘Loss of train guidance (Passenger Train)’ has been developed to
strictly model only those instances where a derailment actually occurs. The losses associated
with this model include those occurring before the derailment due to abnormal deceleration,
if there are any. However, where such deceleration avoids a derailment, the consequences are
included in the ‘Abnormal Deceleration’ model. The cluster comprises
HP602 Loss of train guidance (Passenger Train) (HP412, HW409 &HN402)
5.1.16. Core Hazard: HP603—Loss of Train Guidance (Freight Trains)
The risk model for HP603 ‘Loss of train guidance (Freight Train)’ has been developed to strictly
model only those instances where a derailment actually occurs. The losses associated with this
model include those occurring before the derailment due to abnormal deceleration, if there are
any. However, where such deceleration avoids a derailment, the consequences are included
in the ‘Abnormal Deceleration’ model. The cluster comprises
HP603 Loss of train guidance (Freight Train) (HP411, HW408 &HN401)
5.1.17. Core Hazard: HP604—Objects/Animals on the Line
The risk model for HP604 ‘Objects/Animals on the line’ has been developed to model only the
instances of animals or objects being on the running railway and having some effect thereon.
There may be many instances of animals entering and leaving the railway having no effect at
all and being entirely unnoticed. These scenarios are not modelled, neither are those in which
other objects, such as litter, come to rest on the railway, but do not affect the system at all.
Instances of objects and animals on the line causing fires are captured in the fire models and
not within this model. This model also specifically excludes all causes and consequences
arising from the Core Hazard HN501 ‘Crossing running railway at a Level Crossing’. The
cluster comprises
HP604 Object/animals on line (HP511, HW510 &HN514)
5.1.18. Core Hazard: HP605—Inappropriate Separation between Trains
The risk model for HP605 ‘Inappropriate separation between trains’ has been developed to
address only the scenarios in which the separation between trains, normally provided by the
signalling system, has broken down. This hazard is defined such that there is no interface
between it and the ‘Loss of Balance’ core hazards. The cluster comprises:
HP605 Inappropriate separation between trains (HP505, HW504, HN505)
5.1.19. Core Hazard: HP606—Onset of Fire/Explosion
Core Hazard HP507 onset of fire/explosion for passengers has been developed to include those
situations where fire is a spontaneous event, however, the situations where fire is a secondary
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consequence of a train collision or derailment are excluded. Noxious fumes are included when
the cause is fire related.
Consideration has been given to the interface of his Core Hazard with Core Hazard HP500 /
HW500 / HN500 abnormal or criminal behaviour. The cluster comprises:
HN400 Fire at line side
HP400 Fire inside passenger carriage
HP401 fire outside passenger electric train
HP402 fire outside diesel passenger train
HP403 Fire at station
HW400 fire on electric freight train
HW401 fire on diesel freight train
5.1.20. Core Hazard: HP607—Unsound/Unsecured Structures
The HP514 Core Hazard for Unsound/Unsecured Structure has been developed to include
those situations where structures are unstable creating a threat to passengers or neighbours.
This core hazard shall not include instability of trains or the movement of materials on trains.
Consideration has been given to the interface of this core hazard with the core hazards object
on line and inappropriate separation between trains.
All structures going beyond the railway boundary are covered here and not in HP509,
inappropriate separation between running rail and passenger.
Neither the causal nor the consequence models refer to situations where structures are unstable
creating a threat to workers. This is a part of Core Hazard HW512 Unsecured Objects at Height
and Core Hazard HW517 Collapsing Machinery/Materials/ Structures. The cluster comprises
HP404 Unsound/Unsecured Tree
HP405 Unsound/Unsecured Tunnel
HP406 Unsound/Unsecured Under-bridge / Culvert
HP407 Unsound/Unsecured over-bridge
HP408 Unsound/Unsecured Station
HP409 Unsound/Unsecured Signalling Structure
HP410 Unsound/Unsecured Electrification Structure
5.2. Workers Group
The national level safety study of the railway workers group was planned and conducted over
a number of workshops with diverse participants from many of the stakeholder groups. A
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similar set of prompts and photos focused on this group were taken and composed into ‘A
Day in the Life of a Railway Worker’ that covered most credible scenarios that employees/
workers interact with the railways. This comprised planning, operating, station duties,
maintenance and driving of trains. The pictorial scenarios were likewise employed as the
backdrop to a creative Hazop style process to identify all circumstances where railway
employees/workers were potentially exposed to hazardous states.
By the end of the national level workshops, 119 hazards had been identified [5] for the workers
group. Through a further review, all hazards with common causality or synergy were grouped
as a cluster under a core hazard. For the passenger group, each core hazard was tagged with
a H for hazard, W for workers and a unique number that represents the relative proximity of
the hazard to an accident scenario. The core hazards for the workers group, relating to the
exposure scenarios are depicted as follows.
5.2.1. Core Hazard: HW500—Abnormal or Criminal Behaviour
The model developed for HW500 addresses the range of abnormal and criminal behaviours
that are known to be performed within the railway infrastructure. They do not, however,
address abnormal working practices of railway personnel, with the exception of train drivers




HW428 Crossing line at station
5.2.2. Core Hazard: HW502—Loss of Passenger Compartment Integrity During Movement
The scope of this core hazard includes the following:
• Doors opened early on stopping slam shut or CDL trains, potentially resulting in workers
on the train falling out of the train or workers on the station platform being struck by open
doors.
• Slam shut or CDL trains departing with a door open, potentially resulting in workers on the
station platform being struck by the open door or the open door being struck by a passing
train.
• Doors opened during train movement, potentially resulting in workers falling out of the
train.
• Doors on the wrong side of the platform unlocked (on trains with sliding or CDL doors) or
opened (on trains with slam shut doors), potentially leading to workers getting off the train
on the wrong side, or falling out of the train onto the track. Also included here are incidents
where doors which are on the same side of the train as the platform but which are not
adjacent to the platform (e.g. when a train is longer than the platform) are unlocked or
opened and passenger or worker leaves or falls out of the train.
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• Train carriage decoupling during movement, potentially leading to workers falling off the
train.
• Doors failing to open at a station are included within this core hazard in the causal analysis
for consistency with earlier work but consequence barriers are not modelled as it is consid‐
ered that there are no safety implications within the scope of this core hazard associated
with doors failing to open. Train doors are barriers to consequence escalation for other core
hazards, for example HP507 ‘Onset of fire/explosion’, but failure of train doors to open does
not in itself present a hazard.
The cluster comprises
HW502 Loss of passenger compartment integrity during movement
5.2.3. Core Hazard: HW503—Worker in Path of Closing Train Doors
This hazard encompasses workers in path of closing train (HW503). The scope of this core
hazard includes
• Worker hit by closing door.
• Worker caught in door of stationary train, potentially leading to the train moving off,
dragging the person along the platform.
• Worker trying to board a moving train, potentially leading to apparel being caught on the
door and dragged along the platform or opening the door then falling and being hit by the
door or caught up in the door.
The cluster comprises
HW503 HW503 worker/apparel in path of closing train door
5.2.4. Core Hazard: HW505—Loss of Balance
We have excluded from this core hazard any falls occurring on level crossings, although works
crossings were included. There is some overlap at the consequence side with HW508. We have
included falls getting on and off trains by drivers and cleaning staff who often have to negotiate
steps and gaps which would not be encountered by passengers. The cluster comprises
HW410 Loss of balance on the ground
HW411 Loss of balance on stairs and escalators
HW412 Loss of balance getting on and off trains
HW413 Loss of balance whilst in a train
HW414 Loss of balance when working at height
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5.2.5. Core Hazard: HW508—Inappropriate Separation between Running Railways and Workers
The HW508 Core Hazard for inappropriate separation between running rail and workers has
been developed to include those situations where the distance between the running rail and
people is not sufficient to ensure the safety of workers.
This core hazard does not include Core Hazard HN501 failure of level crossing to protect the
public from passing trains. This model also does not include incidents of inappropriate
separation between running rail and workers resulting from suicides. Finally, this model does
not include incidents of inappropriate separation between running rail and people caused by
derailment. The cluster comprises
HW402 Red zone working
HW403 Green zone working
5.2.6. Core Hazard: HW509—Inappropriate Separation between Un-insulated Live Conductors and
Workers
The scope of ‘Inappropriate separation between un-insulated live conductors and workers’
includes the following:
HW415 Occurrence of DC power arc
HW416 Existence of touch potential
HW417 Structure exposed to leakage current [DC]
HW418 Inappropriate separation from conductor rail
HW419 Structure in contact with live conductor rail
HW420 Inappropriate separation from OHL
HW421 Structure in contact with live OHL
HW422 Inappropriate separation from OHL induced voltage
HW423 Inappropriate separation from ground potential
HW424 Occurrence of AC power arc
HW425 Structure exposed to current leakage [AC]
5.2.7. Core Hazard: HW511—Worker Protruding Beyond Train Gauge During Movement
Core Hazard HW511, worker protruding beyond train gauge during movement, have been
developed to include all situations in which a person is protruding outside the gauge of a
moving train.
The model developed excludes incidents resulting from suicide or attempted suicide—these
are assumed to be covered under HHW500 abnormal or criminal behaviour. The cluster
comprises
HW511 Worker protruding beyond train gauge
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5.2.8. Core Hazard: HW512—Unsecured Objects at Height
This core hazard falls within the generic grouping of ‘Objects Falling from Height’ affecting
workers (HW512) that includes the following:
• Objects falling from height within stations (HP513, HP512) as a result of degradation (e.g.
falling glass) or maintenance or construction work.
• Objects thrown at trains (HP513, HW512) or hung in front of trains (HW512).
• Falling luggage stored at height on trains and falling train furniture (HP513, HW512).
• Dropped crane loads (HW512).
• Falling objects from the infrastructure (HW512, HN512).
The cluster comprises:
HW512 Unsecured objects at height
5.2.9. Core Hazard: HW513—Inappropriate Separation between Workers and Moving Vehicle (Other
Than Rail Vehicle)
The scope of this core hazard is concerned with inappropriate separation between the workers
(HW513) and moving vehicles (not rail vehicles). This encompasses the following:
• Accidents involving road vehicles in collision with pedestrians, other vehicles or structures
in the vicinity of stations and work sites (including workers at level crossings in local control
mode).
• Accidents involving non-road motorised vehicles, push trolleys and catering trolleys.
• Accidents involving overturned machinery and inadequate control of wheel set movements.
The cluster comprises:
HW513 inappropriate separation between workers and vehicles
5.2.10. Core Hazard: HW514—Handling Heavy Loads
The core hazard was defined to assume some error had occurred in handling a heavy load
since otherwise the estimated number of incidents could be so high to be meaningless as a
hazard. We scoped the hazard to cover manual handling of loads, including unloading from
vehicles.
We did not formulate a definition of a heavy load as a specific weight but considered any
incident where the handling of a load caused some loss and where the weight of the load was
a factor. We followed the general approach of HP516 of dividing the hazard into problems
with lifting, carrying or stacking a load. The cluster comprises
HW514 Improper manual handling of heavy load
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5.2.11. Core Hazard: HW517—Unsound/Unsecured Machinery/Materials or Structures
The scope of this core hazard includes the following:
• Crane and rail crane collapse potentially leading to a worker being crushed.
• Collapse of stacked materials potentially leading to a worker being crushed.
• Inadequate protection for working at height potentially leading to a worker falling whilst
working at height.
• Misuse or inadequate maintenance of tools causing worker injury.
The cluster comprises
HW517 unsound/unsecured machinery/materials/structures
5.2.12. Core Hazard: HW518—Work in Confined Spaces
We kept the scope of this hazard quite large to include events where workers are in spaces
such as offices and drivers in cabs and are exposed to hazards such as fumes from batteries.
There is probably some overlap with core hazard area HW512 in the consequences relating to
workers in a confined space being affected by toxic or hazardous fumes. We have excluded
shunting incidents since these are being dealt with under Core Hazard area HW508.
The cluster comprises:
HW518 Work taking place in confined space
5.2.13. Core Hazard: HW519—Contaminated Water and/or Land
The core hazards for contaminated water and/or land for workers and neighbourhood (HW519
and HN502, respectively) have been defined as the release of harmful substances likely to cause
contamination of the environment. This allows the consideration of detection, mitigation and
remediation barriers in the consequence domain. The release of toxic gases likely to cause harm
to workers or neighbours has also been considered under this core hazard.
This core hazard considers harm to workers or neighbours as a result of coming into contact
with land, water or air contaminated with harmful substances, rather than coming into contact
with the harmful substances themselves although the toxicology is similar, the frequency and
dispersion will differ. Core Hazard HW521, workers in proximity to harmful substances covers
the case where water or land contamination is not an issue.
The cluster comprises:
HW519 Release of hazardous substances
5.2.14. Core Hazard: HW520—Inappropriate Working Methods/Environment
The scope of this hazard was defined to include most ‘occupational’ accidents where typically
a single worker is affected. We also included the case of crane loads and other mechanical
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equipment fouling trains passing nearby as this was always due to operator error. Any
particular scenario where an inappropriate working method was applied to result in an
incident which was also covered by another core hazard was excluded. For example, if an
inappropriate lifting technique was applied to a task involving a heavy object, we did not
consider this part of this core hazard but dealt with it under HW514.
The cluster comprises
HW520 Inappropriate working methods/environment
5.2.15. Core Hazard: HW521—Workers in Proximity to Harmful Substances
The Core Hazards Workers in Proximity to Harmful Substances (HW521) have been defined
as the hazard presented to workers when in proximity to uncontrolled harmful substances.
This includes those harmful substances carried by the railway (dangerous goods) as well as
harmful substances routinely used in the running and maintenance of the railway (fuel oils,
caustics, etc.). It does not include substances which are harmful only due to their physical state,
for example boiling water or hot food, or indeed, railway food in general.
The case where workers come into proximity to harmful substances through contaminated
water or land is not considered in this report as that case is covered under Core Hazard HW519
contaminated water and/or land. The cluster comprises
HW521 Workers in proximity to harmful substances
5.2.16. Core Hazard: HW522—Road Vehicle Accidents
Core Hazard HW522, road vehicle accidents covers accidents to workers in road vehicles
whilst on railway business, but on the public highway. The model excludes incidents on
Railtrack property and controlled infrastructure—these are covered under Core Hazards
HW513/HP515 inappropriate separation between workers/passengers and Moving Vehicle
(other than Rail Vehicle).The cluster comprises:
HW522 Road Vehicle Accident
5.2.17. Core Hazard: HW523—Objects Thrown or Falling from Train
The core hazard considered in this report considers the impact on workers of ‘Objects Thrown
or Falling from Train’. The impact on neighbours of objects thrown or falling from trains is
included in the work scope for HN511 and is not included in the scope of work reported here.
The work scope for HW523 includes the following:
• Objects deliberately thrown from trains.
• Objects falling off trains, for example shattered brake disk.
• Loads falling from freight trains, including ballast.
The cluster comprises:
HW523 Object thrown or falls from train




The national level safety study of the railway neighbours group was planned and conducted
over a number of workshops with diverse participants from many of the stakeholder groups.
Neighbours are those who live within proximity of the railway environment and cross the line
at level crossings. A similar set of prompts and photos focused on this group were taken and
composed into ‘A Day in the Life of a Railway Neighbour’ that covered most credible scenarios
that neighbours of the railways get exposed to generally involuntarily. The pictorial scenarios
were employed as the backdrop to a creative Hazop style process to identify all circumstances
where railway neighbours were potentially exposed to hazardous states.
By the end of the national level workshops, 64 hazards had been identified [5] for the neigh‐
bours group. In a similar manner, Core Hazards were developed for the neighbour group;
each Core Hazard was tagged with a H for Hazard, N for Neighbour and a unique number
that represents the relative proximity of the hazard to an accident scenario. The core hazards
for the neighbour group, relating to the exposure scenarios are depicted as follows.
5.3.1. Core Hazard: HN500—Abnormal or Criminal Behaviour
The models for HP500, HW500 and HN500 address the range of abnormal and criminal
behaviours that are known to be performed within the railway infrastructure. They do not,
however, address abnormal working practices of railway personnel, with the exception of train
drivers and senior conductors. This was agreed between Human Engineering and Railtrack at
the start of the modelling process. The cluster comprises
HN416 Suicide attempt
HN417 Trespass
HN418 Abnormal behaviour at special events
5.3.2. Core Hazard: HN501—Crossing Running Railway at Level Crossing
Core Hazard HN501, crossing running railway at a level crossing, has been developed to
include all situations in which a user (i.e. a Neighbour) is present on a level crossing without
the intended degree of protection from trains. This may arise from intentional or inadvertent
misuse of the crossing by the neighbour as well as from failures and errors in railway equip‐
ment and procedures.
The definition excludes situations in which harm may arise when using a level crossing as
intended, for example if a user falls and injures themselves on a crossing but is still able to
cross within the design time limit. Such occurrences are assumed to be subsumed within Core
Hazard HN506, loss of balance.
The model excludes incidents at level crossings resulting from suicide or attempted suicide—
these are assumed to be covered under HN500 abnormal or criminal behaviour
The model is limited to neighbour hazards and thus does not consider hazards at worker
crossings provided within stations, depots, sidings etc. Un-authorised neighbour use of such
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The model excludes incidents at level crossings resulting from suicide or attempted suicide—
these are assumed to be covered under HN500 abnormal or criminal behaviour
The model is limited to neighbour hazards and thus does not consider hazards at worker
crossings provided within stations, depots, sidings etc. Un-authorised neighbour use of such
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crossings should be regarded as abnormal or criminal behaviour (HN500), being a form of
trespass. (Unauthorised passenger use is covered in Core Hazards HP509 inappropriate
separation between running railway and workers/ passengers.)
It should be noted that HN509, inappropriate separation between running railway and
neighbourhood, did not consider level crossing hazards. HN501 and HN509 are thus taken to
be mutually exclusive.). The cluster comprises
HN480 crossing running railway at a manual level crossing
HN481 crossing running railway at an automatic level crossing
HN482 crossing running railway at user worked level crossing
HN484 crossing running railway at a level crossing
5.3.3. Core Hazard: HN502—Contaminated Water and/or Land
The core hazards for contaminated water and/or land for neighbours have been defined as the
release of harmful substances likely to cause contamination of the environment. This allows
the consideration of detection, mitigation and remediation barriers in the consequence domain.
The release of toxic gases likely to cause harm to workers or neighbours has also been
considered under this core hazard.
This core hazard considers harm to workers or neighbours as a result of coming into contact
with land, water or air contaminated with harmful substances, rather than coming into contact
with the harmful substances themselves—although the toxicology is similar, the frequency
and dispersion will differ. The cluster comprises
HN502 Contaminated Water and/or Land
5.3.4. Core Hazard: HN503—Electro-Magnetic Interference (EMI) Caused to by Railway Operations
EMI caused by railway operations to businesses, general public, adjacent buildings, hospitals,
HN503 has been developed to include those situations where EMI from the infrastructure or
rolling stock could affect the safety of neighbours directly. This core hazard does not include
EMI caused by infrastructure or rolling stock to signalling and track circuits, or interference
between the rolling stock and infrastructure. Such interference could be considered part of the
base event frequencies for other core hazards. Interference caused by radio systems is not
explicitly examined, it is considered to be subsumed into the frequencies of the initiating events
identified and would be subject to the same design controls and regulations. In addition, this
core hazard does not consider the effects of earth leakage currents causing corrosion of steel
pipelines or structures. Thus issues such as HN30 (corrosion of structures from dc rail systems)
are covered under HN510. That core hazard also covers the possibility of electrocution due to
inductive pickup in cables running adjacent to the AC electrified lines. The cluster comprises
HN503 EMI impact on neighbourhood
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5.3.5. Core Hazard: HN504—Impact from Railway Construction/Maintenance Works
The scope of ‘impact from railway construction and maintenance works’ includes the follow‐
ing:
• Inappropriate construction and maintenance practices’ not included under other core
hazards
• Dumping heavy loads onto roads, buildings and property of neighbours
Release of flammable materials (other than gas mains) and damage to electrical cabling and
gas mains
The cluster comprises
HN504 Impact from railway construction/maintenance works
5.3.6. Core Hazard: HN506—Loss of Balance
We have excluded from this core hazard falls to trespassers and falls occurring on level
crossings. As all persons on stations are regarded as passengers for the purpose of this project,
the relevant neighbours for this core hazard are basically those persons using footpaths and
footbridges which form part of the railway infrastructure. Footpaths alongside public roads
are part of the public highway and are excluded. The cluster comprises
HN403 Loss of balance on the ground
HN404 Loss of balance on stairs
5.3.7. Core Hazard: HN509—Inappropriate Separation between Running Railway and Neighbourhood
The HN509 Core Hazard for inappropriate separation between running rail and neighbours
have been developed to include those situations where the distance between the running rail
and people is not sufficient to ensure the safety of passengers, workers or neighbourhood.
This core hazard does not include Core Hazard HN501 failure of level crossing to protect the
public from passing trains. This model also does not include incidents of inappropriate
separation between running rail and neighbourhood resulting from suicide. Finally, this model
does not include incidents of inappropriate separation between running rail and people caused
by Derailment. The cluster comprises
HN509 Inappropriate separation between rail &neighbours
5.3.8. Core Hazard: HN510—Inappropriate Separation between Un-insulated Live Conductors and the
Public
The scope of ‘inappropriate separation between un-insulated live conductors and the public’
includes the following:
HN405 Occurrence of DC power arc
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HN406 Existence of touch potential
HN407 Structure exposed to leakage current [DC]
HN408 Inappropriate separation from DC conductor rail
HN409 Structure in contact with live conductor rail
HN410 Inappropriate separation from OHL live conductor
HN411 Structure in contact with live OHL
HN412 Inappropriate separation from OHL induced voltage
HN413 Inappropriate separation from ground potential
HN414 Occurrence of AC power arc
HN415 Structure exposed to leakage current [AC]
5.3.9. Core Hazard: HN511—Flying Debris from Moving Train and Objects Falling from Trains
HN511 Core Hazard for flying debris from moving trains and objects falling from trains has
been developed to include those situations where parts of the train and objects carried on the
train are separated from the moving train and are a potential hazard to neighbours.
This core hazard does not include things falling from bridges into the surrounding neigh‐
bourhood. These incidents are covered in the Core Hazard HN512 unsecured objects at height.
Neither the causal nor the consequence models refer to situations where parts of the train and
objects carried on the train are separated from the moving train and are a potential hazard to
passengers or workers. The cluster comprises
HN511 Flying debris / objects falling from trains
5.3.10. Core Hazard: HN512—Unsecured Objects at Height
This core hazard falls within the generic grouping of ‘Objects Falling from Height’ affecting
neighbours (HN512) which includes the following:
• Objects falling from height within stations (HP513, HP512) as a result of degradation (e.g.
falling glass) or maintenance or construction work.
• Objects thrown at trains (HP513, HW512) or hung in front of trains (HW512).
• Falling luggage stored at height on trains and falling train furniture (HP513, HW512).
• Dropped crane loads (HW512).
Falling objects from the infrastructure (HW512, HN512).
The cluster comprises
HN512 Unsecured objects falling from height
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6. System Level Security Issues
The transportation network constitutes the artery of economic activity and growth in modern
economies. Whilst challenged by telecommunications and internet technologies, the move‐
ment of goods and people is still an indispensable aspect of social and economic life contri‐
buting around one tenth of the GDP in the developed world1. It is not surprising therefore to
find transportation on the social and political agenda and any faults, failures and consequent
accident, being given a high degree of publicity and exposure. Traditionally, the key mantra
in transportation has been safety followed by reliability, punctuality, cost, journey time and
quality of travel. This has held true so far for the most modes of transport until recently when
malicious intent with the aim of disrupting the network, victimising its customers and
inflicting large economic losses has added a new ingredient to the traditional concerns of the
industry. The malicious intent broadly falls into the following categories:
• Antisocial Behaviour and Vandalism
• IP Espionage/Violations
• Theft, Extortion, and Fraud
• Robberies, Assaults
• Sabotage
• Terrorism and CBRN Attacks
Whilst vandalism is of limited consequence and often related to adventure seeking youth, the
other categories of concern specifically terrorism pose a largely new sinister development often
beyond the powers of transportation authorities to predict, prevent or contain. This is where
the power of scientific structured approaches and methodologies principally applied in safety
engineering can be exploited to render assurance in transportation security in road, rail,
shipping and aviation transport hubs.
The proficient assessment, control and mitigation of safety and security risks demand a
systematic and objective approach to understanding and proactive management of response
processes. However, the traditional focus of security relating to the physical infrastructure and
systems is now extended to cyber systems in view of the extensive deployment of modern
communications and computing in the railways. A systematic approach to system level
security should consider physical and cyber threats and vulnerabilities to assure adequate
security throughout the life cycle of the product, process, system or undertaking.
Many facets of a system’s performance are inter-related and overall optimisation requires a
reasonable insight into the desirable system properties and performance profile. This is equally
applicable to the transportation and railways where the provision of service is nowadays
taking place within a commercial and cost/performance conscious environment.
1 U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis
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Adoption of a systemic and numerate approach to safety and security assurance within an
integrated systems framework yields a more inclusive understanding of key facets of per‐
formance and the inevitable trade-offs between cost, reliability, quality, safety, security and
capacity, journey time/punctuality in the railway context. It also generates rational criteria in
support of decision making thus reducing the dependency upon opinion-based subjectivity,
lengthy processes and less-informed costly choices. The enhanced objectivity and transparency
would result in streamlined decision making and more efficient/responsive processes thus
saving time and cost and fostering progress. Additionally, it generates major economic benefits
by arriving at a right solution first time. In short, a more objective and numerate approach
could help to avoid the subjectivity which be-devils much of the current approach to safety
and security management.
Finally, an integrated approach to safety and security assurance that is based on a generic
accident model is intuitively more pertinent than one based on anecdotal observation and view
of available technologies. It rebalances focus on risks that arise during design, installation,
operation, maintenance and retrofitting. It cuts across organisational boundaries, roles,
responsibilities and requisite competences that, in the system life-cycle approach, tend to be
overlooked thus constraining our perception of risks.
In view of the increasing concerns over security of the transportation systems, the advanced
processes and methodologies principally developed and applied in safety critical industries
such as nuclear, transportation, oil and gas industries should be extended to the prognosis of
transportation vulnerabilities to malicious intent2. The new framework is intended to princi‐
pally harness the significant overlaps between safety and security landscape to offer:
• Systematic and scientific study of transportation networks with a view to identify vulner‐
abilities to malicious intent in a multi-modal environment whilst also identifying safety and
environmental issues.
• Assessment of the risks associated with significant hazards, vulnerabilities or threats.
• Identification of principal elimination, control and mitigation measures.
• Cost-benefit studies to provide technical, procedural and organisational risk elimination/
control/mitigation measures with highest potential impact.
• Transportation threat/vulnerability log to keep key stakeholders informed and engaged in
the overall assurance process.
• Transportation surety cases to capture the system, safety and security issues (hazards,
threats and vulnerabilities), control and mitigation measures and the rationale for the
continued vigilance and continual improvement.
• Safety and security (Surety) management systems to provide a framework for continued
control and fulfilment of the obligations by the duty holders.
2 UITP-UIC Press Release June 2004
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The key benefits will accrue from a structured and cost-effective and high-performance
approach to the integrated safety and security assurance of products, systems and services
hence surety. In view of the generic nature of the process, these capabilities can be extended
to provide the integrated services beyond transportation.
Integrated framework for assurance of safety and security is highly pertinent to the emerging
profile of the railways in that, whilst safety is subject to an impressive record of improvement,
security is a largely unknown and poses the bigger challenge in the overall assurance land‐
scape.
The risk profiling of the national railways depicted in Section 5 did not take security threats
and system level vulnerabilities into account. This was largely driven by the concerns over
network safety at the time and lack of immediate security threats to the railways. Ever-since,
railways and mass transit systems in the European mainland and indeed in Asia have been
targets of attacks and terrorism highlighting the need for a consistent, comprehensive and
effective approach to security assurance alongside that of safety.
7. Safety Roles and Competences
The safety performance of the various transportation modes is on the steady improvement
largely driven by better regulation, improved deployment of communications and computing
technologies in spite of rising speeds and passenger numbers. Many countries in North West
Europe outperform the European average for passenger and workforce fatalities with Den‐
mark, United Kingdom and Netherlands in the top three best performing countries that have
performance an order of magnitude below the European average.
The European Railway Agency (ERA) has published indicative statistics on the relative safety
of various transportation modes that indicates railways are approaching aviation levels of









Table 5. Relative Safety of Transportation Modes (Source ERA)
Taking the top level system’s constituents perspective as depicted in Figure 2, we postulate
that whilst advancing technology has made significant contributions to the reliability and
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integrity of the automation and infrastructure, the human (people and process) aspects have
lagged behind in the relative scale of improvement. The principal aspects relating to people’s
influence on the safety performance relate to their competence and the collective values/
behaviours referred to as safety culture. The rules, codes of practice and standards constitute
the other key contributory facet of overall system safety framework. The desired improve‐
ments in rules and standards as well as understanding and improving collective safety culture
are beyond the scope of the current discussion. Here, we concentrate on the systematic
characterisation, evaluation, assessment and management of safety competences as a key
aspect of the human dimension in safety performance.
7.1. Competence
The European Guide to good practice in knowledge management [6] defines competence as
an appropriate blend of knowledge, experience and motivational factors that enables a person
to perform a task successfully. In this context, competence is the ability to perform a task
correctly, efficiently and consistently to a high quality, under varying conditions, to the
satisfaction of the end client. This is a much more demanding portfolio of talents and capabil‐
ities than successful application of knowledge. So a competent person is much more than and
knowledge worker [20]. Competency may also be attributed to a group or a team when a task
is performed by more than one person in view of the multi-disciplinary nature, complexity or
the scale. A competent person or team requires a number of requisite qualities and capabilities,
namely
1. The domain knowledge empirical, scientific or a blend of both.
2. The experience of application (knowing what works) in different contexts and the
requisite skills.
3. The drive, motivation to achieve the goals and strive for betterment/excellence as well as
appropriate behaviours such as team work, leadership, compliance with professional
codes etc.
4. The ability to adapt to changing circumstances and demands by creating new know-how.
5. The ability to perform the requisite tasks efficiently and minimise wastage of physical and
virtual resources.
6. The ability to sense what is desired and consistently delivers a high quality to the
satisfaction of the end client(s).
The right blend of these abilities renders a person or group of people (a team) competent in
that they would achieve the desired outcomes consistently, efficiently, every time or more
often than not satisfying or exceeding the expectations of the clients over varying circumstan‐
ces. Such persons/groups will be recognised for their mastery of the discipline and not just
considered a fount of relevant knowledge often characterised by qualifications. In this spirit,
competence is the ability to generate success, satisfaction, value and excellence from the
application of knowledge and knowhow.
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The Business Dictionary [7] defines competence as a cluster of related abilities, commitments,
knowledge and skills that enable a person (or an organisation) to act effectively in a job or
situation. It further states that competence indicates sufficiency of knowledge and skills that
enable someone to act in a wide variety of situations. Because each level of responsibility has
its own requirements, competence can occur in any period of a person’s life or at any stage of
his or her career. With reference to the legal profession, the dictionary defines competence as
the capacity of a person to understand a situation and to act reasonably. The disputes regarding
the competence of an individual are settled by a judge and not by a professional (such as a
doctor or a psychiatrist) although the judge may seek expert opinion before delivering at a
judgment.
In the context of UK’s Managing Health and Safety in Construction (CDM Regulations), [8]
the HSE elaborates on the necessity for competence as follows.
To be competent an organisation or individual must have:
• Sufficient knowledge of the tasks to be undertaken and the risks involved.
• The experience and ability to carry out their duties in relation to the project, to recognise
their limitations and take appropriate action to prevent harm to those carrying out con‐
struction work, or those affected by the work.
The HSE [9] further maintain that competence develops over time. Individuals develop their
competence through a mix of initial training, on-the-job learning, instruction, assessment and
formal qualification. In the early stages of training and experience, individuals should be
closely supervised. As competence develops, the need for direct supervision should be
reduced. If you are engaging a person or organisation to carry out construction work for you,
then you need to make a reasonable judgement of their competence based on evidence. The
evidence will usually be supplied to you by the person or organisation quoting or bidding for
the work. There are many industry card schemes which can help in judging competence.
However, the possession of a card by an individual is only one indication of competence. You
are expected to make efforts to establish what qualifications and experience the cardholder
has.
7.2. Recent Developments
The matters of competence and relevance of the deployed human resource to the requirements
of mission and safety critical tasks have always been recognised but not been explicitly
formalised until recently. The European Standard for Safety Critical Software [11] in the rail
sector is potentially the first to recognise and formalise human competence requirements in
the context of high-integrity software development for railway applications. The tables in
Annex B of the standard have ten normative role specifications in the development of high-
integrity software for safety applications, namely
B.1: Software Requirements Manager
B.2: Software Designer
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B.9: Software Project Manager
B.10: Software Configuration Manager.
For each one of the above roles, a template based on the UML Class for the role is developed
to describe the minimum essential competence requirements in terms of attributes (qualities)
and operations (key activities and responsibilities) in the development and deployment of
safety critical software. Whilst these appear simplistic and potentially inadequate, the signif‐
icance of recognising and incorporating human characteristics in a traditional process only
standard cannot be under-stated. In this respect, the competence requirements in the safety
critical software standard are just a start and a foundation for more elaborations!
In principle, many of the normative software roles are generic and can be modified and applied
to hardware, sub-system and system aspects. In a complex and safety critical project, it is
beneficial if not necessary to adopt a systematic approach to characterising, assessing and
managing competence in the key roles since as a minimum; these will be required for sub-
system and system level software developers where a fair proportion of the change will
originate from. To this end, a Competence Assessment and Management System is an essential
aspect of a credible strategy within the context of a safety critical programme.
7.3. Competence Assessment and Management, a Systems Approach
Given the six facets of competence elaborated earlier under 7.1, the acquisition, assessment,
development and management of competence poses a challenge beyond the traditional
education and curriculum vitae. Whilst a blend of all six facets is a pre-requisite for competency
and mastery in a given discipline, the significance of each is highly dependent on the context
and requirements of a given domain. Whilst theoretical knowledge plays a more significant
role in abstract scenarios, experience of application, adaptability and creativity may become
more prominent in other domains. Whatever the domain, however, a systems framework for
the evaluation, development and enhancement of competence is called for. This by necessity
comprises two inter-dependent framework one focused on evaluation and assessment and the
other on the management of competence.
7.3.1. Assessment of Competence
The competence assessment framework provides an integrated perspective on competence in
a given context whilst additionally empowering the duty holders or the organisation to
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benchmark each aspect, measure, assess and where necessary take actions to enhance various
elements in the framework. [20] This is illustrated in the Weighted Factors Analysis (WeFA)
schema of Figure 7. The latter aspects of benchmarking, evaluating, assessing and potentially
enhancing competence are inherent in the underpinning WeFA methodology [12] and not
elaborated here. The Schema details are omitted and elaborated in the subsequent section.
Figure 7. The Systemic Competence Assessment Framework
The determination, benchmarking, evaluation and quantified performance assessment of six
drivers and three inhibitor Goals in the above WeFA schema is carried out as follows
7.3.1.1. Driver Goals
The requisite ‘domain knowledge and understanding’ in a given context as depicted in the
driver Goal 1 (G1) is broadly supported by relevant industry’s skill/competence frameworks.
There are a number of such frameworks in use largely within various engineering disciplines
in the United Kingdom, for example OSCEng, [13] IRSE [14] and IET [15]. Given the poor state
of attention to competence and systematic approaches to its recognition, evaluation and
assessment internationally, United Kingdom appears amongst the leading proponents
globally [16].
Railway Research - Selected Topics on Development, Safety and Technology70
benchmark each aspect, measure, assess and where necessary take actions to enhance various
elements in the framework. [20] This is illustrated in the Weighted Factors Analysis (WeFA)
schema of Figure 7. The latter aspects of benchmarking, evaluating, assessing and potentially
enhancing competence are inherent in the underpinning WeFA methodology [12] and not
elaborated here. The Schema details are omitted and elaborated in the subsequent section.
Figure 7. The Systemic Competence Assessment Framework
The determination, benchmarking, evaluation and quantified performance assessment of six
drivers and three inhibitor Goals in the above WeFA schema is carried out as follows
7.3.1.1. Driver Goals
The requisite ‘domain knowledge and understanding’ in a given context as depicted in the
driver Goal 1 (G1) is broadly supported by relevant industry’s skill/competence frameworks.
There are a number of such frameworks in use largely within various engineering disciplines
in the United Kingdom, for example OSCEng, [13] IRSE [14] and IET [15]. Given the poor state
of attention to competence and systematic approaches to its recognition, evaluation and
assessment internationally, United Kingdom appears amongst the leading proponents
globally [16].
Railway Research - Selected Topics on Development, Safety and Technology70
The composition and extent of ‘skill and relevant experience’ in a given context as depicted in
the driver Goal 2 (G2) in the assessment framework is supported by subsequent decomposition
of G2 into lower-level WeFA structures, the so-called Level 2 and Level 3 goals. This principally
helps determine the driver and inhibitor goals for the higher-level goal, the domain experience.
The requisite ‘psycho-physical factors and behaviours’ in a given context as depicted in the
driver Goal 3 (G3) in the framework is supported by subsequent decomposition of G3 into
lower-level WeFA structures in WeFA. This principally helps determine the driver and
inhibitor goals for motivational, behavioural and drive aspects.
The essential determinants of ‘efficiency and waste minimisation’ in carrying out tasks in a
given context as depicted in the driver Goal 4 (G4) in the framework is supported by subse‐
quent decomposition of G4 into lower-level WeFA structures that drive or inhibit this goal.
The key determinants of ‘quality, excellence and consistency’ in carrying out tasks in a given
context as depicted in the driver Goal 5 (G5) in the framework is supported by subsequent
decomposition of G5 into lower-level WeFA structures, drivers and inhibitors, respectively.
Finally, the degree of ‘adaptability, innovation and creativity’ in a given context as depicted
in the driver Goal 6 (G6) in the framework is supported by subsequent decomposition into
lower-level factors relevant to this focus.
Given the hierarchical nature of WeFA schema, the so-called level 1 goals in the proposed
individual competence assurance system are generic and universal. The decomposition of
these goals into appropriate drivers and inhibitors in levels 2 and beyond will help tailor the
generic model towards specific requirements of a given role in a given context. The driver and
inhibitor goals in levels 2 and below in a competence role schema denote the specific measur‐
able predictors for generic level 1 goals such as knowledge, experience.
Once a role is completely characterised through decomposition of the generic model (level 1)
into a number of predictors (levels 2 and below), the schema is subsequently weighted by the
same expert panel that have helped with the development of the schema. This assigns relative
significance to the factors in the schema thus rendering it compatible with the values, prefer‐
ences and possibly culturally driven norms within the application environment. A calibrated
schema is then reviewed, enhanced and validated for general application within the context
of use. In an automated environment, a validated/authorised schema can be assigned to every
member of staff in a given role, enabling them to evaluate themselves against the criteria and
develop a competence profile to establish the areas in need of further development.
7.3.1.2. Inhibitor Goals
The key aspects and the extent of ‘lack or inadequacy of relevant new learning’ in a given
context of application as depicted in the inhibitor Goal 1 (G1) in the proposed framework is
supported by subsequent decomposition into lower-level WeFA structures, the so-called Level
2 and Level 3 drivers and inhibitors.
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The key predictors and the extent of the ‘absence or inadequacy of relevant practice’ in a given
context as depicted in the inhibitor Goal 2 (G2) in the framework is supported by subsequent
decomposition into lower-level WeFA structures.
Finally, the degree of ‘recurrent errors and violations’ in a given context as depicted in the
inhibitor Goal 3 (G3) in the framework is supported by subsequent decomposition into specific
predictors of these behaviours and outcomes in the schema.
A suitably developed and validated WeFA schema for competence assessment in a given role,
context/domain additionally requires a measurement scale for each goal (driver or inhibitor)
as well the weights, that is the strengths of influence(s) from each goal, on higher-level goals.
Once established, the weighted framework lends itself to application for assessment and
management of individual’s or groups’ competence in fulfilling tasks in the particular context
as depicted by the framework. This would render a number of advanced features and benefits,
namely
• Up to five levels of competence comprising apprentice, technician, practitioner, expert,
leader in a given role/domain;
• Identification of the gaps and training/experience/mentoring requirements;
• A consistent and systematic regime for continual assessment and enhancement.
It should be noted that assessment here is devised and intended as a tool in the service of
systematic approach to staff development and should not be misconstrued as an adversarial
instrument for classification of people’s contributions to the organisation.
7.3.2. Management of Competence
The deliverables of the engineering process applied to the creation and realization of parts,
products, systems or processes often follow a life cycle from concept to decommissioning as
popularised by engineering standards as detailed in Section 2.
In this spirit, the human resource involvement/employment within an engineering environ‐
ment, organisation or project likewise follows a life-cycle comprising seven key phases
essential to the systematic and focused management of knowledge, [20] namely
Proactivity comprises corporate policy, leadership, mission, objectives, planning, quality
assurance and commitments to competency and service delivery for the whole organisation;
Architecting and profiling which comprises specification and development of a corporate
structure aligned with the strategy and policy objectives together with the definition of roles
and capabilities to fulfil these;
Placement which essentially involves advertising and attracting candidates matching the role
profiles/requirements involving search, selection and induction. Selection relates to deriving
role focused criteria and relevant tests to assist with the systematic assessment, scoring and
appointment tasks. Induction involves a period of briefing, familiarisation and possibly
training the extent of which is determined by the familiarity and competence of the individual
concerned and the complexity and novelty of the role;
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Deployment and empowerment which involves a holistic description depicting the scope of
the responsibility, accountability and technical/managerial tasks associated with a specific role
and empowering the individual to fulfil the demands of the role. This would include training,
supervision, coaching, resourcing, delineation of requisite authority and accountabilities,
mentoring and potential certification as means to empowerment for achievement and devel‐
opment;
Appraisal which involves the planning and setting performance objectives, and identification
of the performance indicators/predictors synergistic to the demands of a role and the individ‐
ual’s domain knowledge, aimed at ensuring all relevant and periphery aspects of the role are
adequately addressed and the necessary provisions are made for learning where a need is
identified. The evaluation and appraisal provides the necessary feedback on compliance with
individual and organisational objectives and achievement, enabling the organisation to
identify and reward good performance and develop remedial solutions where necessary;
Organisation and culture which involves clarification of role relationships and communica‐
tions, support, reward and motivational aspects for competency development including
requisite resources and learning processes for attaining the policy objectives. This is intended
to develop and foster a caring and sensitive approach/culture nurturing talents and paving
the way towards an innovating organisation;
Continual development and progression: this comprises identifying the synergistic aspects
which may serve as a complementary and rewarding extension to individuals’/teams’ specific
roles. Development may involve managerial, technical, support functions or an appropriate
blend of duties at the whole life-cycle level or extensions to the role-specific activities and
vision/ career paths above an existing role into other parts of an organisation and even beyond.
The review and assessment of success in all the principles inherent in the framework also fall
within the continual development principle.
The seven focal areas/principles constitute a systematic competency management framework.
It is worth noting, however, that employment and project/product life cycles are orthogonal
in that securing the requisite human resource and competence for any phase of an engineering
production activity would potentially involve all the seven phases of the competence man‐
agement.
The traditional process-based prescriptive rules and standards [4] have served the industry
over a century where product and system complexities were generally low permitting good
design and sufficient testing to ensure integrity of products, processes and systems. The
pervasive complexities arising from adoption of new ICT technologies have necessitated a
continuous approach to assurance throughout the life cycle as advocated by modern standards.
This is now the accepted norm in the most safety and mission critical applications and
industries.
Alas, the significance and role of the human agent has been largely ignored so far on the
unfounded assumption that a recipe given to any capable and qualified person will ensure
quality and integrity of the outcomes. With the ever increasing embedded knowledge contents
in most products, processes and systems, the necessity to focus on the humans as the source
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of such creation, and their fitness for the task in hand is now gaining momentum. In the face
of such realisation and demands, our capacity to understand, characterise and evaluate human
capabilities and latent potential has lagged significantly behind other technological advances.
We posit that human competence should be regarded as an integral facet of assuring designs,
products and services, especially those with safety, security, sustainability or mission critical
profile. The continual assurance processes advocated by modern standards need to comple‐
mented with focus on human competence to face the modern challenges of high risks and ever
increasing complexity. The framework offered uses systems thinking to address assessment
and management of competence within a coherent solution for enhancing quality, safety,
reliability and assuring integrity.
8. General Trends and Emerging Issues
The statistics published by the Office of Rail Regulation (ORR) in the United Kingdom [17] is
a timely reminder of the rise in passenger demand over the recent past that seems to illustrate





















































Figure 8. Rise in UK Railway Passenger Demand (ORR data)
Data from the World Bank relating to a rather similar period [18] seem to pint to a rising trend
especially in the developing economies (Figure 9).
Overall, rise in global demand for rail transportation needs to be matched by increasing
infrastructure investment, technology development and rising consciousness about the carbon
foot print and global warming impact of transportation. Given the highly advantageous
position of rail transportation with respect to sustainability, energy efficiency, carbon foot‐
print, convenience and the increasing speeds, this is a growth industry on a competition course
with the airlines.
Railway Research - Selected Topics on Development, Safety and Technology74
of such creation, and their fitness for the task in hand is now gaining momentum. In the face
of such realisation and demands, our capacity to understand, characterise and evaluate human
capabilities and latent potential has lagged significantly behind other technological advances.
We posit that human competence should be regarded as an integral facet of assuring designs,
products and services, especially those with safety, security, sustainability or mission critical
profile. The continual assurance processes advocated by modern standards need to comple‐
mented with focus on human competence to face the modern challenges of high risks and ever
increasing complexity. The framework offered uses systems thinking to address assessment
and management of competence within a coherent solution for enhancing quality, safety,
reliability and assuring integrity.
8. General Trends and Emerging Issues
The statistics published by the Office of Rail Regulation (ORR) in the United Kingdom [17] is
a timely reminder of the rise in passenger demand over the recent past that seems to illustrate





















































Figure 8. Rise in UK Railway Passenger Demand (ORR data)
Data from the World Bank relating to a rather similar period [18] seem to pint to a rising trend
especially in the developing economies (Figure 9).
Overall, rise in global demand for rail transportation needs to be matched by increasing
infrastructure investment, technology development and rising consciousness about the carbon
foot print and global warming impact of transportation. Given the highly advantageous
position of rail transportation with respect to sustainability, energy efficiency, carbon foot‐
print, convenience and the increasing speeds, this is a growth industry on a competition course
with the airlines.
Railway Research - Selected Topics on Development, Safety and Technology74
With the advancing technology, increasing automation, land speeds and demand for higher
levels of safety, the key issues facing the industry from a safety and security perspective will
be
i. Safety and security assurance of complex communications, supervisory and control
systems comprising advanced hardware, hugely intricate heterogeneous software
including some COTS components and vast amount of data.
ii. Integration of diverse multi-sourced inter-operable systems into a safe operational
railway system.
iii. Understanding, addressing and monitoring of organisational and culture aspects of
the human dimension.
iv. Developing and adopting advanced evidence driven scientific frameworks for
evaluation, assessment and certification of railway products, services and systems.
v. Integration of safety and security assessment and management frameworks [19] for
enhanced effectiveness, efficiency and cost reduction.
vi. Standardisation and harmonisation of operational rules across international borders.
vii. Developing common methods and metrics for the evaluation and assessment of
safety and security.
Finally, with the maturity of the ICT technologies employed and improvement of safety
performance, the concern will shift towards security as a more likely cause for incidents and
accidents than the traditional concern over safety. Increasing levels of automation in train
driving, traffic management and control would expose the future railway environment to a
range of security threats that may take the operators, IMs and the authorities by surprise unless
security, alongside safety is taken into account throughout the life cycle of products, systems
and processes.
To this end, a similar reference portfolio as developed for the UK national railway’s safety
hazards is required to address security threats and vulnerabilities at railway system level. This
Figure 9. Rise in Global Railway Passenger Demand (World Bank Databank)
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will provide a rational, systematic and consistent support to the operators and the supply chain
in the industry empowering them to effectively address the security requirements pertinent
to the scope of their services, products, systems and processes.
9. Abbreviations
CBRN Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (attacks)
CDL Central Door Locking
CDM Construction, Design and Management (regulations)
Comms Communications
ConOps Concept of Operations
COTS Commercial-Off-the-Shelf
CRS Customer Requirements Specification
CSC Certificate of Safety Conformity
DRACAS Data Reporting and Corrective Action System
EMC Electro-Magnetic Compatibility
FMECA Failure Mode Effects and Criticality Analysis
FRACAS Failure Reporting and Corrective Actions System
FSaR Functional Safety Requirements
GDP Gross Domestic Product
HAZAN Hazard Analysis
Hazid Hazard Identification
HAZOP Hazard And Operability Study
HRC Human Resource Competence
HSE Health and Safety Executive (UK)
HW Hardware
IHA Interface Hazard Analysis
IP Intellectual Property
ISA Independent Safety Assessor
IT Information Technology
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O&M Operation and Maintenance




OSHA Operation and System Hazard Analysis
PHA Preliminary Hazard Analysis
PSP Product, System or Process
PW People-ware, the human element in a control system
QMS Quality Management System
RAM Reliability, Availability, Maintainability
SDS System Design Specification
SDSS System Design Safety Specification
SHA System Hazard Analysis
SSHA Sub-system Hazard Analysis
SIL Safety Integrity Level
SLSR Railway System Level Safety Requirements
SMS Safety Management System
SMIS An old UK Safety Management Information System data base
SRS System Requirements Specification
SSHA Subsystem Hazard Analysis
SSRS Subsystem Requirements Specification
SW Software
THR Tolerable Hazard Rate
UML Unified Modelling Language
V&V Verification & Validation
VTR Validation Test Report
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Abstract
This chapter presents the results of a cognitive systems engineering approach applied to
railway systems. This application is through the methodology of ’System for Investiga‐
tion of Railway Interfaces – SIRI’. The utility of the chapter lies in highlighting errors in
the current approaches to safety risk management.
Keywords: Cognitive systems Engineering, Systems safety engineeering, Human factors
engineering, Risk and Decision Making
1. Introduction
This chapter presents the results of a cognitive systems engineering approach to safety, ’System
for Investigation of Railway Interfaces – SIRI’. The objectives of the application are to show:
a. How current methods to model, analyse, and manage safety risk do not facilitate learning
lessons from past accidents;
b. How the use of heuristics by decision makers induce biases into the Committee-based
decision-making process;
c. How failure of understanding amongst railway practitioners manifests when the attrib‐
utes of reliability, availability, maintainability, and safety (RAMS) are treated as inde‐
pendent parameters of a signalling system.
© 2015 The Author(s). Licensee InTech. This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution,
and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
The above failings are demonstrated by means of a case study of Cambrian European Railway
Train Management System – ERTMS – level crossing incident investigated by UK’s Rail
Accident Investigation Board(RAIB) in Jan 2012.
RAIB noted that a deviation to a safety critical requirement to interlock the function of the
barriers with the function of train protection (braking system) was granted by the Signalling
Standards Committee to the duty – holder organisation – Network Rail, without asking for a
human factors analysis or risk assessment to support the deviation request. This incident
occurred at the automatic barrier locally monitored type level crossing (ABCL). This chapter
provides the causal factors behind the decision to grant a deviation to safety critical require‐
ments.
This chapter draws upon author’s papers peer reviewed and published in the proceedings of
the IET International System Safety Conferences since 2006, and publicly available literature
[2, 3, 4, 7, 9, 11, 12].
The rest of the chapter is organised in this way: Section 1 provides the abstract of the chapter;
Section 2 shows why wrong-but-popular approaches to safety risk management persist in the
railway domain; Section 3 presents a case study using the SIRI methodology to help under‐
stand its application; Section 4 provides conclusions on subject matter of the chapter. Section
5 provides acknowledgements. Section 6 provides the references.
2. Explanation for persistence of wrong-but–popular approaches to safety
risk management: Doing the wrong thing right
OM. What instructions did the Blessed Lord give: Be compassionate. Be controlled.
Be charitable.
Sri Adi Śhankarāchārya, 8th Century AD, Brihadaranyaka Upanishad
Translated by Prof V. Roebuck [79]
Everything is fine today that is our illusion.
Voltaire, quoted by Douglass W. Hubbard [29]
We have inherited the neural mechanisms that evolved to provide ongoing
assessment of threat level, and they have not been turned off. Situations are
constantly evaluated as good or bad, requiring escaping or permitting approach.
Good mood and cognitive ease are the human equivalents of assessments of safety
and familiarity.
Nobel laureate and psychologist, Prof Daniel Kahneman (pp. 90) [36]
OM is the sacred symbol to denote Brahman in the Hindu religious literature. More informa‐
tion can be gained about the nature and meaning of the symbol from reading Prof Roebuck’s
writings [79]. Prof Charles Perrow, originator of Normal Accident Theory, recounted the
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abnormal blessings he had received from his co-researchers in his preface to second edition of
his book. Author speculates that Prof Charles Perrow did not know the source of abnormal
blessings for the success of Normal Accident Theory as he may have thought he had not prayed
for its success [49, 79]. In his survey of risk assessment theories and practices, Charles Perrow
did recognise the work of cognitive systems engineering experts and various kinds of rational‐
ities but opinied that these view points did not recognise the role of power in and of organisa‐
tions (pp. 379) [79]. Interpretating the reality of accident causal factors and represent them by
means of fault free fault tree analytical representation to show errors in the systems engineer‐
ing steps, in the professional opinion of the author, helps mitigate the problem of discounting
power of subject matter experts, and risk assessors in generating biased risk information in
producer and client, systems engineering and regulatory organisations (pp.65) [52].
From the vast literature on risk on the perspective of risk rationality in human affairs, it is easy
to think of four types of rationalities: omniscient rationality, which is enjoyed by political
economists like Nobel laureate Gary S. Baker, “bounded” or limited rationality advanced by
organisational decision scientist is and some risk assessors like Nobel laureate Herbert A.
Simon, irrationality as advocated by behavorial economists like Noble laureate Daniel
Kahneman, reluctant rationality of participants in making choices and displaying regret after
the fact who may regard false negative alarms (near miss incidents) as reliablity events [36,
62]. Typical example being NASA managerial judgements on the Challenger launch decision.
Neuro-scientists have identified human brain regions associated with emotional and cognitive
side of information processing activity when an individual processes a risky stimulus [36, 50].
Studies cited by Nobel laureate Daniel Kahneman, Peter N.C. Mohr, and his co-workers draw
attention to the fact that decision maker(s) when engaged in the tasks of revealing preferences
or answering queries on uncertain situations such as questions on lottery, risk assessment, and
risk management do consult their emotions, and these decisions can be called decisions under
risk. Decision theorists like psychologists, philosophers, statisticians, and economists ap‐
proach decision making in a mathematical manner and are not prone to emotions and framing
effects felt in the case of non-decision scientist(s) asserted in these research papers. The idea
of risk as a rare event with odds of 1 in 400 or more with a consequence probability of 0.249%
is possible is acknowedged by Prof David Hand, an expert statistician [26]. In other words,
definition of rare events and estimation of the odds of their occurrence by expert statisticians
may be prone to error is the thesis advanced by Prof David Hand. Evidence for this thesis is
drawn by Prof David Hand from the case study of Sudden Infant Death Syndrome. Sir Roy
Meadow’s expert evidence led to erroneous legal prosecution of Sally Clarke. Rare event of
train and vehicle collision on the Great Britain railway track was experienced by the members
of the same family in the UK within a span of 15 years is cited as well [26]. The mean expected
rate for such random events to occur as per Poisson’s distribution is 0.741%. It is tempting to
arrive at a conclusion that operational reliability of the railway is very high, i.e. 99.25% based
upon the foregoing metric. Most pre–university students learn about stastitical distributions
in their final year of secondary school leaving stage. Students of risk management can easily
be laid into error if they are not careful in their thinking when making risk judgements that
involve casual inferences (pp. 166–67) [36]. The litmus test for any student of decision making
Application of Cognitive Systems Engineering Approach to Railway Systems...
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and risk management is the case of NASA Space Shuttle Accident in 1986. This case study
alone poses challenge to statistical and rational decision theory, learning from past failure
incidents, theories of control, system safety, and risk management [5, 36, 49]. The signal of less
than adequate design shuttle vehicle flown by NASA and supported by its supplier, Morton
Thiokol, till the pre-launch decision was obscured or buried under the noise generated by the
hindsight observations of NASA manager’s pre-launch decision [5]. To its credit, NASA,
Langley Research News hosts the book on its website written by former Morton Thikol
engineering director, Allan Madonald, who had a change of heart without any apparent reason
on the pre-launch decision day and went along with engineer Roger Boisjoly who was opposed
to the launch decision [5], [55]. Risk management expert Douglass Hubbard is of the view that
Bayesian risk analysis may have helped in the case of NASA Challenger decision situation
where the failure data was scanty [29]. Bayesian risk analysis can certainly help if prior
information of categorial variables is available in the odds form and likelihood ratio of positive
and negative rates are known as well. But we ‘ve bear in mind Prof James Reason’s thesis that
most of us are not intutive bayesians [55]. Once Johann Wolfgang von Goethe observed that
it is much easier to recognize error than to find truth; the former lies on the surface, this is quite
manageable; the latter resides in depth, and this quest is not everyone’s business. No accident
researcher has the luxury of verifying correspondence between ideas of managerial oversight
and risk seeking behavior apart from relying upon lessons learn from behavioral science risk
literature (pp. 228) [53, 54].
The thesis advanced in the research papers in the area of cognitive psychology is that people
who resist intutive responses to following bat–ball question do not need to reflect on the
question again. The bat-–ball puzzle is as under. This question is to be answered in an intutive
manner without solving it on a paper.
A bat and ball costs £1.10.
The bat costs one dollar more than the ball.
How much does the ball cost?
The intutive answer is 10 cents. Many thousands of university students have answered the
bat–ball question. More than half of the undergraduate students at Harvard, MIT, Princeton
gave the intutive–incorrect –answer.
The failure rate at other American universities is even more higher at 80% (pp. 44–45) [36]. The
correct answer is 5 cents. Perhaps, a distinction between intelligence and rationality is needed
is the suggestion made by these researchers (pp. 49) [36].
The author observes that intutive errors in decisions made by these undergraduate students
cannot be explained by saying that these students are not skilled mathematicians. The author
speculates that the psychological mechanisms involved in the perceptual and cognitive
decision process by experimental subjects are as follows; mentally formulating the equations
to represent the quantities of prices involved, and then subtracting the equations to identify
one of the single unknown and arrive at its value by halving it. The difference between those
who get the right and wrong answers is simply this: failure to divide in the final equation.
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These errors are attributed by cognitive psychologists to the property of overconfidence of
subjects who answer the question as 10 cents. From the science of cybernetics perspective, the
purpose of the bat–ball question is to trigger thinking activity on decisions on safety-related
control systems where the safe state of the system cannot be perceived by sight and failures in
risk management and safety assurance process are likely [12, 28, 44, 57].
When author compares and evaluates the foregoing behavorial science research findings
against the research findings published within system safety research domain, then another
type of culture of decision-making emerges. Complexity of a socio-technical system became
the focus of attention of system safety researchers during the 1980s. Prof Charles Perrow (1984)
argued that complexity of organisations and tight-coupling of systems render it difficult to
foresee how rare accidents can occur. The problem of complexity poses serious challenge to
formal system safety management processes. Evidence is available to show that the counter
thesis of Normal Accident Theory namely, High Reliable Organisations, is negated by John
Bushby’s case study of two British railway accidents [16]. James Reason (1990) whilst advanc‐
ing a general view of accident causation in complex systems in the form of Swiss Cheese Model
observed that system (normal) accidents have their origin in latent failures (fallible decisions)
in supervisory control systems made at the corporate management, designer(s), and line
management levels. He noted that identifying latent errors is a challenge faced by human
factors researchers concerned with preserving the safety of complex, high-risk systems (pp.
199–216) [55]. Further, the author accepts Prof James Reason’s idea of latent error that it is
intimately bound up with the character of technology and accepts that tackling latent errors
by identifying resident pathogens is the most effective way to improve the safety of complex
systems (pp. 174) [55]. Prof Jens Rasmussen (1994) and his co-workers raised the question: are
managers willing to spend the effort required for effective risk management? They argued
senior managers like chief executive officers (CEOs) may not possess competence to deal with
discipline of system safety management as they are usually drawn from finance or legal
background (pp.159) [52]. System safety practitioners are to be found at lower levels in
organisation in situations where the mean time between fatal accidents is large and the tenure
of CEOs is short. In other words, CEOs do not get feedback on their performance in the field
of system safety risk management. Further, they argued that Prof James Reason’s approach
will encounter problems if large number of ’less than adequate’ conditions or decisions are
identified from the past accidents using causal trees included in the Management Oversight
and Risk Tree by William Johnson. However, applicant shows how the problem of representing
various less than adequate latent failures by way of fault tree representation, taking into
account the less-than-adequate decisions, is shown by the case study later on. This will show
where interventions may be necessary.
It is common to observe three strategies to manage risks of fatal accidents [2, 52]. The strategy
of emperical safety control used in the traffic and work domain is based upon ‘safety on the
average’ for high-frequency and low-consequence traffic accidents. The problem with the
strategy is that these measures may be degraded if the organisation is under economic
pressure. Author finds that Network Rail’s approach to change the specification of a signalling
cable without checking for unsafe conditions that may be generated during operations is one
example from the railway domain of this tendency to buckle under economic pressure as it
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was done in 2011. Risk management strategy of making design improvements after learning
lessons from investigation of medium size, infrequent accidents is practised within the railway
and aircraft domains. The third, risk management strategy followed is through the control of
hazards based upon use of multiple barriers or defences as in the nuclear domain based upon
predictive risk analysis (pp. 35–159), [52]. Prof Trevor Kletz argued that organisations suffer
from lack of memory in 2003 [38]. An UK Health & Safety Executive (HSE) Publication HSG
238 argued that safety-related control systems are bound to fail if the errors in the specification,
design, testing, commissioning phases (lifecycle factors) of control systems are not checked
and corrected [72, 73 ,74, 75]. Prof Nancy Leveson presented a new control systems engineering
method, named STAMP, for accident analysis, which included representations of legal, socio-
technical systems as well [40]. Knut Rygh, Chief System Safety Engineer, Accident Investiga‐
tion Board, Norway, stated in 2005 publication that it is an establised fact that a systematic
safety assessment is an accident investigation before the accident occurs (pp. 90–108) [63]. It
follows from the foregoing research facts that an occurrence of incident or an accident implies
that system safety case which documents the results of potential accident has either failed to
investigate the potential hazard in a thorough manner or system case documentation ignored
the hazard that could occur in the operations or lessons learnt from past accidents were
forgotten or unknown dangerous unforeseen mode of operation has occurred or incident
reporting system has failed or failures in risk management process were ignored or the
independent safety analysts organisation has used the safety target of Mean Time to Unsafe
Failure for safety case without using HAZOP + Fault Tree Analysis in the safety analysis of
complex systems [29, 33, 34]. Prof Derek Hitchins (2007) stated that systems engineering cannot
be carried out by the method discovered by Rene Descartes; dividing the problem space into
its parts to analyse the parts and a holistic method as a frame of reference is necessary [28].
Following the financial crisis in 2007/2008, the idea of Black Swan event was popularised by
Prof Nicholas Taleb [36]. Prof John Adams (2009) argued that economics of safety is a debate
that is not settled as moral attitudes towards risk management are not stable; they depend
upon the individual or social cultural perspective invovled in the debate [1]. Nobel laureate
Daniel Kahneman (2011) argued that senior executives lack robust decision-making process
and are prone to committing same errors like others as well [36]. Further, most railway, house-
hold kitchen, and weapons system projects fail to attain their objective due to planning fallacy
as noted by him drawing upon the evidence of 2005 Oxford study. Prof David Hand (2015)
argued using the evidence of 2008 financial crisis that risk inherent in the finance operations
is better handled by Cauchy distribution as the decision-making framework of Gaussian means
and variance leads to under-estimation of fat-tail risk events. During the financial crisis in 2008,
it was revealed that Goldman Sachs’s Chief Financial Officer (CFO) reported 25 standard
deviation events occuring in a row in their operations [26]. Readers may wish to look up the
probability of 25 Sigma event on the freely available online website – Wolfram Computational
Engine. This works out to be 6.113 E-10–138 or a chance event of obtainning a head in all tosses
of 456 fair coins. These rare events have occurred several times during the course of the past
two decades. This failure in understanding risk is labelled in the safety risk literature as latent
error. If latent errors are not cognised, then there is no way to address them. Therefore, switch
to Bayesian risk management is required. However, Prof David Hand’s work illustrates how
abuse of statistics can occur [26].
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The following are the definitions for latent and active errors.
Definition: Active errors are human errors, whose effects are felt almost immediately. For
example, a road user may enter a level crossing space when it is not safe to do so due to wrong-
side failure of the level crossing as in the case of the Herefordshire level crossing accident in
2011 [2, 11].
Definition: Latent errors are human errors whose adverse consequences may lie dormant
within the system for a long time, only becoming evident when they combine with other factors
to breach system (production) defences. For example, wrong-side failure event of the level
crossing caused by the signaller who raised the barrier needed a conjuction of events of lack
of approach locking and a road user entering the crossing space simultaneously to manifest
the Herefordshire level crossing accident in 2011 [2, 11]. The independent accident investigat‐
ing organisation, RAIB, reasoned, by way of counter-factual reasoning, that if the level crossing
were to be fitted with approach locking facility, then the signaller would have been prevented
from raising the road barriers, after they have been lowered. The causal statement was accepted
by all organisations invovled in the situation according to the intutive frame of reference in
the language of Prof Jens Rasmussen. Rather than questioning the scenario as to why the train
did not stop at the level crossing signal fitted with Train Protection Warning System (TPWS)
when stop signal was replaced, RAIB remained satisfied with the answer they found [2]. Based
upon behavorial research discussed earlier, lack of cognitive reflection is implied and author
concludes that this is a sign of irrationality. In human error terms, this act of omission can be
called violation by element and duty holder as well.
Now, let us look at the other reasons for failures to recognise latent errors. First, lack of
familiarty with the cognitive system engineering approach advocated by Prof Jen Rasmussen
and his co-authors in the railway domain signalling and telegraph, human factors, safety and
risk experts [52, 54]. Consequence of the lack of familiarity is the exclusion of certain stake‐
holders organisations’ contribution to risk. Prof Jens Rasemussen’s approach demands that
cognitive system analysis shall include all stakeholder organisations and their contribution
(positive or negative) towards system safety performance must be represented. These contri‐
butions are captured by way of a graphical representation in the form of Accimap [32, 52, 54].
Evidence for the lack of familiarity of contribution of human errors in management field can
be seen in the case of the popular quantitative risk assessments made up of fault and event
tree model. These representations are used by industrial practitioners for identifying accident
precursors to safety risk, but do not include latent errors [24, 56]. The latent errors are errors
committed in the areas of risk policy, domain-specific safety standards, which are industry
consensus standards, and ignore errors in system design, risk assessments, independent safety
assessments and reviews, and risk management that lead to less than sub-optimal diagnosis
of potential or actual hazards. And as a result, risk assessors and managers pay less attention
to less than adequate barriers for controlling hazards can be seen from the documentation on
hazard analysis, modelling, risk analysis, and management of individual and societal risk
concerns [17, 24, 60, 61, 72, 74, 75, 77]. Recommendations from the UK HSE Guidance on safety
relevant control systems are not followed in these documents [73, 74]. When accidents do occur,
front-line staff or members of public get blamed for less than adequate designs with which
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these actors have to grapple as it can be seen in the case of assertion made in the publication
by a team of railway signalling and train driving managers and this blame culture was
investigated as well [25, 80].
All psychologists hold the thesis that human mind cannot estimate the probabilities or
likelihood of rare events which lie between the interval of zero to one percentile and ninety-
nine percentile of distribution of probabilities and errors in judgements arise due to basic
inability in human thinking (pp. 315) [36]. Misconceptions of chances and lack of recognition
of co-variation do occur in the railway industry is asserted by the author following Prof James
Reason’s work. For example, collision of a train with a vehicle on the track was regarded as
once-in-a million kind of chance event by a member of public is cited by Prof David Hand [26].
The author found that the probability of Hixon level crossing accident was reckoned by S. Hall,
a British Rail signalling expert (1991)to be one in a million kind of chance event [2, 11].
However, the RSSB (formerly Rail Safety and Standards Board) Report tells a different story
of high likelihood of more than ten collisions events per year [59]. If readers think that progress
may have been made since 1990s, then they will be disappointed to read that errors in risk
modelling by Network Rail/RSSB All Level Crossings Risk Model were reported in the UK
House of Commons Report in 2014 [71]. Combining two pieces of information such as RSSB’s
statistical data with the causes identified in the RAIB accident reports poses a problem of
inferrring causes of level crossing accidents. This problem is logically equivalent to the problem
of applying Bayes rule to the taxi-cab problem cited in the risk literature (pp. 166–167) [36].
Second explanation is that the majority of railway domain experts, i.e. engineers and managers,
are not aware of errors in their statistical, economical, logical, ontological, and cosmological
reasonings of railway accidents [26, 32, 36, 42, 50, 55, 67].
For example, if reliability, availability, maintainability, and safety properties of systems and
human actors forming part of a given social-technical system are considered in an unified
manner, then it is clear they are not to be treated as independent parameters as it is assumed
in classical economical theories is demonstrated by sociologist Prof Charles Perrow and system
safety theorist Prof Nancy Leveson as well [40, 49]. Prof Charles Perrow argued that errors in
sub-systems in the system lifecycle factors may interact in unforseen ways; and as a result of
these unwanted interactions, risk of an accident cannot be foreseen and pre-determined.
Therefore, some high-risk technologies like nuclear plants that are prone to acccidents should
be avoided. Rare events like nuclear power accidents require more time to manifest not
withstanding the claims of risk assessors and managers to the contrary [13, 17, 49, 57]. The
author found this reasoning to be true in the cases of NASA Space Shuttle Challenger and
Japanense Nuclear accidents where errors in risk assessment led to under-estimating of fatal
risk in terms of its likelihood [5, 6]. RSSB does not apply the requirements in the risk guidance
from cognitive perspective issued to the industry to itself and fails to identify risk in its
management systems are shown by the case study in the paper [58, 59, 60, 61].
The author is led to the insight on human and scoial cognition, drawn from works of Nobel
laureates Herbert A. Simon, Daniel Mcfadden, and Daniel Kahneman, that cognitive errors
in information processing activity do exist [36, 42, 55, 67]. Insight drawn from the work of
Nobel laureate, Herbert Simon (1978), is that the fundamental limitation of human cognition
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in organisational context gives rise to satisficing behaviour: tendency to settle for satisfacto‐
ry rather than optimal courses of action; this is discussed in the text on the topic of bounded
rationality in Section 3.3.1 of the Chapter 2 on cognitive science tradition by James Reason
[55]. In the same text, Reason observed that this is true for both individual and collective
decision  making  and  cites  Cyert  and  March  (1963)  who  demonstrated  organisational
planners are inclined to compromise their goal setting by choosing minimal objectives rather
than those likely to lead to best outcome. Organisational behaviour needs to become the
focus of attention [15]. Two examples of the necessity to focus on this social tendency to
compromise goals can be read from the evidence of failure of the High Speed 2 Business
Case in the UK House of Lords Economics Affairs Committee Report and failure in the
case of Chinese ERTMS Train Crash [14, 68].
Third, Prof James Reason advanced the idea of controlling safer operations by identifying the
pathogens hidden in the senior and line management decisions and practices that feed into
psychological precursors of unsafe acts is the best way of controlling safer operations [55].
These hidden pathogens are best discovered, as per the author’s knowledge, by using the
Management Oversight and Risk Tree to include human failings in risk assessment, risk
management, engineering management, and investment management. This idea is supported
byProf Jens Rasmussen as well. The problem of determining the risk in a qualitative or
quantitaive manner is subject to professional biases is noted by Prof David Ball in the UK HSE
Research Report 034 on how to understand and respond to the societal concerns. He observed
that a risk management strategy cannot be promoted without a belief that one way of life, or
one way of sharing risks and costs, is better than another [73]. Questions of will to impose harm
on others and acting under ignorance are philosophical questions if we disregard the legal and
bounded rationality perspective for a moment [66, 67]. Acting upon information generated by
FN curves by means of RSSB’s Safety Risk Model or FN curve data analysis without taking
into account decision-making under uncertainty is an error is noted by Prof Andrew Evans in
his study of transport accidents. The literaruture by Prof Andrew Evans shows how FN curves
are constructed [76].
The HSE Report 034 had emphasised the need to incorporate plural views into decision
making, while acknowledging that these will be based substantially on beliefs, values and
ways of categorising the world, rather than upon objective information [73]. Role culture plays
an important role is shown by Prof John Adams as well. In other words, bias will unavoidably
be encountered, and ultimately the question may well come down to choosing one form of
bias over another. Further, the following features characterise risk-based decision-making:
• not all values are equal – some can be more thoroughly justified than others (moral philos‐
ophy) and some – when applied – produce better practical results than others
• a risk management strategy cannot be promoted without having an opinion that one way
of life is better than another.
• risk management is essentially political – the only honest and open way forward is to admit
this and embrace it
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The Skills-Rules-Knowledge taxonomy advanced by Prof Jens Rasmussen is applicable to the
co-operative archictecture of work which is applicable to the current regime of risk manage‐
ment within the Europe as well [53, 54, 55]. Duty of co-operation is mandated by the UK Rail
Regulator as well [46]. Contrary to the advice that emerges from reading the management
literature that safety and production planning should not be placed lower than finance and
planning activity in the hierarchy of management concerns, it is common place to find
economic concerns being prioritsed ahead of the safety concerns in the industrial context. From
cognitive science perspective, this act of compromising safety is a violation (pp. 206), [55].
The cognitive biases and information processing flaws were identifed by Prof Andrew.P. Sage
as well. These flaws affect information formulation for acquisition, analysis, and interpretation.
These can be read from the works of Prof Andrew P. Sage [47]. These flaws are based on those
identified in the works of 1974 Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky’s paper [36].
The following are the biases that have come to the author’s attention as a result of his own
research on system risk assessment and management.
1. Incomplete data. Failure to include uncertainty in the scientific estimates of reliability,
availability, and maintainability of digital signalling systems including communication
systems as a whole. I know the report is damning, and it may be based upon solid
evidence, but how sure are we? We must allow for that uncertainty in our thinking.
2. Defence-in-depth fallacy. Fallacy on the part of computing science experts who entertain the
idea that graceful degradation of automated information processes (fault tolerant
architecture) shall be fail safe as the automated system is designed to stop the process
under control if in doubt over the data (how the computer will doubt its input data, its
own logic, and the outputs it generated if it has no access to real world like human beings
is not questioned?);
3. Affect Heuristic and/or planning fallacy. The transport programme has large benefits and no
major costs. I suspect the affect heuristic. No one pays attention to the fact of failure of
90% of the large railway projects to attain the cost, and passenger targets has been cited
in a 2005 study. The great and good in the company are agreed with the programme
mission and they like their plans. I suspect Affect and satisficing heuristic and planning
fallacy [36].
4. Narrative fallacy. The consulting engineer is learning too much from the recent £1 billion
project success, which is too tidy. The engineer has fallen for a narrative fallacy.
5. Out of mind out of sight bias. The fault tree and event tree analysis of the train crashes do
not show any management and technical errors. I suspect ‘out of mind out of sight bias’.
6. Blame Game. The train failed in the tunnel. The communcation between the trackside and
train-based equipment did not take place in the degraded scenario due to operator error.
The computer simulation did not test this scenario. I smell the ‘blame game’.
7. Gambler’s fallacy. Clear-cut information about the probablity of an event is not taken into
account because people believe that chance is a self-correcting process, such that a
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availability, and maintainability of digital signalling systems including communication
systems as a whole. I know the report is damning, and it may be based upon solid
evidence, but how sure are we? We must allow for that uncertainty in our thinking.
2. Defence-in-depth fallacy. Fallacy on the part of computing science experts who entertain the
idea that graceful degradation of automated information processes (fault tolerant
architecture) shall be fail safe as the automated system is designed to stop the process
under control if in doubt over the data (how the computer will doubt its input data, its
own logic, and the outputs it generated if it has no access to real world like human beings
is not questioned?);
3. Affect Heuristic and/or planning fallacy. The transport programme has large benefits and no
major costs. I suspect the affect heuristic. No one pays attention to the fact of failure of
90% of the large railway projects to attain the cost, and passenger targets has been cited
in a 2005 study. The great and good in the company are agreed with the programme
mission and they like their plans. I suspect Affect and satisficing heuristic and planning
fallacy [36].
4. Narrative fallacy. The consulting engineer is learning too much from the recent £1 billion
project success, which is too tidy. The engineer has fallen for a narrative fallacy.
5. Out of mind out of sight bias. The fault tree and event tree analysis of the train crashes do
not show any management and technical errors. I suspect ‘out of mind out of sight bias’.
6. Blame Game. The train failed in the tunnel. The communcation between the trackside and
train-based equipment did not take place in the degraded scenario due to operator error.
The computer simulation did not test this scenario. I smell the ‘blame game’.
7. Gambler’s fallacy. Clear-cut information about the probablity of an event is not taken into
account because people believe that chance is a self-correcting process, such that a
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deviation in one direction will necessarily be followed by a deviation in the opposite
direction. ‘The shares have been falling for the railway firm, it is time to buy as the trend
will reverse’. Gambler’s fallacy can be seen as a factor in the explanation of Saint Peters‐
burg paradox described in the literature.
The expected value of the game as a sum of the product of probability of loss or gain multiplied
by the values of the outcomes considered by the decision maker(s) or taker(s) is poor psychol‐
ogy is noted by Nobel Laureate, Daniel Kahneman. These type of erroneous arguments can be
seen in the case of level crossings [25].
8. Illusion of Invincibility bias. The supplier has announced a new train protection system
which is designed to be fail safe and uses mutliple but redundant channels for information
processing. Full moon effect on information processing is not recognized. I suspect
‘Illusion of invincibility bias’.
9. Expert’s Subjective Risk Bias. The supplier has furnished us the risk register for the antici‐
pated risks. The hazard mitigation method is noted by the domain experts, but the method
of hazard control is insufficent for the risk. I suspect ‘Expert’s Subjective Bias’.
Allais paradox: Norms of Expected Utility Theory and axioms of Rational Choice were violated
due to certainty effect by expert statisticians and future Laureates in Economics in the following
decision situation is cited by Laureate economist Daniel Kahneman (pp. 310–321) [36], (pp. 39)
[55].
Decision I: choose 61% of £520,000 or 63% of £500,000
Decision II: choose 98% of £520,000 and 100% of £500,000
10. Railway Senior Managers’s Fallacy. The train driver has the ultimate responsibility for the
safety of the train and passengers and has to comply with signal commands. We have
robust systems for recruiting, training, developing, and certifying the train staff. Our
operating rules and regulations are robust. The train drivers can handle the emergency
and normal situations with cognitive work load.
11. Our experience has shown that signalling systems are functioning correctly after the
accident. I suspect ‘Senior Manager’s Fallacy’.
12. Railway Engineer’s fallacy. Human intuitions are prone to errors and mistakes. Train
driver’s response is too slow for attaining productivity target. Let us automate the train
driving task. I suspect ‘Engineer’s fallacy’.
13. Instrumentalism Fallacy. Give a small boy a hammer, and he will find that everything he
encounters needs pounding. I suspect instrumental fallacy.
14. Geometer’s Fallacy. Noble laureate and a physicist, Albert Einstein, in his phenomenalogical
experience wrote that old geometers like Euclid dealt with conceptual objects (straight
line, point, surface) but not really with space, such as was done later in Descartes’s
analytical geometry [20]. We must be careful of the lack of connection between geometry
and physics. I suspect Geometer ‘Engineer’s fallacy’.
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15. Measurement Fallacy. Risk not measured is not managed. Let us quantify the risk of rare
events according to Poisson method and justify that it is acceptable as the greater good of
the society is served by ignoring so-called wider human factors. I suspect Measurement
Fallacy.
16. Concrete Jungle Fallacy. European and American city dwellers have a much higher
percentage of rectangularity in their environments than non-Europeans and so are more
susceptible to Muller-lyer illusion. Muller-lyer illusion occurs when two lines of equally
long parallel lines with arrow tails placed at the end visually appear longer.
17. Coherence Bias. The plan to implement the requirements as a decision rule has been agreed
by domain experts. But this plan fails to meet the decision criteria for cognitive adequacy
and safety requirements. Warnings about the inadequacy are dismissed as soon as raised.
The operator’s inattention due to distractions in the environment to execute the task is
ignored. I suspect group–think bias [4, 36].
18. Fault and event tree analysis bias. Goldman Sach’s (error cited earlier) bug is not acknowl‐
edged by mechanical approach to change management in organisations without paying
attention to the nature and behaviour of organisations and blindly relying upon methods
like fault and event trees are prone to error [13, 16, 17, 25, 55, 65, 78].
Some of the above latent human factors that may contribute to any of the potential ERTMS
accident was noted by Sanjeev Appicharla in 2013 [6, 8]. The author refers the reader(s) to an
excellent online 2010 report by Felix Redmill in the computing science domain on how to judge
if the safety risks are ALARP via a decision-making process [57]. There is no unanimous
agreement on the use of ALARP principle as per the UK House of Lords Report [77]. However,
the Redmill’s 2010 Report does not take into account all errors in information processing of
choices revealed to us by economists and psychologists in general and Nobel laureates, Herbert
A. Simon, Daniel Mcfadden, and Daniel Kahneman in particular [36, 42, 67]. The author does
not subscribe to the idea automated risk assessement tools such as genetic alogrithms are of
help. Readers may note that SIRI methodology is a engineering methodology to assist system
and safety analysis of engineered systems by taking into account success and failure scenarios
and based upon the theory of decision-making under uncertainty in the data and decision-
making process [35, 37]. The challenges posed by problems of complexity, causality, overcon‐
fidence, human error, hindsight and outcome biases, bounded rationality, economic choices,
cognitive limitations, out of sight out of mind bias, halo effect, omissions and oversight has to
be met by any methodology to be used for decision making for the assurance of system safety
risk management of complex engineered systems [55].
In this section, idea as to why some wrong approaches to safety risk management relying upon
risk-benefit analysis or fault and event tree analysis or reactive risk management persist was
discussed.
In the next section, the case study of ERTMS Cambrian Safety Critical Incident is taken up to
show how the foregoing concepts are logically demonstrated in the case study of Cambrian
ERTMS Safety Critical Incident.
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3. Analysis and modelling of cambrian ERTMS safety critical incident
To manage the hazardous (potential or actual) situations, the different steps followed in the
system and safety analysis as per SIRI methodology are as follows [3].
a. Developing description of an operational railway (system modelling process through
architecture context diagrams, operational process diagrams, parameters diagram,
and/or event causal flow analysis and agree emergent properties). This activity is usually
carried out within a team and process is used to elicit domain knowledge through
representation of diagrams such that a validated design or concept diagram is taken as
input to the next stage of the SIRI methodology;
b. Identifying hazards (hazards identification process through hazard and operability
(HAZOP) study, a team-based acitivity by HAZOP Chair);
c. Modelling accident scenarios (causal analysis process through Energy and Barrier Trace
Analysis to identify harmful energy sources, victims, and barriers; failures of barriers
detected through the application of Management Oversight and Risk Tree questionnaire
and compare results with Skills–Rules–Knowledge Framework and Swiss Cheese Model
to identify latent errors and develop the Hazard and Causal Factors Analysis Report.
These tasks are to be carried by HAZOP Chair and Secretary)
d. Performing risk assessment and developing countermeasures (risk assessment process
through Bayesian risk analysis and/or binomial distributions or Cauchy distributions to
work out base rates, these results may be needed to be incorporated with MORT Analysis.
Risk analyst and HAZOP Chair)
e. Preparation of impact assessment and documentation of results and release for stake‐
holders’ consultation or peer review (impact assessment process, HAZOP Chair and
MORT Analyst)
The last three steps may involve iterative process between them; processing of develop‐
ing understanding may require intermediate stages to store the results on a draft version
to revisit  the branches of Management Oversight and Risk Tree (MORT) questions from
engineering and risk management perspectives. A red, green, amber light marking system
may be  needed  as  each  sequence  of  energy  transfer  process  may  need  to  be  revisited.
Further, as the original Management Oversight and Risk Tree in 1974 was developed with
an understanding that at the design phase engineers and their managers will  be able to
perceive, concieve, and act upon the identified hazards before the close out of the design
process [35, 37]. However, as the railway domain does not use the concept of affordance
of harm from the system as a design criterion as required by human factors engineering
process, it is necessary to consider various heuristics used by designers and operators and
resulting  biases  that  may  arise  at  the  design  as  well  as  operational  time  in  the  risk
assessment, safety verification, and valdiation phases [5, 6].
It is assumed that HAZOP Chair and Risk Analyst roles will be performed by competent
persons. In terms of meeting systems engineeering and safety standards set by engineering
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institutions such as Institution of Electrical and Electronic Engineers – IEEE std 1220 or
International Electro-technical Commission – IEC 61508 or sector-specific European Commit‐
tee for Electro-technical Standardisation – CENELEC 50126, the two stage processes of system
and safety analysis can be complied and implemented with the help of SIRI methodology [6].
To produce a model of an operational railway, the model should be able to reflect the real
world closely. The operational railway includes several interfaces in all operational circum‐
stances:
a. Man–machine interface (driver–line signals, signaller–automatic route setting, driver–
train, etc.)
b. Machine–machine interface (interlocking – lineside signals, ATP-train brake, ERTMS-
interlocking, ERTMS-fixed and mobile telephony, mobile telephony to ETCS, etc.)
c. Man procedures (operational procedures, work instructions, etc.)
d. Organisational interfaces (safety standards, failure management, hazard control between
duty holders, between duty holders and industry bodies, between various types of
organisations)
However, the present modelling languages suffer from a disadvantage in the sense that they
tend to superimpose their own order on existing systems and fail to capture the rich partial
order present in the system.
The application of the SIRI methodology to the incident situation under study is described.
The RAIB Accident Investigation Report is used as the input document alongside the MORT
(2002) questionnaire.
The RAIB Summary is reproduced here.
Shortly before 22:00 hrs on Sunday, 19 June 2011, a passenger train, travelling from Aberyst‐
wyth to Machynlleth, ran onto the level crossing at Llanbadarn while the barriers at the
crossing were raised, and came to a stop with the front of the train about 31 metres beyond the
crossing. There were no road vehicles or pedestrians on the crossing at the time. The immediate
cause of the incident was that the train driver did not notice that the indicator close to the
crossing was flashing red until it was too late for him to stop the train before it reached the
crossing. Factors behind this included the driver’s ‘Increased work load’ (his need to observe
a screen in the cab at the same time as he should also be observing a lineside indicator), the
design of the equipment associated with the operation of the level crossing, and the re-setting
of the signalling system on board the train before it could depart from Aberystwyth. An
underlying cause of the incident was that the signalling system now in use on the lines from
Shrewsbury to Aberystwyth and Pwllheli does not interface with the automatic level crossings
on these routes.
The RAIB has made six recommendations, three directed to Network Rail, two to Arriva Trains
Wales, and one to the Rail Safety and Standards Board. These cover the development of
engineering solutions to mitigate the risk of trains passing over automatic crossings which
have not operated correctly; changes to the operating equipment of Llanbadarn crossing; the
Railway Research - Selected Topics on Development, Safety and Technology94
institutions such as Institution of Electrical and Electronic Engineers – IEEE std 1220 or
International Electro-technical Commission – IEC 61508 or sector-specific European Commit‐
tee for Electro-technical Standardisation – CENELEC 50126, the two stage processes of system
and safety analysis can be complied and implemented with the help of SIRI methodology [6].
To produce a model of an operational railway, the model should be able to reflect the real
world closely. The operational railway includes several interfaces in all operational circum‐
stances:
a. Man–machine interface (driver–line signals, signaller–automatic route setting, driver–
train, etc.)
b. Machine–machine interface (interlocking – lineside signals, ATP-train brake, ERTMS-
interlocking, ERTMS-fixed and mobile telephony, mobile telephony to ETCS, etc.)
c. Man procedures (operational procedures, work instructions, etc.)
d. Organisational interfaces (safety standards, failure management, hazard control between
duty holders, between duty holders and industry bodies, between various types of
organisations)
However, the present modelling languages suffer from a disadvantage in the sense that they
tend to superimpose their own order on existing systems and fail to capture the rich partial
order present in the system.
The application of the SIRI methodology to the incident situation under study is described.
The RAIB Accident Investigation Report is used as the input document alongside the MORT
(2002) questionnaire.
The RAIB Summary is reproduced here.
Shortly before 22:00 hrs on Sunday, 19 June 2011, a passenger train, travelling from Aberyst‐
wyth to Machynlleth, ran onto the level crossing at Llanbadarn while the barriers at the
crossing were raised, and came to a stop with the front of the train about 31 metres beyond the
crossing. There were no road vehicles or pedestrians on the crossing at the time. The immediate
cause of the incident was that the train driver did not notice that the indicator close to the
crossing was flashing red until it was too late for him to stop the train before it reached the
crossing. Factors behind this included the driver’s ‘Increased work load’ (his need to observe
a screen in the cab at the same time as he should also be observing a lineside indicator), the
design of the equipment associated with the operation of the level crossing, and the re-setting
of the signalling system on board the train before it could depart from Aberystwyth. An
underlying cause of the incident was that the signalling system now in use on the lines from
Shrewsbury to Aberystwyth and Pwllheli does not interface with the automatic level crossings
on these routes.
The RAIB has made six recommendations, three directed to Network Rail, two to Arriva Trains
Wales, and one to the Rail Safety and Standards Board. These cover the development of
engineering solutions to mitigate the risk of trains passing over automatic crossings which
have not operated correctly; changes to the operating equipment of Llanbadarn crossing; the
Railway Research - Selected Topics on Development, Safety and Technology94
processes used by railway operators to request permission to deviate from published stand‐
ards; the operational requirements of drivers as trains depart from Aberystwyth; and the way
in which drivers interact with the information screens of the cab signalling used on the
Cambrian lines.
3.1. System analysis diagram
To enable, visualise, and reason about risk manager behaviour in general operating situation
within the real world, the author has prepared an adapted version of diagram of Prof Jens
Rasmussen’s Skills-Rules-Knowledge Framework within Cognitive Science tradition. The
diagram does not show actual mental world of an individual, but it is a model or a represen‐
tation to be used by SIRI Analyst to reason about certain behaviour in philosophical, teleolog‐
ical, cultural, and scentific traditions of thinking and reasoning reflected in the literature on
risk. However, it should be noted that this model does not reflect real truths. As Prof David
Hand has written, one must revert to religion or pure mathematics for learning absolute truths
[26]. It only shows a frame to reason about heuristics which allows response (automatic or
reasoned) to the questions on risks or operator’s actions in the real danger situation as well as
shortfalls in risk or investment actions reasoned in the mangerial thinking.
To enable  easy  comprehension of  the  context  of  the  UK railway industry  operations,  a
system diagram is  prepared.  This  is  shown in Figure 1.  This  is  an architectural  context
diagram (ACD) showing stakeholder organisations involved in the context of the Cambri‐
an ERTMS Incident. From a systems engineering perspective, organisations forming part
of the railway system are Network Rail and Passenger or Freight operating (not shown in
the  figure)  companies,  European  Railway  Agency,  RSSB,  RAIB  are  system  supporting
organisations whereas Department of Transport is the ultimate owner of the UK Railway
System. Office of Rail Regulator, ORR, is a regulatory organisation. Element organisations
like Alstom, Siemens,  Ansaldo,  Bombardier,  Invensys,  and Thales that  supply signalling
solutions  are  represented  as  contractors.  Professional  engineering  societies  which  train,
license, and certify individuals to meet the railway industrial needs are not represented in
the  diagram,  but  are  recognised  as  institutions  contributing  to  human  capital  develop‐
ment and as consequence to risk management as per Noble laureate and economist, Gary
Becker’s  perspective  [62].  Notified  bodies  or  project  safety  organisations  are  treated  as
entities  acting as  contractors  providing safety auditing,  assessment,  advice,  and accredi‐
tion. The brief details of European Process validation and certification process is defined
in the Section 5.5.3 of the uic Compendium on ERTMS [81].
From system analytical perspective, the definition of an organisation offered by Nobel Herbert
Simon that organisations are adaptable systems made up of physical, technical, and human
resources and exhibit what is known as ‘satisficing behaviour’ is accepted in this chapter [67].
The solid red lines in the above figure indicate safety critical interfaces and functions and
dotted red line indicates influences emerging from accident investigations. Symbol 1 indicates
ORR is legally independent of the Secretary of State. Symbol 2 indicates Passenger Focus is an
independent body set up by the UK Government to protect the interests of passengers.
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3.2. Hypothetical HAZOP study
The description of hazard identification and analytical methods used in the SIRI methodology
is available in the published litearture. It is a hazard identification technique promoted by the
UK Intuition of Chemical Industry in the early 1970s [17].
From the information gathered from the summary section, paragraph 95 and 177 of the RAIB
Report, the critical interface between stakeholder organisations, Network Rail, the owner of
the rail infrastructure and Arriva Trains Wales (ATW), the passenger train operating company
at the operational time is the interface between driver’s eye ball and the driver crossing
indicator [51]. This is identified as Driver_ Perception of the Driver Crossing Indicator (DCI)
and is the emergent property to be conserved in this study and operations as well.
The indicator was flashing red giving dynamic information to the train driver, but driver’s
response was delayed and the train did not stop ahead of the level crossing, indicating a safety
critical deviation. From the SIRI methodological perspective, after Driver_ Perception is a
safety critical deviation as the event of driver perception occurred after the braking point
despite stopping ahead of the crossing space. Reading of the para 100 and subsequent text of
RAIB Report suggests that signaller made mistake in setting the routes which led to a timing
sequence problem, leading to the event of the opening of the barriers prior to the event of train
Figure 1. Architecture Context Diagram of the Railway Industry. Adapted from the UK National Audit Office Report
(The UK National Audit Office 2010).
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passing over the crossing space. The chain of events leading from this pre-cursor event is not
discussed as the parameter of interest in the hypothetical HAZOP study is Driver_ Perception
of the Driver Crossing Indicator in the sequence of events desired and its late occurrence.
Suffices to note that signaller’s error is a latent error and it is clear that human factor analysis
of the signaller’s task post implementation was not carried out. This is a latent error from the
Common Safety Method’s perspective as well [11].
Moreover, the design intent of ERTMS signalling automatic train protection (ATP) system is
to provide the signal to programmable electronic system giving information on safe speeds
and stopping points in Full Supervision (FS) Mode [82]. Thus, from the ERTMS signalling
system function perspective, the emergent property which is to be conserved by trackside sub-
system to on-board train system critical interface is Provide_ Signal.
But the national signalling infrastructure and human factors are excluded from the scope of
Signalling Supplier’s Consortium’s (UNISIG) safety analysis. Further, the Compendium on
ERTMS notes in Section 8.3.2 that the Index 47 document contained in the Chapter 6, risk
analysis performed by two member states resulted in different interpretations of the hazard
lists [82]. Given the fact that certain signalling entities and human factors are excluded, then
the questions on the purpose of the European Train Control System(ETCS) to provide the train
driver with information to enable drive the train safely and to enforce respect for this information is not
satisfied if Driver _Perception _ Crossing Indicator is not included in the movement authority
information. This discovery should provoke thoughts on the requirements management
process used in the programme management of ETCS programes. This incident has shown
that the design intent as per RGS GE/RT 8026 was not met [51].
The sample HAZOP worksheet for automatic train protection system adapted from the IEC
61822 standard for HAZOP study is shown in Figure 2. From reading the text in the para of
the RAIB investigation, para 157 it is clear that the movement authority across the crossing
was issued without stopping information ie No _ Provide_ Signal [51]. From this hypothetical
HAZOP study and RAIB information, it is clear that trackside sub-system was not configured
for the emergent property Provide_ Signal at the ABCL Level Crossings. If a real HAZOP study
were to be conducted, then this failure may provoke thinking about the adequacy of study of
failure scenarios and barriers as well.
Absence of the road user at the crossing space averted the potential accident. The real accident,
if it had occurred, may have led to a range of outcomes with the loss of life as well as public
and media outrage, if too many fatalities had resulted from it.
Figure 3 shows the schematic diagram of Llanbadarn ABCL facility. This figure may have to
be zoomed to 180% or above to gain visual clarity. At the minimum, actions as planned under
the risky scenario of raised barriers and stopping train front stopping 31 metres beyond the
crossing space would have certainly resulted in a collision between the road and the rail
vehicle, given the present understanding of laws of physics [48].
The absence of road user at the same time when the train passed the ABCL crossing space in
error is judged by the SIRI analyst to be an ‘act of God’, as the intention of all stakeholder
organisations such as regulating, specifying, developing, designing, manufacturing, supply‐
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ing, utilising, and maintaining the ABCL design is to allow road users (without committing
an error) to pass through the crossing space when barriers are raised.
Non-provision of engineered safety feature in the contemporary ABCL design is a signalling
engineering induced (latent) error at the RSSB Standards Committee Level whereas driver’s
delay in departing and arriving at the strike in point may be signaller (active) induced error.
Figure 2. Sample HAZOP worksheet for ATP system.
Figure 3. Schematic diagram of Llanbadarn ABCL.
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The SIRI methodology adopts a system-induced error approach; and therefore, it is necessary
to look at errors from a holistic perspective. The lack of compatability of requirements between
Railway Group Safety Standard GE/RT 8026 and European Norm for ERTMS/ETCS System is
a glaring omission in the area of railway safety risk management [46]. It shows intelligence
failure on the part of all organisations. This type of failure was investigated in the GB Railway
domain in 1976 by Barry A. Turner as well [78].
3.3. System safety analysis: Application of Energy Barrier Trace Analysis – EBTA, Skills–
Rules–Knowledge (SRK) and Management and Oversight and Risk Tree (MORT) methods
Management and Oversight and Risk Tree (MORT) is an analytical technique for identifying
safety-related oversights, errors, and/or omissions, or assumed risks that lead to occurence of
an incident or accident [17, 35]. The MORT diagram uses of the logic of fault tree. It contains
two main branches. One related to control of technical factors denoted by letters SB, SD, etc.,
which are leaves of the causal tree and representing system life-cycle factors. Another branch
relates to management branch denoted by letters such MA, MB. Leaves within these branches
are noted by lower case letters a1, b2, etc., which relate these events to questions listed in the
MORT User Manual [17, 35].
The MORT Report contains following acronyms:
LTA: less than adequate
DN: did not
FT: failed to
HAP: hazard analysis process
The description of the concept of operations is drawn from the ORR documentation, RSSB
Railway Group Standards, and is based upon the author’s past experience of chairing HAZOP
study at RSSB for generic ABCL facility and described using the generic Event Causal Factors
(ECFA) analysis chart. This is shown in Figure 4. This may be required to enlarge till 180% to
gain visual clarity on the computer screen.
The description of the expected event sequence to form a coherent description uses a particular
notation of ECF analysis. The criteria to be used to read the event sequence diagram follows.
• Events must describe an occurrence, not a condition,
• Events must be described with at least one noun or verb,
• Occurrences must be precisely described,
• Events must describe one discrete action,
• Events are enclosed in rectangles and connected to other events as a forward chain using
horizontal arrows,
• Conditions are enclosed in ovals and are connected to events by vertical arrows,
• Events should range from beginning to end of the particular method of operation,
Application of Cognitive Systems Engineering Approach to Railway Systems...
http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/61527
99
• Each event should be derived from the one preceding event save for initiating event,
• Colour coding is used to distinguish infrastructure manager (IM), railway undertaking or
train operating (RU) domain, and user domain,
• Events are labelled with number or letters to identify the sequential flow of events in
respective duty holder domain.
The Concept of Operations describes the operational scenario when the train is approaching
the warning board and the train driver is in vigilant mode of information processing. However,
the desription of the incident RAIB (paragraph 110) informs that the event of approaching the
warning board was delayed due to train entering Staff Responsible, SR, mode [70]. The ABCL
being located near the station inserted a delay in the normal specification of the ABCL task
analysis, and no separate task analysis was performed by the Railway Understaking (RU) in
question. The time to approach to the level crossing space is specified in the form of a time
interval and no account was taken in the variation in the time for the tasks to be performed by
the train driver due to differernt operating modes was undertaken by RSSB before granting
deviation to the safety critical requirements specified in the Railway Group Standard – RGS
GE/RT 8026 [51].
This is a latent error embedded into the system where engineering and organisational errors
are committed. This is an instance of Railway Senior Managers and Engineer Fallacies. Further,
this latent error refutes the European Railway Agency, and RSSB’s idea that the management
and regulation of the railway is designed to ensure that – if each transport operator meets its
obligations with respect the safety of its own operation and the state also fulfils its duties –
then the sum of the parts will lead to a whole that is safe. Further, the RSSB statement does not
fit the idea of systems thinking that whole is more than sum of its parts. This idea is entertained
by system engineers as well as human factors specialists. Moreover, this error does not align
with the Best Practice of Decisions Under Risk of Prospect Theory, which is acknowledged by
RSSB in its July 2014 document [6]. Given the nature of the latent error, it is clear that this
decision not to conduct workload assessment is a violation from RSSB’s own Best Practice for
Human Factors Risk and Safe Decision Taking [58, 61].
Given the Concept of Operations diagram which the author has developed, introducing timing
analysis into the scheme is not a difficult issue if the data from the human factors engineering
is included as well. From the direct inspection of events sequence described in the diagrams
shown in the Figure 4, the expected event labelled E-IM-13 in the Network Rail domain flashing
white aspect, and contrary to the expected event labelled E-RU-6 in the Arriva Train Wales
domain, the red light was perceived, suggesting that the barriers were raised and an obstruc‐
tion may be expected in the path ahead of the train.
Realising this fact, train driver applied brakes but the train did not stop short of the crossing.
Since this constitutes a safety critical deviation, it is necessary to inquire further as to why the
driver’s response was slow and what shaped that behaviour. The train driver’s action was a
skill-based error type where the spatio-temporal response was delayed [12, 36, 55, 52].
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RU Domain Events : E-RU-1; Shared property are labelled Emergent Properties that threaten the safety of railway operations
IM Domain Events : E-IM-1
ECF Chart Showing flow of operational events Sh 1 of 3
Road User Domain Events : E-U-1, E-U-2
See Continuation Sheet 2
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Figure 4. Representation of the concept of operations of ABCL Facility signalled by traditional lineside signalling
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3.4. Energy barrier trace analysis
From the RAIB Report(s), the information available from the stakeholder organisations
websites, the following worksheet is generated. This worksheet forms the starting point of the
root cause analysis.





vulnerable person or thing
SB2




(train movement into the crossing
space) when barriers are raised
None present at the time of incident ERTMS Cab Signalling (not provided
with movement and braking
information when approaching level
crossings) does not apply to national
signalling infrastructure (incomplete
data for safety analysis).
Latent error: status quo bias
Restriction on train speed
(not provided with information at level
crossings). Latent error: status quo bias
Obstacle detection (not provided).
Latent error: habit bias.
Lifting barriers (provided) but not
inerlocked with train movement.
Latent error: habit bias.
Approaching locking (not identified in
the RAIB report). Latent error: habit
bias.
Interlocking system (did not provide
function of locking barriers with train
braking function).
Latent error: illusion of validity of driver’s
expertise.
Did not provide bridges, underpass,
etc.
Latent error: illusion of control.
Table 1. For Energy Barrier Trace Analysis (EBTA) worksheet
Logic of combinations may be applied to the following table. The author does not agree to the
Pearson’s idea that causation and correlation can be inferred in the same way [23].Credit to
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God is given at the user level crossings where no indication of approaching train can be
percieved or passenger manages to escape the accident [73, 74]. Otherwise, the table indicates
that level crossings are accidents waiting to happen. This table can be interpreted again using
the Prof James Reason’s Swiss Cheese Model as well. The ECFA activity yields information on
unsafe acts. But the precursor information on regulatory, organizational oversights is available
from the EBTA and MORT charts.
It  is  clear  from the  foregoing  particular  description  of  the  ABCL incident  by  RAIB,  an
ineffective system was deployed. The method of application of the MORT under the SIRI
Methodology has  been described in  2011 and 2012 [2,  6,  7,  9].  Call  for  replacement  for
bridges is  not  met  easily due to failure on the part  of  social  actors  to  percieve the risk
correctly.  Further  erroneous interactions  between distant  components  of  Route  Manage‐
ment System and level crossings user’s intention leading to fatality at the level crossing site
are noted in the accident literature [70].
To consider how and why the hazardous system was deployed and safeguards were not
provided, it is necessary to apply the MORT questionnaire, as an organisation framework, to
the RAIB report and related literature to arrive at all factors involved in contributing to the
incident. MORT audit questionnaire is freely available online at www. nri.eu.com [35, 37].
3.5. Information on hazard causal factors: SIRI MORT representation
The application of MORT audit questions (2002 version) and the elicited following responses
are characterised as human errors [35, 37]. Readers are requested to enlarge the images to make
them readable. The Lessons learnt from the 2011 Incident and evidences drawn from the RAIB
Report 11/2012 and 2010 RSSB Road and Rail Interface Report are described together with the
evidence to support the reasoning in the form of a fault tree representation. The MORT Causal
Trees for engineering and managerial are represented in Figure 5, Figure 6, and Figure 7. The
hueristics and biases shown are not mapped to organisations involved in Figure 5. Such
mapping may be carried out with the available information. The information contained in the
MORT Top Tree derives from the managerial and engineering branches and evidences from
the requirements for safety management system, generation, operation and maintenance of
system safey case from UK and European Commissions Norms.
The inspection of the above diagram shows that how the hazards, and heuristics and biases
involved in safety risk information processing at the knowldege -based level with a potential
of loss of 32 lives with 99% probability as per standard Cauchy distribution with statistical
median of 0.72 fatality per 1,000 ABCL level crossings and scale factor equal to 1 were not
analysed. The neglect of base rates can be seen from the HS2 Risk Report [27]. Fault within
fault tree analysis labelled as out of sight out of mind bias is self evident in this case study.
The mean weighted fatality rate of 0.72 fatalities for road vehicle passengers is taken from RSSB
Report dated 2010 [60]. The basis of the calculations and more elaboration of the causal tree
follows.
The information on the hazard causal factors will be appreciated when the information is
placed in the frame of reference using the concept of operations diagram (see Figure 3).
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It should be noted that ERTMS Safety Experts do acknowledge that Command Control &
Signalling Technical Interoperability Specification (TSI) cannot itself gaurantee the safety of
system since the National Part of Signalling System and an interface to it is outside the TSI
Scope (pp. 206) [82]. The way to integrate man–machine interactions, operational rules, or non-
inter-operability technical components into system safety analysis, as per the European
Railway Agency, is to treat the safety performance of inter-operable constituents as a fixed
factor and derive safety requirements for the non-TSI constituents. ERA arguments is that top
down decomposition and allocation of probabilities ignores the human factors in risk assess‐
ments, fault tree analysis, and allocation of physical, human and social capital. The Consensus
decision making process adopted at the RSSB Signalling Standards Committee level does not
use any system analysis to detect conflicts between various types of requirements which give
rise to human factor concerns. In other words, Group think bias due to assignable causes or
optimism fallacy can manifest in such decision settings due to systematic human failings in
lack of systems engineering process in specification of safety requirements, risk analysis &
modelling and human factors investigation. ERA is aware of incompleteness of the generic
risk analysis but RSSB does not include human factors concerns.
Less than adequate competence of professional heads of signalling, risk assessment, inde‐
pendent review, operations, human factors, safety, and systems engineering disciplines at
regulatory, safety, duty-holder, supplier and validation organisations is a natural conclusion
that can be drawn from the case study. The Greek philosopher, Plato once asked who will
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guard the guardians via Glaucon who thought it was absurd to consider their oversight (Plato’s
Republic). This was the original thesis stated by author in his 2006 publication [3]. The
European Process for SafetyAuthorisation as defined in by Peter Winter in the UIC Compen‐
dium on ERTMS in 2009 for the safety certification did not assure the safety operability albiet
technical inter-operability of components has been attained (pp.128) [81]. Identifying, inter‐
pretation of current state, evaluating of options, identification of target (safe) state, specifying
the safety goal for the Cambrian ERTMS Implementation which forms five crucial stages of
decision making of Skills-Rules-Knowledge Decision Model were less than adequate. The
work groups invovled did not have the interest of public safety at the heart of their decision
making activity (pp. 369) [49]. Management Oversight and Risk Tree’s decision model provides
the idea that noise generated by political rhetoric overshadows the signal of less than adequate
design of level crossings. Author has observed the tendency on the part of safety organisations
to club several safety and human factors engineering technqiues such as Hazop, Fault and
Event Tree Analysis, Operator Task Analysis to conduct safety critical analysis and has raised
this concerns with Chair of Human Factors Working Group of UK INCOSE set up recently [6].
The feedback on this document is awaited. However, the safety case for ERTMS/ETCS is
difficult to generate using the existing safety management methods was argued by the author
at RSSB in January 2010 [10].
Incomplete system definitions cannot be used for system safety analysis is learnt from the the
literature of control systems engineering from the UK HSE Guidance Note HSG238 as well
[73]. However, this vital fact has been omitted by RSSB research managers is learnt from
reading this research paper published in 2011 [22]. In other words, if operator error and
signalling technical error are contributory causes ( ignoring latent errors) then to attain SIL4
target for the overall system, the state of being at risk due to technical and signalling equipment
failure has to exceed one chance per hundred billion opportunities per hour. This is under the
assumption train driver’s behavior is logically equivalent to a low demand SIL2 system from
past data and including effect of immutable human nature discovered by David Hume. [65,
66, 80].
In other words, human error rate has to exceed SIL4 level if we include latent errors as well.
The question of conjunction fallacy naturally arises if the final cause of the hazard is to be
investigated together with its material (national signalling failure rate), formal (failure rate of
risk management system), and effective causes (failure of human factors), as per Prof Jens
Rasmussen’s idea of Aristoteleian causal representation as applied to hazardous events and
theory of probability as well (36), (pp. 53) [53]. Thus, the idea of fat tail risk has escaped the
attention of ERTMS specification writers, European Rail Agency safety experts, and safety risk
experts at GB rail national safety bodies and duty-holders. This social phenomena is not new.
Aircraft industry shows similar tendecies as well [13, 49].
The meaning of hazards management is restricted to storing information on databases rather
than eliminate hazards can be seen from a metro railway project Report in 2009 [30]. Further,
the idea of conjunction of random failure events of redundant information processors has been
paid attention, but fat tail risk problem showing up as group-think bias is not entertained in
the risk literature by ERTMS designers, regulators, duty-holders, and standard bodies as noted
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byNobel laureate Daniel Kahneman and Sanjeev Appicharla [4, 36]. Review of RSSB Safety
Risk Model in 2012 did not refer to the errors that could occur in the usage of Bow-tie models
as it has been shown in the accident investigation of loss of military aircraft, Nimrod in the
Nimrod Report in 2009. Accident pre-cursor models do not include managerial, and engineer‐
ing oversight and tendencyto assume risks can be seen from this review. Less than adequate
technical review of fault tree analysis can be seen from this reference [24]. Further, the Review
Report did not raise concerns over the subject matter experts using normalising constants in
the risk equation as highlighted by Prof Paul Slovic [25, 36, 78]. Further, the familiar short-cuts
have been taken to selecction of goals, task and execution of decision process as per Prof Jens
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Rasmussen’s SRK model of eight stage process of decision making and the potential hazard
of train colliding with a road vechicle was not recognised by senior managers as per Prof James
Reason’s Swiss Cheese Model. The tendency not to eliminate risk within British Railway days
is noted by risk and regulation expert, Prof Hutter [41].
The MORT results have shown the relevent hueristics and resulting biases incorporated into
the MORT analysis shows a different risk picture than the expert railway safety and economic
managers can imagine. An integrated analysis of quantified risk assessment, wider human
factors via Swiss Cheese Model, and decision errors at the knowledge -based level called latent
errors to show resident pathogens via cognitive systems engineering approach in an applica‐
tion of MORT is a novelty. This need is stated in RSSB Research Project calling for formal
procedures to be applied to the task of assessment of rules and staff of RSSB as well [19, 2–
11]. The decisions taken by various organisations show that these stakeholder organisations
were not optimising safety for the road users, passengers, and staff.
The incident occurred as RSSB/Network Rail did not consider inclusion of level crossing
functionality into the Cambrian ERTMS Automatic Train Protection System. The decision-
making process used by RSSB Signalling Standards Committee for deciding upon the imple‐
mentation of mandatory safety requirements specified within the Railway Group Standards
was less than adequate as it failed to take into worst-case scenario of risk possible and the EU
 
Figure 6: SIRI MORT SB2 Branch.  
Incomplete system definitions cannot be used for system safety analysis is learnt from the the 
literature of control systems engineering from the UK HSE Guidance Note HSG238 as 
well[73]. However, this vital fact has been omitted by RSSB research managers is learnt from 
reading this research paper published in 2011[22]. In other words, if level crossing 
functionality or human factors limitations are needed to be integrated into the system, then by 
the use of logic of fault tree analysis, the safety requirements for national signalling 
(probability of failure of national signalling asset) and human factors ( probability of failure of 
human operator) contribution to the loss event shall be greater than the overall system risk 
target of one chance event, and failure rate of national signalling systems has to exceed one 
chance per billion opportunities per operating hours (pp. 208) [82]. 
 
Correction and Restoration Factors LTA to 
prevent repeat accident/incident
Safety Improvement Factors LTA
+







Fatality risk at 1,000 
ABCL Crossings to 
Pedestrians and 
vehicle users road 
users per year is 
2.71and .72 as per 
RSSB Safety Risk 









Risk as per Cauchy distribution 
P50. 0.72, P90=3.79
P99= 32.5 computed on free online 





Risk targets anchor 
thinking that risk 
posed by railways to 
level crossing users 
is miniscule due to 
use of denominator  
used as normalising 








Errors in risk 







































Awareness of Certification/Permission Regime
LTA
----------------------------
Information processing limitations on the part risk 
assessor, safety assessors, managers, 







fallacies in reasoning 







Note 1: RSSB and Standard Committee 
Members are not responsible for safety 
properties of decisions made by them. It is the 
duty-holder’s responsibility
-------------------------------------------------
Duty-holder is required under the Common 
Safety Method to comply with Safety 
Standards when making changes to 
requirements
------------------------------------------------
So, if a duty -holder asks for a deviation to a 
safety critical requirement then RSSB will 
grant them the deviation, not withstanding  the 
fact such a change may increase risk .  
-------------------------------------------------------
Sanjeev Appicharla was formally asked by 
RSSB CCS& ENE staff in  2005 to help them 
with a systems engineering methodology to 
identify missing measures at duty-holder’s 
interface. Thus, from the above request, it can 
be deduced that RSSB’s cognitive system 
does not recognise whether a change is 
safety critical in nature or not and relies upon 
the Duty-holder to comply with Common 
Safety Method.
-------------------------------------------------------
Sanjeev Appicharla published in 2010 this 
disposition of Standard Committee to take 
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adequate barriers to protect users , 
passengers and staff from being exposed to 
the operating hazard(s).
----------------------------------------------------------
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Techncial Specification for Inter-Operability did exclude the functionality. The hazard analysis
process used to close out the hazards failed to take into account wider and local human factors
due to this exclusion [49, 55, 69]. Further, linear interaction between Design of the System with
Operator (train driver and level crossing user) is not an hidden interaction in the work
situationand therefore, from a complex systems persective, the ABCL Incident is simply a
component failure accident [55].
4. Conclusion
The reasons for persisent use of wrong-but-popular approaches like cost-benefit analysis, and
fault and event tree models for safety justification, identification of accident pre-cursors, and
management of safety risk through independent safety assessment approach were presented
in the chapter.
The Cambrian ERTMS case study has identified all engineering, managerial, organisational,
and regulatory actions which have contributed to the ERTMS Safety Critical Incident using
the SIRI methodology. The case study showed various heuristics and biases that were active
in the railway industry. This is a novel use of hueristics and biases appraoch within the
cognitive systems engineering tradition without omitting any stakeholder organisation in the
SRK, MORT, and SCM analysis.
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Abstract
The issues discussed in this chapter are of interest of both the manufacturers and the ex‐
perts responsible for condition of the track superstructure. In general, stress in steel ele‐
ments may affect the energy state, phase changes, and corrosion. It may reduce fatigue
strength and cause damage and cracks of the rails. It is one of the causes of accelerated
development of standard railhead defects. Proper selection of, e.g., bending process pa‐
rameters provides uniform distribution and acceptable level of residual stresses in the
bent components. Residual stresses that develop during manufacturing process in the
railway turnout steel components can change their strength properties. The first part of
this chapter presents ultrasonic measurement method and computer simulation that al‐
lowed to develop a method to diagnose state and distribution of residual stresses in steel
components of the railway turnout (wing rails and switch blades) in the production proc‐
ess. The second part of this chapter includes experimental and simulation studies of su‐
perstructure in operational conditions. A track substructure with a crashed stone
composite is a solution of reinforced standard track substructure. The results are used to
draw conclusions concerning further development and possible modifications of a pro‐
posed solution. A significant number of simulation calculations also allow to determine
the duration of guaranteed functionality of a reinforced track substructure.
Keywords: Railway turnout, residual stress, ultrasonic measurements, finite-element
method, ABAQUS railway track, crashed stone composite
1. Introduction
The development of the railway infrastructure at the turn of the 20th and 21st centuries and
the increase in passenger train speed to Vmax = 300–350 km/h and freight train speed to Vmax =
140–160 km/h on some routes are the results of railway vehicle design improvement and
railway infrastructure optimization.
© 2015 The Author(s). Licensee InTech. This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution,
and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
Track superstructure allowing to reach high speeds and transfer even higher stresses and loads
up to 25–30 tonnes per vehicle axle is required to meet very strict strength and durability
requirements.
The infrastructure is subject to complex dynamic effects, changing with the increase in load
and speed. In the last several decades, standard railway track structure have not change
significantly, even though it is subject to studies and improvements aimed at increasing
railway traffic safety and limiting operating costs.
The durability of the track superstructure is also affected by the quality of materials used, e.g.,
steel components used in production of railway turnouts. Steel components of the track
superstructure (rails, switch blades) show internal stresses even in the manufacturing process
due to process treatment including surface hardening and bending. The treatment introduces
additional energy to the material, i.e., stresses, which does not weaken the material, although
may affect component operation and result in damage.
2. Review of the literature
Standard railway tracks include a permanent way with the rails and the sleepers on a ballast,
operating under load in elasto-plastic state. The ballast is a source of permanent (plastic)
deformation. The advanced technological and material solutions allow the operation of the
rail bed under operating load in elastic state [1, 2]. Several developed mathematical models of
the railway track, its components, and the effect of a vehicle on the track have been detailed
in [4, 5].
Nowadays, a finite element method (FEM) is one of the most commonly used methods in
addressing complex engineering issues. The method can be used in many fields, to easily create
various areas and shapes of complex geometry. Numerical methods have been used in railway
track component development for several decades. Extended studies have been performed by
the Warsaw University of Technology, the Cracow University of Technology, and other
research and development institutes. The studies have included residual stress analysis in steel
turnout components, i.e., all rails, including flat-bottom rails.
The aim of the numerical calculations is to determine residual stresses in a rail after relieving
and to determine the influence of different parameters on stress size and pattern. The results
of numerical calculations have been compared to the results of ultrasonic stress measurements.
The studies of international researchers have included modeling the effects observed as a result
of rail rolling on roller straighteners. The studies [7] have included rail models and residual
stress patterns after rolling simulation and the effect of the rolling process on stress size and
pattern. A finite element method, as a basic tool in today’s mechanics, has also found its use
in railway track and bed development.
As mentioned in various studies, the authors of refs. [8, 12] have presented the results of
numerical calculations for created models, as well as the results of measurements performed
on testing track sections and in laboratory conditions. The author of this chapter uses FEM for
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simulation calculations of static and dynamic loads of the railway track components [13–15].
Standard railway tracks include a permanent way with the rails and the sleepers on a ballast,
operating under load in elasto-plastic state. The ballast is a subject to permanent strain
resulting in plastic deformation. The advanced technological and material solutions allow the
operation of the rail bed under operating load in elastic state [16, 17]. The weakest point of the
standard railway track is a compacted crushed stone layer. Several research studies on crashed
stone quality, type, and grading as well as on the mechanical compaction methods [18] have
been presented. The studies have not given satisfactory results in relation to the reduction of
increase in non-uniform plastic strain intensity of the ballast. As a consequence, systematic
and frequent repairs are required to eliminate unacceptable geometrical unevenness of a
railway track. An energy generated at the wheel/rail interface is transmitted by the rail and
rail fixings to the sleepers and via ballast to the rail bed causing an intense vibration field.
Kinetic energy increases with the increase in train speed, and as a result, a vibration accelera‐
tion of rails, sleepers, ballast, and rail bed increases. It results in considerable tensile stresses
within the ballast, affecting internal friction balance and causing ballast to breakup. The ballast
subsidence (plastic strain) cannot be avoided, and at the same time it increases with the increase
in ballast stresses and vibration acceleration.
Crashed stone ballast layer is subject to tensile stresses. Vibrations in the ballast layer cause
acceleration exceeding the acceleration of gravity g, further reducing ballast resistance to
tensile stresses. Crashed stone ballast layer at sleeper and ballast interface at operational loads
is in a spatial compressive stress state. The principal stress tensor can be described as σ1> σ2>
σ3 > 0. It means that the crashed stone ballast is in a tri-axial compression state thus creating
the best conditions for ballast operation. The most adverse conditions can be observed when
the ballast is subject to pulsating and variable tensile stresses. Further analysis shows that the
tensile stresses are most likely to occur near the rail fixing point, i.e., point of wheel-ballast-
crashed stone ballast load transmission and in the areas from the side of the ballast face. Top
ballast layer in those areas requires protection against factors that may cause deconsolidation.
Stress analysis in the track subgrade shows that the tensile stresses decay in the track subgrade
at the depth of 60 ÷ 80 cm.
3. Residual stress
Residual stresses are considered stresses counteracting each other inside the component, which
is not affected by any external loads. Internal loads are a measure of elastic strain energy stored
in a specific body area and are additional component loads. Assuming a plane internal strain
state of the stresses on the component surface (rail), normal and shear stresses can be defined
[20], see Figure 1.
Components of plane stress state:
• σx, σy, σz
• τxy, τxz = τyz = 0
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The stresses on the rail surface are defined by normal stresses and tangential stresses σn, σt.
Each component at the rail surface without load meets the following condition:
 0  0n tis s= =
For those conditions, the relation between strain and stress is as follows:
( )1z z tEe s ns= - (1)
( )1t t zEe s ns= - (2)
 0tnt = (3)
Residual stresses σz and σt can be determined based on Equations (4) and (5):












Figure 1. Components of plane stress state on rail surface [21].
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where σt tangential stress, σz is the normal stress, εt is the tangential strain, εz is the horizontal
residual strain, and ν is the Poisson ratio.
3.1. The phenomenon of residual stresses
The residual stress arises in the case of heterogeneous plastic deformation caused by
• bending and cold rolling
• thermal stresses
• heterogeneous phase transitions
For steel railway superstructure components, occurrence and change in residual stresses are
due to thermal stresses and plastic strain resulting from bending and cold rolling.
Thermal stresses are a result of non-uniform phase transitions due to thermal treatment,
including surface hardening, used for shaping the steel turnout components. The treatment
aims to increase hardness of the surface layer of a wing rail or a switch blade.
The effect of generating residual stresses in this case is more complex compared to heteroge‐
neous cold strain. It is affected by a temperature gradient and resulting thermal stresses,
including phase change processes, recrystallization, relaxation, and dependence of material
properties on temperature. For steel railway superstructure components, occurrence and
change in residual stresses are due to thermal stresses and plastic strain resulting from bending
and cold rolling. Thermal stresses are a result of non-uniform phase transitions due to thermal
treatment, including surface hardening, used for shaping the steel junction components. The
treatment aims to increase hardness of the surface layer of a wing rail or a switch blade.
Residual stresses in hardened steel components are due to a martensitic transformation at
lower temperatures, where an overcooled austenite transforms into a martensite—a phase
with lower density or other structures depending on requirements and thermal processes
(hardening). The transformation of overcooled austenite can be conveniently analyzed based
on an austenite decomposition graph, also called isothermal transformation diagrams (or
time–temperature–transformation (TTT) diagrams). If the thermal and textural stresses
overlap, as is the case with steel hardening, the direction and the size of residual stresses after
the temperature is even in the component cross section are determined by the offset in the
transformation initiation stage in the surface area and in the core in relation to the moment the
thermal stress sign reverses. In other words, the textural stresses tend to increase or reduce the
thermal stresses depending on the cross section, cooling rate, and steel hardening capacity [20].
The depth of hardened layer also affects the distribution of residual stresses after hardening.
Non-uniform plastic strain or temperature gradient will thus result in residual stresses. The
rails and switch blades after rolling and quenching do not often meet the requirements on
straightness and require straightening using special roller straighteners. Maintaining the
required rail straightness is particularly important at high travel speeds. The process introdu‐
ces significant longitudinal residual stresses. For rails straightened on the roller straighteners,
as a result of variable strain of surfaces in contact and not in contact with the rollers, 150–300
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MPa residual stresses over the running surface of a head and at the bottom of a rail foot, and
–100 to 200 MPa compressive stresses at a rail web are recorded.
3.2. Experimental studies of residual stresses
Residual stress values can be obtained by experiments and theoretical analysis. The methods
of theoretical determination of residual stresses involve solving complex thermal, elastic, and
plastic relations. It is a complex solution, due to lack of accurate data on actual loads exerted
on an object. The theoretical analysis of residual stresses is bound up with the elastic theory
and elastic properties, plastic flow and material hardening, heat transfer, phase transitions,
thermal expansion, structure, and thickness of surface layer. The complexity of processes that
occur in the material during process treatment means that the results of the theoretical analysis
are based on simplified models and cannot be used to evaluate the residual stress state even
in components with straight geometry and require use of the experimental method. The
residual stresses have been the topic of interest for the researchers and scientist for several
decades. Thus, various methods and techniques for measuring the residual stresses were
developed. Generally, residual stress measurement methods in steel components can be
divided into two categories: destructive and non-destructive methods. Destructive methods
do not allow to determine the quality of tested objects without damage, whereas non-destruc‐
tive methods allow multiple tests on the same object.
Ultrasonic method used by the author to determine the residual stresses is based on the relation
between ultrasonic wave velocity and stress. Ultrasonic wave velocity is determined with an
accuracy of a fraction of a meter per second to measure the residual stresses with required
precision. To measure the absolute values, the effects of temperature and non-uniform
distribution of elastic properties and material texture on the wave velocity must be allowed
for. A relatively easy and simple method is the ultrasonic measurement with DEBRO-35
instrument. The method uses electro-acoustic effects, i.e., a relation between stress and velocity
or time the ultrasonic wave requires to cover a specific distance (at the surface zone). The
residual stresses are measured using a special measuring head system that records longitudi‐
nal and lateral surface waves (Figure 2).
The  meter  measurement  circuits  allow  for  the  effect  of  rail  temperature  change  to  the
velocity  of  wave  propagation.  The  head  system  features  temperature  sensor,  providing
information  required  for  automatic  compensation  of  a  velocity  of  wave  propagation  at
different temperatures.
The advantage of the method is the ability to perform non-destructive testing in field condi‐
tions, compact and easy-to-use system, and the ability to display the measurement results. In
addition, the preparation of tested section surface does not require time-consuming operations.
3.2.1. The experimental wing rail and switch blade tests
Experimental rail section tests were performed on components subject to rolling, surface
hardening and bending into wing rails used in the railway turnouts.
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3.2.1.1. The transverse bending of the switch blades and wing rails
The specimens were bent in the steelworks manufacturing railway turnouts (former Koltram
S.A., Zawadzkie), involved three- and four-point bending. Figures 3–6 show the method of
section bending including the point of support and force causing the strain as well as cross
sections used.
3.2.1.1 The transverse bendin  f the switch bl des and wing rails 
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Koltram S.A., Zawadzkie), involved three- and four-point bending. Figures 3–6 show the 
method of section bending including the point of support and force causing the strain as well 
as cross sections used.  
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Figure 4. Four-point transverse bending of the switch blade I60 (a) and wing rail (b) sections.
Figure 2. Special measuring head system in ultrasonic instrument DEBRO-35.
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Figure 5. Measurement places at the circumference of rail UIC 60.
Figure 6. Measurement places at the circumference of rail I60.
3.2.1.2. Results of residual stress measurement—bending process
The diagrams (Figures 7–10) show example of longitudinal stress changes at the circumference
of rail and switch blades after bending processes of selected sections. A horizontal axis
represents a distance from the centre of a head rolling surface (measured at the rail and switch
point surface), and vertical axis represents the longitudinal component of a residual stress.
Railway Research - Selected Topics on Development, Safety and Technology122
Figure 5. Measurement places at the circumference of rail UIC 60.
Figure 6. Measurement places at the circumference of rail I60.
3.2.1.2. Results of residual stress measurement—bending process
The diagrams (Figures 7–10) show example of longitudinal stress changes at the circumference
of rail and switch blades after bending processes of selected sections. A horizontal axis
represents a distance from the centre of a head rolling surface (measured at the rail and switch
point surface), and vertical axis represents the longitudinal component of a residual stress.
Railway Research - Selected Topics on Development, Safety and Technology122
Figure 6. Measurement places at the circumference of rail I60. 
	
3.2.1.2 Results of residual stress measurement—bending process 
	
The diagrams (Figures 7–10) show example of longitudinal stress changes at the 
circumference of rail and switch blades after bending processes of selected sections. A 
horizontal axis represents a distance from the centre of a head rolling surface (measured at the 
rail and switch point surface), and vertical axis represents the longitudinal component of a 
residual stress. 
Figure 7. Longitudinal stress changes at the circumference of rail UIC 60 before and after 























Figure 7. Longitudinal stress changes at the circumference of rail UIC 60 before and after three point bending process‐
es (section 300 mm).
Figure 8. Longitudinal stress changes at the circumference of rail I60 before and after three point bending processes
(section 150 mm).
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Figure 9. Longitudinal stress changes on the top surface of rail UIC 60 before and after four point bending process
(section 150 mm).
Figure 10. Longitudinal stress changes on the top surface of rail I60 before and after four point bending process (sec‐
tion 0 mm).
The results of measurements for residual stresses obtained with ultrasonic testing show after
the bending tests that in case of four-point bending the distribution and size of residual stresses
is more favorable and uniform compared to the three-point bending case. Numerous research
works and service observations show that from practical point of view, the most dangerous
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proves to be the maximum tensile stress σmax, which may accelerate the development of
cracking process and cause permanent deformation of the steel components.
3.2.2. Surface hardening switch blades and wing rails
After the bending process, the switch blades and wing rails are subject to a pearlitizing process
in the course of hardening the rolling surfaces. As a result of flame heating of a rolling surface
to the depth of up to 20 mm, and subsequent cooling with water mist and compressed air, a
fine pearlitic structure with specified hardness is obtained. The heat stream from flame heating
is generated by the special nozzles (burners) installed on the surface hardening station. The
temperature of heated running surface shall not exceed 673K (400°C). Figures 11 and 12 show
hardening zones of steel components.
Figure 11. Heat treatment areas of the wing rail UIC 60 and actual frog point.
Figure 12. Heat treatment areas of the switch blade I60.
The diagrams presented further on (Figures 13 and 14) show examples of longitudinal stress
changes at the circumference of rail and switch blade after hardening and bending processes
for the selected sections.
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Figure 13. Longitudinal stress changes at the circumference of rail I60 after heat treatment and after bending processes
(section 300 mm).
Figure 14. Longitudinal stress changes at the circumference of rail UIC 60 after heat treatment and after bending proc‐
esses (section 150 mm).
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Figure 13. Longitudinal stress changes at the circumference of rail I60 after heat treatment and after bending processes
(section 300 mm).
Figure 14. Longitudinal stress changes at the circumference of rail UIC 60 after heat treatment and after bending proc‐
esses (section 150 mm).
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3.3. FEM simulation studies
The subject of the numerical analysis in this paper is simulation of three- and four-point
bending, rolling, and surface hardening processes of the section samples of UIC 60 rail and I60
switch blade. The analysis concerns strains and stresses generated in the course of the above-
mentioned technological operations. The main purpose of the numerical calculations is to
determine residual stresses in the rail after the relief that happens after bending and/or
hardening process. It is also to define the influence of different test parameters on the size and
distribution of stresses. Structure models and numerical calculations were made using the
ABAQUS—a software with an extensive capabilities of non-linear analysis of physical issues,
including mechanics of the deformable solids.
3.3.1. The material of the model
Figure 15 shows experimental curve–stress σ vs. strain ε for a single axis steel tensile test (black
line). Young’s modulus E = 210.000 MPa and Poisson ratio ν = 0.3 were used for calculations.
Point A is defined with a non-proportional elongation proof stress σA = 629.7 MPa. Point A in
the approximation curve divides the elastic state from the plastic–elastic state with hardening.
Point B is selected at the curvilinear hardening section for stress σB = 900.0 MPa. Point C is
determined by maximum stress achieved during test, i.e., temporary strength Rm = 1069.0 MPa.
Besides, stress and strain values for the approximation curves (red line) were determined for
each temperatures represented in Figure 15.
Figure 15. Experimental material curve and its approximation σ – ε depending on the heating temperature.
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3.3.2. Load and boundary conditions
The way of support and the load application used in the experiment were replaced by ideal
boundary conditions in the numerical model. The calculation process was divided into two
steps. The first corresponding to the loaded state condition, and the second corresponding to
the condition realized state. The way of support was defined by reduction of the specific
degrees of freedom in the nodes, which correspond to the experiment are present in the support
sections (Figure 16). During simulation of the surface hardening, the rail may show longitu‐
dinal displacement as a result of material expansion due to rolling surface heating.
(a)                                                                                                    (b) 
Figure 16. Finite element models of UIC 60 (a) and I60 (b) rail with boundary conditions 
and loading—three and four point transverse bending. 
During simulation of the rail section rolling, the roller force on the rail and the roller speed are 
set. The load was increased gradually (incrementally), and the system of equation was solved 
to determine the increment in strain, stress, and displacement. The rail was supported by two 
adjacent rollers at specific centers (Figure 17).  
	
Figure 17. Finite element models of UIC 60 rail with boundary conditions and 
loading—the rolling process. 
3.3.3 Results of numerical analysis 
Several simulation calculations covering different variants of section bending, surface 
hardening, and rolling process were performed. Figures 18–21 show the results of computer 
simulation for UIC 60 rail and I60 switch blade models. The figures show contours of the of 
reduced stress σHM and residual stress 11 after relief.
a)                                                                     b) 
Figure 16. Finite element models of UIC 60 (a) and I60 (b) rail with boundary conditions and loading—three and four
point transverse bending.
During simulation of the rail section rolling, the roller force on the rail and the roller speed are
set. The load was increased gradually (incrementally), and the system of equation was solved
to determine the increment in strain, stress, and displacement. The rail was supported by two
adjacent rollers at specific centers (Figure 17).
3.3.3. Results of numerical analysis
Several simulation calculations covering different variants of section bending, surface hard‐
ening, and rolling process were performed. Figures 18–21 show the results of computer
simulation for UIC 60 rail and I60 switch blade models. The figures show contours of the of
reduced stress σHM and residual stress σ11 after relief.
Numerical calculation results shown in Figures 18–21 provided a number of interesting data
in addition to the experimental tests. A location of extreme stresses around the periphery of
analyzed objects may be determined based on the results obtained.
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3.4. The evaluation of residual stresses
Use of ultrasonic measurement method (DEBRO-35 measuring instrument) and computer
simulation allowed to develop a method to diagnose state and distribution of residual stresses
in steel components of the railway turnout (wing rails and switch blades) in the production
process [15]. The method involves summation of residual stresses measured prior to treatment
(bending, hardening) and stresses during simulation. The method allows to assess the level
and distribution of residual stresses achieved using different bending or hardening processes.
The example results of diagnosing residual stresses are shown in Figures 22 and 23.
Figure 17. Finite element models of UIC 60 rail with boundary conditions and loading—the rolling process.
Figure 18. Contours of reduced stress σHM of the rail UIC 60 (a) and I60 (b) switch blade section after three (a) and four
(b) point bending.
Experimental and Simulation Study of the Superstructure and Its Components
http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/61517
129
Figure 19. Contours of residual stress σ11 of the rail UIC 60 and I60 switch blade section after three (a) and four (b)
point bending.
Figure 20. Contours of residual stress σ11 of rail UIC 60 after rolling process [14].
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Figure 19. Contours of residual stress σ11 of the rail UIC 60 and I60 switch blade section after three (a) and four (b)
point bending.
Figure 20. Contours of residual stress σ11 of rail UIC 60 after rolling process [14].
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Figure 22. Comparison of measurement results of residual stress after cold bending (rail foot I60) with results summa‐
rizing stresses from the numerical analysis and measurements before bending (section 0 mm).
Figure 21. Contours of residual stress σ11 on the head of rail UIC 60 after heat treatment.
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Figure 23. Comparison of measurement results of residual stress after cold bending (rail foot UIC60) with results sum‐
marizing stresses from the numerical analysis and measurements before bending (section 0 mm).
4. Operational research of superstructure
4.1. Experimental studies
Using crashed stone composite in the form of a ballast bed reinforced with geogrids and local
chemical stabilization of crashed stone is one of the possible answers to the question how to
improve the ballast resistance to deformation. The solution has been developed by the Division
of Transport Infrastructure of the Warsaw University of Technology Faculty of the Transport
(by T. Basiewicz, K. Towpik, A. Gołaszewski) [22]. The proposed crashed stone composite
comprises a layer of crashed stone reinforced with a geogrid and stabilized with a polyurethane
resin. The track superstructure with a crashed stone composite ensures a complex mechanical
and chemical resistance of the ballast to deconsolidation. Mechanical resistance is ensured by
reinforcement with at least two geogrids. The first geogrid covers the area of ballast contact
with a subgrade. After the first crashed stone layer is laid and compacted, the second geogrid
is placed. After the second layer of crashed stone is laid (to obtain a required thickness of ballast
under the sleeper, as per standard requirements), it is compacted and supplemented to the
standard shape of a stockpile. In the final stage with a dynamic surface stabilization, the
structure is chemically stabilized with a special polyurethane resin by injection. Figure 24
shows the layer of ballast reinforced with the geogrid and the resin.
The key purpose of the track geometry measurements for the track structures section with
crashed stone composite was to evaluate the deformability of the track vs. the adjacent
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comparative track sections. Results of measurements, of the EM 120 measuring motor car,
made during 17 trips between 2008 and 2013 were used in the evaluation of track geometry
deformability. The traffic load in that period was approximately 18 Tg. Changes in the quality
index result and changes in the standard deviation for vertical and horizontal track irregular‐
ities provide an indirect description of ballast bed deformation.
The values of the quality index “J” were computed as follows
w e0.5
3.5
z yS S S SJ
+ + +
= (6)
where Sz is the standard deviation for vertical irregularities, Sy is the standard deviation for
horizontal irregularities, Sw is the standard deviation for track twist, and Se is the standard
deviation for track gauge.
The studies [22] present complete test results covering the entire test period. Figures 25 and
26 show selected test results for track superstructure with crashed stone.
4.2. Simulation studies
The simulations complement the experimental tests performed at the section of “CMK”
(railway central trunk line—an element of the Polish railways network). Figure 27 shows a
schematic railway track model used in simulation calculations, allowing for the rigidity and
attenuation of each railway superstructure component.
Figure 24. Track structures with crashed stone composite [13]. 1—rail UIC 60, 2—sleeper, 3—crashed stone layer with
resin, 4—crashed stone layer, 5—top reinforcement (geogrid, geosynthetic), 6—bottom reinforcement (geogrid, geo‐
synthetic)
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The motion of the system may be expressed by the following differential equations:
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Figure 25. Values of the quality index “J” for different sections of existing subgrade (I1—section No.1 with geogrid; I2
—section No.1 with geosynthetic; and I3—section No.2 with geogrid) vs. reference sector IV.
Figure 26. Values of standard deviation for vertical irregularities for different sections of existing subgrade (I1—section
No.1 with geogrid; I2—section No.1 with geosynthetic; and I3—section No.2 with geogrid) vs. reference sector IV.
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The motion of the system may be expressed by the following differential equations:
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Figure 25. Values of the quality index “J” for different sections of existing subgrade (I1—section No.1 with geogrid; I2
—section No.1 with geosynthetic; and I3—section No.2 with geogrid) vs. reference sector IV.
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4.2.1. Model geometry— Finite element grid railway track
Structure models and numerical calculations were made using the ABAQUS—a software. A
geometry of a numerical model is defined as a grid of nodes indicating position and size of
finite elements. Simplified numerical models of the superstructure were developed, including
a single sleeper or three sleepers buried in the ballast.
Due to the complex shape of modeled structures, apart from cuboids with six walls, additional
three-dimensional components were also included, solids with a triangular base (with five
walls). Square components are considered the most relevant for the description of the issues
with bending as a prevailing treatment to better describe stress concentration and allow better
approximation of curved shapes with lower number of elements. Figure 28 shows FE railway
track models.
For simulation purposes, the interfaces between each of structure components were deter‐
mined since the development of a complete model grid with the same degree of detail is not
feasible. The grids for various components may vary in size. The interface is a surface con‐
necting two adjacent grid segments with various grid densities to maintain the model con‐
tinuity (Figure 29). It enables a proper distribution of load on adjacent grids to maintain the
3D model homogeneity.
Figure 27. The schematic railway track model used in simulation calculations: P(t)—concentrated force; m—mass of
elements; EI—bending stiffness of rail; c—damping; k—stiffness.
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Notation Parameter Value Unit
Er Elastic modulus of rail 210,000 MPa
kps Rail pad stiffness 239 MN/m
cps Rail pads damping 30 kNs/m
ρb Ballast density 54 kg/m3
ρr Rail density 7,850 kg/m3




Poisson ratio of rail
Poisson ratio of ballast







cp Ballast damping 250 kNs/m
kp Ballast stiffness 110 MN/m
ρs Sleeper density 2,400 kg/m3
Es Elastic modulus of sleeper 70,000 MPa
Eg
νg
Elastic modulus of geogrid





ρg Geogrid density 0.00132 kg/m3
Table 1. 1The parameters of stiffness and damping elements in the track construction model
4.2.3. Model load and support conditions
Means of support used in the course of testing were substituted with ideal boundary conditions
in the numerical model. A static and dynamic cylinder thrust of the cylinder on the rail and
the speed of cylinder rotation simulating the vehicle speed were set. The load was increased
gradually (incrementally), and the system of equation was solved to determine the increment
in strain, stress, and displacement. Support conditions are defined by a specific loss of degree
of freedom, preventing from displacement in specific directions (Figure 30).
4.2.4. Results of simulation calculation
The selected results of numerical calculations, obtained using 3D models of a reinforced
railway track in different arrangements, are shown in diagrams as Huber–Misess reduced
stress contours and strain maps. The Huber–Misess hypothesis of the largest shear stress and
the shear strain energy hypothesis are used in the calculation of structures and machine parts
with elastic–plastic materials. Figures 31 and 32 show numerical calculation results.
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Within the course of simulation, the extreme stresses appeared at the wheel/rail interface. An
increase in stress and strain is observed with the increase in a number of load cycles. A location
of extreme stress values around the periphery and inside the analyzed structure may be
determined based on the simulation results. The simulation calculations will be used to
determine the strength properties of suggested track substructure reinforcement at various
static and dynamic loads. The advantages of the simulation include a reduced cost compared
to service tests and mapping of the load in these tests, which would have taken years in
operating conditions
g Geogrid density 0.00132 kg/m3
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5. Duration of guaranteed functionality
The duration of guaranteed functionality is a graphic representation of a fatigue performance
of any railway track component as a function of operating load. At the initial operational stage,
a slope of a strain accumulation curve for railway track structure is close to 90° and results
from the railway track stabilization (subsidence). The next stage includes operation under load
until the slope of a strain accumulation curve aims to reach higher values. Based on the
simulation results obtained by the author of this chapter, as well as test results [22], the author
have attempted to plot the curves describing the service life of selected railway track compo‐
nents. Figure 33 shows test results and simulation results contributing to the plastic strain
relation as a function of operating load.
The graph shows a comparison of plastic strain vs. load at the testing track section, with or
without railway track reinforcement using a geogrid and a resin. A curve plotted using
simulation calculations is also included, although due to a long calculation time, the simulation
curve is limited to 18 Tg load. The determination of a strain accumulation curve slope requires
further tests and analyses to increase the operating load and continue observations.
6. Development and testing of superstructure
The track superstructure as a basic element of the railway system is crucial to the operation
and safe management of the railway traffic. Changes in operating conditions of the railway,
i.e., increased operational speeds of passenger trains up to 350 km/h or increased operational
speeds of freight trains as well as increased permissible load up to 250 kN, result in higher
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requirements for the track superstructures. The changes result in higher forces and vibration
levels exerted on the superstructure. In addition, the economic aspects will force the designers
and infrastructure operators to optimize the maintenance costs. A need to reduce the costs is
one of the causes of using non-standard superstructures for high-speed rail networks. High
operational speeds result in high ballast wear due to increased friction between the crashed
stones. Increased wear requires more frequent ballast make up or replacement. Both standard
requirements and technical specifications for interoperability (TSIs) guidelines for environ‐
mental protection, e.g., level of noise and vibrations are also key factors in improving track
superstructure.
A question can be asked, if at the passenger train speeds over 350 km/h, is it reasonable to use
standard ballast superstructure or use ballast-free solutions? More and more often, new
solutions utilizing different materials used in the road engineering are also implemented in
the railway solutions, including geomesh, geotextile, and various polyurethane resins, which
may increase strength and durability of superstructures. It is also advisable to continue tests
on fatigue effects at the rail/wheel interface and interactions between those surfaces. Incorrect
mating between the railway vehicle and the rail may result in defects and damage to the
running surface. Incorrect mating between the rail and the wheel may result from wheel
polygonization and use of high-power trains, where incorrect wheel sidle protection (WSP)
system is to prevent incorrect braking and starting. In high-speed trains, apart from basic
braking system, also cleaning brake inserts are used to remove fouling from the running
surfaces of wheels and railway track rails on which the trains travel.
Figure 33. Theoretical model of duration of guaranteed functionality.
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7. Conclusions
The data presented in this section are a result of experimental and simulation tests performed
by the author during 10 years of the research and scientific career. The discussed issues are a
subject of interest for both manufacturers and experts responsible for the condition of a track
superstructure. The stresses may affect the internal energy state of the material, phase changes,
and corrosion of the material, reduce fatigue strength, and cause damage to the rails. The
stresses are also one of the causes of accelerated development of standard railhead defects.
The presented method of residual stresses evaluation using ultrasonic testing and numerical
analysis in the course of the production process provides control over size and distribution of
internal stresses due to bending and hardening processes. Another area of interest was related
with the track superstructure tests, in particular involved seeking design solutions to reduce
the maintenance costs by extending the time between repairs of the track superstructure
components. The optimization of the maintenance costs by using advanced solutions in the
track superstructure design may be an interesting method to extend its durability. The
presented test results are the inspiration to continue the research in this area and seek new
solutions, e.g., optimizing maintenance costs of the railway infrastructure, and determining
structure durability using simulations.
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Abstract
Monitoring the conditions of railway tracks is essential for ensuring the railway safety.
In-service vehicles equipped with sensors and GPS systems can act as probes to detect
and analyse real-time vehicle vibration. Recently, a compact on-board sensing device has
been developed. This chapter describes the track condition monitoring system that uses a
compact on-board sensing device and diagnosis software. The diagnosis software pro‐
vides the function of detecting track faults using the root mean square (RMS) of the car-
body acceleration. It also allows analysis in the time-frequency domain using wavelet
transform. A monitoring experiment in a local railway line showed that the system is ef‐
fective for practical application.
Keywords: Safety, Track, Condition monitoring, Fault detection, Vibration, Wavelet,
Multiresolution analysis
1. Introduction
Preventive maintenance, in which responsible persons recognise unsafe or risky conditions
and instigate repairs before accidents occur, has become an important issue for railways [1,2].
To facilitate preventive maintenance, it is desirable to monitor track conditions either contin‐
uously or at high frequency levels. Currently, the methods utilised for track monitoring include
observations by trackmen, as well as the use of specialised track inspection and rail flaw
detection cars. However, while these methods allow highly accurate track monitoring, the
operational frequency at which they can be deployed to monitor tracks is extremely limited
due to considerations such as cost and sustainability controls. Additionally, local railways
suffer not only from significant age-related facility deterioration but also from difficulties in
securing funding and maintaining technological advancements, which means that many
railway operators are unable to perform adequate monitoring.
© 2015 The Author(s). Licensee InTech. This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution,
and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
In-service vehicles equipped with simple sensors and GPS may serve as probes to detect and
analyse real-time vehicle vibration and signalling systems while running. Probe vehicles [3,4]
may dramatically change the current style of rail maintenance and thus contribute to estab‐
lishing safe transport systems.
The probe vehicles can change the current maintenance style to focus on locations regarded
as essential maintenance areas, utilising data acquired by real-time monitoring of actual
vibration together with positional information obtained by GPS. Monitoring based on
information obtained by in-service vehicles may enable the detection of maintenance problem
at an early stage [4], thus contributing to the revitalisation of local railways by making
maintenance tasks more efficient.
In response to these challenges, the use of probe vehicles, which consist of in-service vehicles
to which simple sensors have been added, can be considered as a plausible technique for
monitoring track conditions during the course of commercial operations. Previously, portable
on-board devices have been developed to allow diagnostic track monitoring [5-8]. A number
of long-term experimental studies conducted in cooperation with railway operators have
demonstrated the feasibility of pinpointing the locations of track faults and the reproducibility
of measured data.
In this chapter, we describe a compact on-board sensing device that represents an improve‐
ment on portable probe devices [8,9] along with a track condition monitoring system that
utilises track condition monitoring software[10]. We then present an example of the diagnostic
results obtained using this monitoring software. The root mean square (RMS) value of the
vibrational acceleration was used as an assessment index in diagnosing rail condition. In
addition to the RMS value of the vibrational acceleration, wavelet transforms are used in order
to develop a system capable of more accurate diagnoses.
2. Track condition monitoring system
2.1. System overview
Several kinds of track faults can be detected by measuring the acceleration of bogies [11-13].
However, if track faults can be detected in-cabin, condition monitoring of track irregularities
will be much easier. As the distinctive signal of track faults is hidden in natural frequency of
car-body vibration, signal processing is necessary for the acceleration measured in-cabin to
detect track faults.
Figure 1 shows a schematic overview of the track condition monitoring system. This system
is divided into a vibration measurement unit and an analysis unit. The vibration measurement
unit utilises a compact on-board sensing device to measure the vehicle vibration from within
the car itself during ordinary commercial operation. The analysis unit uses track condition
monitoring software to extract the requisite information from the measured data and then
computes assessment values to diagnose the track condition. The compact on-board sensing
device is described in Section 2.2, while the monitoring software is described in Section 2.3.
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Figure 1. Track condition monitoring system [10]
The measured data obtained from the measurement unit are transmitted to the analysis unit
either by a cellular telephone channel or by writing to external media. The diagnostic results
produced by the track monitoring software are used to provide feedback to railway operators
through online channels via smartphones or tablet computers. Railway operators can use this
information to establish the track maintenance priorities, thus facilitating the maintenance
planning and work.
In addition, the real-time measurement of railcar vibrations during commercial operation
allows for rapid response, such as emergency track inspection and maintenance, in situations
when railcar vibration observations detect irregularly large deviations from standard control
values. Thus, the use of this monitoring system to perform continuous monitoring of railcar
vibrations allows early detection of deterioration or other track irregularities, thus enabling
railway operators to conduct effective maintenance work [9].
2.2. Compact on-board sensing device
Figure 2 shows the compact on-board sensing device used in the track condition monitoring
system. This device comprises three-axis acceleration sensors, a rate gyroscope, a Global
Positioning System (GPS) receiver that is used to determine the train position and travel speed
and sensor interfaces that input sensor signals to a computer.
This device is battery-powered and capable of up to 6 h of sustained operation. Thus, the device
need only be placed inside a cabin to enable vehicle vibration measurements and does not
require human supervision. If the vehicle is equipped with an on-board power supply, the
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device is capable of continuous measurement. Furthermore, the device is equipped with
function for automatically transmitting measured data to a server via cellular phone channels
and writing data to a microSD card or other recording media. By further equipping the device
with a noise meter, it is also possible to diagnose corrugation conditions from cabin noises.
2.3. Monitoring software
Using the compact on-board sensing device to diagnose track conditions required the devel‐
opment of an interface on the software side that is capable of establishing communication with
the on-board devices and that offers features such as efficient handling of the large volumes
of measured data that accumulate from the devices. It was also necessary to create visualisa‐
tions to display the monitoring results and reduce the time interval required between meas‐
urement and diagnosis. Accordingly, we chose to implement a graphical user interface (GUI)
for signal-processing operations on measured data and result visualisation in MATLAB
(MathWorks). The following section discusses these operations in more detail.
3. Track monitoring software
3.1. Assessment indexes
Track irregularities not only cause vehicle vibrations that degrade rider comfort, they also
increase the risk of derailments. For this reason, they are among the most important items to
be monitored. Vehicle vibrations are strongly correlated with track irregularities, so the
magnitude of vehicle vibrations is an effective means of assessing general track condition
trends [2]. For this reason, sections of track over which high rates of vehicle vibrational
acceleration are detected may be understood as indicative of degraded track conditions.
Height:72 [mm] 
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Figure 2. Compact on-board sensing device [10]
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This monitoring software takes the amplitude of the vibrational acceleration as an index of
track faults. The RMS value of this amplitude is then extracted and used to assess track
conditions. However, because this assessment value alone does not convey frequency infor‐
mation, we augment it by performing time-frequency analysis using continuous and discrete
wavelet transforms to obtain more detailed diagnostic information.
3.2. RMS values
We need to obtain localised RMS values over short time intervals to obtain the relationship
between track condition and position. The RMS value may be obtained from measured values
over a short time segment (the number of the data: N) at the time t according to
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Track irregularities include longitudinal level irregularities, alignment irregularities and cross
level irregularities. To assess the longitudinal level irregularities, we determine the RMS values
of the vertical acceleration measured by the compact-size on-board sensing device. Here we
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Figure 3. The main window of the track monitoring software [10]
Figure 3 shows the main window of the track monitoring software. The display here is an
example of the analysis of actual measured data from a regional railway, as discussed in Section
5 below. The main window indicates an assessment of track condition based on the RMS value
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of the vibrational acceleration computed using Eq. (1). The track diagrams in the upper portion
of Figure 3 indicate colour-coded assessments of track conditions for each station-to-station
segment. The different colours (red, yellow and green) indicate the RMS value of the vibra‐
tional acceleration referenced to the threshold value determined for the system.
The lower part of Figure 3 shows the RMS value of the actual measured value and the travel
speed for a selected station-to-station segment. By inspecting regions with large RMS values,
it is possible to clarify the position at which track faults arise.
The upper portion of Figure 4 compares travel data for multiple journeys on specific station-
to-station segments. Points at which the preset threshold value (2.0 m/s2) was exceeded are
plotted. The point at 5260 m was plotted a large number of times, suggesting the possibility of
a track fault at that location. The lower portion of Figure 4 displays the RMS values (maximum
values) of the points circled by the dashed-line curves in the upper portion for each of several
dates. The decrease in the RMS value reflects the effect of repair work carried out between
September 2012 and February 2013. This shows that the system enables specific points to be
identified as segments requiring inspection, thereby facilitating long-term monitoring of track
maintenance.
Consequently, whereas assessments of travel data from a single journey (Figure 3) fail to yield
accurate assessments in some cases, assessments of travel data from multiple journeys (Figure





















Figure 4. Assessments of travel data from multiple journeys [10]
3.3. Assessment using a continuous wavelet transform
In the previous subsection, we discussed the use of RMS values for simple monitoring of track
conditions. However, assessments based on RMS values do not furnish frequency information
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3.3. Assessment using a continuous wavelet transform
In the previous subsection, we discussed the use of RMS values for simple monitoring of track
conditions. However, assessments based on RMS values do not furnish frequency information
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and are thus poorly suited for characterising many varieties of track faults. To remedy this
deficiency, in this subsection, we discuss an analysis based on the continuous wavelet
transform, which is a method of time-frequency analysis, as a technique for yielding more
detailed diagnostics.
The continuous wavelet transform proceeds by multiplying a target waveform x(t) by a mother
wavelet ψ(t). This is a transformation technique that has the effect of emphasising certain
portions of the waveform and suppressing others. The technique, which is well suited to the
analysis of unsteady signals exhibiting sudden variation, is defined by
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The parameters a and b are known, respectively, as the dilatation and location parameters; they
have the effect of translating in time the mother wavelet ψ(t) by a time shift b and 1/a on
frequency. ψ̄(t) indicates the complex conjugate of ψ(t).
Figure 5 shows a real-world example of the continuous wavelet transform feature implement‐
ed by the monitoring software. Users may select a station-to-station segment to display target
vibrational acceleration waveforms, and their wavelet transforms, for that segment. The signal
plane of the continuous wavelet transform is expressed by contour lines; colours closer to white
correspond to larger amplitudes and contain large numbers of corresponding frequency
components. The vertical axis of the signal plane displays the pseudo-frequency as obtained






















Figure 5. Real-world example of the continuous wavelet transform [10]
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3.4. Discrete wavelet transform
Visualising analytical results based on continuous wavelet transform contour line maps is a
convenient method of displaying for learning the properties of signals. However, for signal
processing carried out by arithmetic operations, displaying information results by superposing
multiple pieces of information is not always efficient. For this reason, we discretise the
parameters a and b in Eq. (2) to give the following discrete wavelet transform:
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Integer m and n are the scaling and the dilation parameters, respectively.
We now use this discrete wavelet transform to perform multiresolution analysis. In multire‐
solution analysis, a target signal x(t) is decomposed into approximation coefficients (repre‐
senting its low-frequency components) and multiple detail coefficients (representing its high-
frequency components). Using the discrete wavelet transform with the decomposition level
m0, the signal x(t) may be expressed as
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Thus, the original signal x(t) may be expressed in the form
0
0
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Figure 6 shows the results of a multiresolution analysis via discrete wavelet transform carried
out by the monitoring software. Using this feature, the car-body vibrational acceleration of
each station-to-station segment may be decomposed at any desired level, and the signal may
be reconstructed from the required components. Thus, by inspecting particular components,
it should be possible to detect track faults corresponding to those components. The decompo‐
sition level m0 must be chosen appropriately based on the sampling frequency and the
frequency band from which one wishes to extract features.
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Multiresolution analysis: level 6	























Figure 6. Multiresolution analysis via discrete wavelet transform (decomposition level m0: 6) [10]
4. Simulation
The track condition monitoring system in this study is premised on the use of vibrational
measurement devices to measure the vehicle vibrational acceleration. For this reason, we used
simulations to investigate whether different types of track faults, including longitudinal level
irregularities, corrugations and level differences in rail joints, may be detected from data on
vehicle vibrational acceleration.
• Vehicle model
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Figure 7 shows the vehicle model used in the simulation. The vehicle model is a linear model
of a single car that considers two degrees of freedom (vertical motion and pitch) for the car
body and two degrees of freedom (vertical motion and pitch) for each bogie, yielding a total
of six degrees of freedom. The car runs at a speed of 50 km/h over a straight-line segment of
track of length 300 m. Table 1 lists the parameters of the vehicle model.
mtmt It Itθt2 θt1Zt2
kp cp kp cpkp kpcp cp







Figure 7. Vehicle model [10]
Symbol Description Unit Value
mb Car-body mass kg 14600
mt Truck mass kg 2400
Ib Car-body inertia kgm2 500452
It Truck pitch inertia kgm2 2773.5
2lb Car-body base m 14.1
2lt Wheel base m 2.15
kp Primary suspension vertical stiffness kN/m 1090
ks Secondary suspension vertical stiffness kN/m 329
cp Primary suspension vertical damping kNs/m 19.6
cs Secondary suspension vertical damping kNs/m 27.2
v Vehicle speed km/h 50
Table 1. Vehicle parameters
• Track geometry
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We created track geometry data whose frequency characteristic was inversely proportional to
the spatial frequency; that is, the amplitude was larger at long wavelengths and smaller at
short wavelengths.
Irregularities such as longitudinal level irregularities, corrugations and level differences in rail
joints were artificially added to the basic track geometry waveforms constructed. The ampli‐
tude of the longitudinal level irregularities for positions between 40 and 60 m was set equal to
two times the reference track irregularity. Corrugations were added over a 10 m stretch of track































































































Figure 8. Assessments of the simulated data [10]
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mm and a frequency of 175 Hz. The wavelength in this case is 0.08 m. At the 250 m position,
we created a step-shaped level difference of 2 mm. These track irregularities are shown in the
top part of Figure 8.
• Car-body vertical acceleration
We input the track geometry data, including the constructed irregularities, to the vehicle model
of a single railcar shown in Figure 8 and then computed the car-body acceleration (in the
vertical direction) above the centre of the front bogie. The sampling frequency was set to 820
Hz, the same as that of the vibrational measurement device. To the acceleration data computed
in this way, we added white noise to represent observation noise and then output these data
as the acceleration data (the second part from the top in Figure 9). The standard deviation of
the measurement noise was 10-3 m/s2.
• RMS values for the car-body vertical vibration acceleration
Using Eq. (1), we determined the RMS value of the computed car-body vertical acceleration
(the third part from the top in Figure 8).
• Continuous wavelet transform of the car-body vertical acceleration
We applied a continuous wavelet transform to the computed car-body vertical acceleration
(fourth and fifth part from the top in Figure 8). For the mother wavelet, we used Morlet
wavelets.
• Discrete wavelet transform of the car-body vertical acceleration
We used the discrete wavelet transform to conduct a multiresolution analysis of vibrational
acceleration. Using the Daubechies wavelets (generation index: eight), we set the decomposition
level to be m0 =6 (Figure 9).
The effect of track irregularities may be partially discerned from the original waveform of the
vibrational acceleration in Figure 8. However, discrepancies associated with other faults may
not be discerned. The increased RMS value in the vicinity of 50 m reflects the effect of longi‐
tudinal level irregularities. On the other hand, the RMS value increases slightly in the vicinity
of 250 m, but the level difference between this and the longitudinal level irregularity cannot
be distinguished from the waveform. Thus, we conclude that the use of RMS values is poorly
suited to distinguishing the different track faults.
Next, we consider results obtained with the continuous wavelet transform. Looking at the
signal plane (151–333 Hz) of the continuous wavelet transform, we see a strong signal near
150 m around a frequency of 174 Hz. When corrugations of wavelength 0.08 m are run at
a speed of 50 km/h, the frequency of the corrugations is 174 Hz. The appearance in the
signal  plane  of  features  at  this  frequency  and  at  the  position  in  question  may  thus  be
understood as originating from corrugations. In addition, in the signal plane of the 0.7 to
2 Hz band, the signal strength grows extremely large in the vicinity of the natural frequency
of the car body. This effect, which is particularly pronounced near 50 m, is thought to result
from longitudinal level irregularities. Thus by using the continuous wavelet transform, we
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have  successfully  detected  information  on  longitudinal  level  irregularities  and  corruga‐
tions from vehicle vibrational acceleration data.
On the other hand, because the vibration response to the level difference, for example, is a step
input, its properties are dispersed over a wide bandwidth. In the present case, since its strength
Figure 9. Multiresolution analysis of the simulated data [10]
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is extremely weak, it is difficult to discern its effect from the signal plane. To remedy this
difficulty, we perform multiresolution analysis using the discrete wavelet transform. Then, by
inspecting the frequency components of the vehicle vibrational acceleration data (Figure 9) as
decomposed into separate frequency bands, we can see that the effect of the level difference,
though extremely weak, is visible in the d4 component.
Figure 10 shows the frequency components that indicate the effect of corrugations (d1+d2), the
components that indicate the effect of the level difference (d4) and the low-frequency band
components, in which the continuous wavelet transform indicated the effect of longitudinal
level irregularities (a6).
Figure 10. Reconstructed signals of Figure 10 [10]
We see that corrugations may be identified in the waveforms reconstructed from the high-
frequency components (Figure 10(a)), that the level difference may be detected in the waveform
of the d4 component (Figure 10(b)) and that the longitudinal level irregularity may be identified
in the waveform of the a6 component (Figure 10(c)). Moreover, for the segment over which the
magnitude of the longitudinal level irregularity was increased to twice the reference value for
track irregularities, the rate of change of the connecting portion is discontinuous. Thus, we
have detected discontinuities in the rate of change of the waveform (Figures 10 (a) and (b)).
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track irregularities, the rate of change of the connecting portion is discontinuous. Thus, we
have detected discontinuities in the rate of change of the waveform (Figures 10 (a) and (b)).
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This suggests the possibility that, by establishing reference values for waveforms extracted not
from axle box acceleration but rather from car-body acceleration data, track faults that are
difficult to detect from RMS values may be detected through the combined use of multireso‐
lution analysis based on the discrete wavelet transform.
5. Monitoring example based on actual measured regional railway data
In the previous section, we demonstrated the efficacy of wavelet transforms for monitoring
the track condition. In this section, we use actual measured value to assess the efficacy of the
primary features of the monitoring software, namely, the computation of RMS values and
signal analysis based on wavelet transforms. The actual measured value used for this assess‐
ment are taken from measurements made to date by the authors’ research group in cooperation
with a regional railway operator over an extended period time using the compact on-board
sensing device [6,10].
For this railway line, we did not monitor corrugations. Therefore, in an effort to reduce the
volume of handled data and increase processing speed, we reduced the volume of the
measured data to 1/10 its original size. The sampling frequency of the reduced data is 82 Hz,
whereupon from Nyquist’s theorem, it follows that the maximum reproducible frequency is
41 Hz.
Figure 11 shows the results of analyses of the actual measured value performed by the
monitoring software. The panels of the figure show, proceeding in order from the uppermost
panel, the travel speed over the target station-to-station segment (as measured from GPS data),
the measured waveform of the car-body vertical acceleration, the RMS value of the vibrational
acceleration and the signal plane resulting from the continuous waveform transform. Based
on the results of the previous section, the frequency bands of the signal plane have been divided
into a low-frequency band, which captures the effect of longitudinal level irregularities, and
the remainder of the frequency range. To observe the track condition, we performed visual
inspections of the outer side of the track.
Looking at the RMS value waveform of Figure 11, we see a large RMS value in the vicinity of
3100 m, despite the fact that the travel speed is low at that point. In addition, the value appears
large at continuous points in the vicinity of 3200 m. Another point of large RMS value appears
near 3320 m. Looking at the signal plane (1.6–16 Hz) of the continuous wavelet transform, we
see effects in the high-frequency band near 3100 m and 3320 m, while we see effects in the low-
frequency band near 3200 m. Visual inspection of the track revealed a turnout near 3100 m; as
the vehicle passes over this point, it exhibits large vibrations, whose effects are thought to be
captured by the analysis.
Figure 12 presents the results of a multiresolution analysis (decomposition level m0 = 6) of
the car-body vertical acceleration. To assess the track condition from the decomposed signal,
we reconstructed the signal into one portion containing components 1.28 Hz or below and
another portion containing all other components (Figure 13). Based on analysis thus far, we
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believe that  the waveform (Figure 13(b))  of  the low-frequency components indicates the
effect of longitudinal level irregularities. Meanwhile, the waveform reconstructed from the
remaining  high-frequency  components  (Figure  13(a))  exhibits  characteristic  impulse-
shaped peaks at fixed intervals. The lengths of the rails in this segment are 20 m, which
roughly  agrees  with  the  interval  of  these  impulse-shaped  signals.  This  suggests  the
possibility that our data detected the presence of rail joints. In addition, the signal detected
in the vicinity of  3320 m may indicate the effect  of  a loose sleeper.  Accordingly,  in our
future work, we intend to collaborate further with the railway operator to investigate this
possibility in more detail.
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Figure 12. Multiresolution analysis of the car-body vertical acceleration [10]




In this chapter, we described a track condition monitoring system that uses track monitoring
software and a compact on-board sensing device. We described the development of the track
monitoring software and presented an example of the diagnostic results the monitoring
software produces. To confirm the efficacy of the track condition monitoring software, we
tested it using simulations and actual measured data. The results demonstrated that our system
is useful for continuous track condition monitoring.
We envision the following techniques for deploying our system in practice. First, a threshold
level for the RMS value will be established, and segments over which the RMS value is large
will be extracted as segments requiring inspection. Next, segments requiring inspection will
be subject to detailed analysis using signal planes produced by a continuous wavelet transform
and multiresolution analysis based on a discrete wavelet transform. Threshold values may
also be established for the components reconstructed from the multiresolution analysis and
used for maintenance purposes.
The proposed system enables the timely provision of feedback regarding track maintenance,
and we expect it will reduce costs and facilitate maintenance efforts to reduce overall mainte‐
nance requirements. In the authors’ future work, the plan is to collaborate with the mainte‐
nance departments of railway operators to demonstrate and improve the effectiveness of the
developed system.
Figure 13. Reconstructed signals of Figure 13 [10]
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Chapter 6
Modeling, Simulation, and Results of Their Use in
Railway Vehicle Dynamics Studies
Krzysztof Zboinski
Additional information is available at the end of the chapter
http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/62105
Abstract
This chapter focuses on problems related to building mathematical and numerical models
of railway vehicle dynamics and then using these models in the process of vehicle dy‐
namics simulation. Finally, the results of such simulations devoted to selected dynamical
problems are presented, highlighting the importance of powerful tools such as both the
modeling and the simulation. The dynamical problems selected for the presentation con‐
cern railway vehicle stability and importance of kinematics accuracy for the description
of the dynamics. These selected problems focus on the vehicle dynamics in a curved
track, both in the circular and transition sections. Type of the chapter should be defined
as the review paper, however, based on the authors’ own results in the main.
Keywords: Railway vehicle, vehicle dynamics, curved track, transition curve, numerical
simulation
1. Introduction
The present review chapter is based on the authors’ results gathered and published in
subsequent parts for many years of his work in the field of railway vehicle dynamics with
focus on a curved track motion. The idea of the chapter is to combine all the results on the one
hand and to select them suitably on the other hand. Both these demands are fulfilled in order
to give a picture of comprehensiveness of the combined issues and not overload the reader
with excessive details that could spoil the presentation of the chapter’s main aim. The aim is
to present the outstanding role of modeling, simulation, and results of their use, in a shortened
way, in the contemporary research questions of the railway vehicle dynamics. However, this
is going to be done through exploitation of the author’s own results. The reference could be
done here to [1], the comprehensive monograph in Polish (371 pages). This chapter is profiled
© 2015 The Author(s). Licensee InTech. This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution,
and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
differently, however, and results are presented in the concise way and internationally acces‐
sible form, i.e. in English.
1.1. The fundamentals in rail vehicle dynamics
It is rather a well-known fact (e.g. Refs. [1–3]), however sometimes being forgotten, that in rail
vehicle dynamics, perturbations of vehicle motion relative to vehicle general motion are of the
primary interest. The general motion of vehicle is of lesser interest as it is predefined by the
track alignment (shape). Hence, in the general view, the vehicle reproduces the motion
imposed by the track centerline shape, as the vehicle is guided by the track (rails). Such a guided
motion is already known. Instead, the perturbed motion relative to the track centerline appears
to be of real importance in the rail vehicle dynamics problems.
Therefore, the description of such a perturbed motion makes the bases in the rail vehicle
dynamics. As recently shown by the author in Ref. [1, 2], there are three options to perform
such description.
Option 1. In this option, one adopts coordinates relative to inertial reference system of type A
in Figure 1 and any formalism of equations building valid for motion relative to A:
B Z { ( ), ( )} { ( ), ( )}fd fd x x t x x t x x u t x x v t¢ ¢= Þ = = Þ = - = -& & & & (1)
where fd is the operator representing any chosen formalism; B is the inertia forces in relation
to A; Z is the external (active) forces; x, ẋ are the coordinates and velocities, respectively; and
u(t), v(t), w(t) are the known functions of time representing displacements, velocities, and
accelerations of transportation, that is, of system A' in relation to A.
Option 2. In this option, one adopts coordinates relative to noninertial reference system of type
A' in Figure 1 and any formalism adapted to motion description relative to A' (the direct
methods of relative motion dynamics):
Β Z P( , ) { ( ), ( )}fd fd fp u u x x t x x t¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢= + Þ = =& && & & (2)
where B' is the inertia forces in relation to A'; P is the imaginary forces (inertia forces arising
from and dependent on the transportation); and fp is the operator of the imaginary forces,
appropriate for the formalism adopted.
Option 3. In this option, one takes coordinates relative to A' and any formalism valid in A. In
practice, this is any of the variational principles of mechanics or the formalism arising directly
from it:
Β Z
( ) { ( ), ( )}
( ) { ( ), ( )}
( )
fz fz
x x u t x x t x x t
x x v t x x t x x t
x x w t
ü=
ï¢= + = =ï Þý¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢= + = =ï
ï¢= + þ
& &
& & & &
&& &&
(3)
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where fz is the operator representing the variational principle.
Figure 1. Multibody system S and useful coordinate systems
Commenting on Eqns. (1–3), one should note that the left-hand side equalities represent
dynamical equations of motion. In case of Eq. (3), the equations of motion are supplemented
with kinematical relations. They express absolute variables with the relative ones and need to
be introduced into Eq. (31) when equations of motion are being solved. The general form of
Eqns. (1–3) serves any form of the vectorial and scalar equations as well as the matrix form in
certain cases. Meaning of the dynamical equations of motion is typical. It becomes obvious as
B represents inertia forces relative to absolute (inertial) system, Z represents external forces,
B’ represents inertia forces relative to moving (noninertial) system, and P represents imaginary
forces (inertia forces depending on the transportation, i.e., motion of noninertial system
relative to the inertial one). Moreover, the operators fd, fp, and fz do not change the meaning
of the forces. The operators are introduced as a reminder that particular formalisms may need
application of some specific coordinates, velocities, recording, and operations to make use of
the formalism.
The curly brackets represent solutions of the equations of motion. As the equations are second-
order ordinary differential equations, the solutions are displacements (coordinates) and
velocities, both the linear and angular ones in general.
It is worth emphasizing that Eq. (2) is the only one that needs explicit form of the imaginary
forces to be recorded. In contrast, in case of Eqns. (1) and (3), the inertia forces are also taken
into account, however, in an inexplicit way. This is because B=B' + P. In addition, if one uses
the same formalism of building the equations to build Eq. (2) or to build either Eqns. (1) or (3),
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then form of the forces B and B’ is identical. The only difference is with their meanings that
refer to absolute and relative motions. In order to highlight this, the superscript “ ’ ” is used.
It is used, in fact, to distinguish all the relative variables in Eqns. (1–3) and also in the subse‐
quent text.
Based on the denotation explained above, one can note in the curly brackets that Eq. (2) is the
only one that leads directly to the solution representing the relative coordinates and velocities.
Eq. (2) is advantageous as the relative variables are those of interest in most of rail-vehicle
dynamics problems. In case of Eq. (1), the relative solution can be obtained indirectly, whereas
in the case of Eq. (3) a part of the solution represents absolute variables and another the relative
ones.
Discussing briefly the practical use of particular options, it has to be stated at first that numbers
and types of application differ. The approach defined with Eq. (1) is definitely used most rarely.
The approach defined with Eq. (3) is the one among all three that is used most often in the
commercial software packages for automatic generation of equations of motion (AGEM). This
includes the software suitable for the systems in a rail vehicle type. Currently, such software
(e.g., MEDYNA, VAMPIRE, SIMPACK, or VI-RAIL codes) are used quite often mainly in
solving many contemporary engineering problems. However, their use in scientific research
is questionable. It is contested because of the so-called black box problem. Thus, following the
formal scientific methodology, the researcher himself and the others should precisely know
how the problem was resolved. Therefore, the assumptions and the way of modeling have to
be elucidated, which allows others to repeat the study or to compare it with results for other
similar but different approaches (for different assumptions and methods of modeling).
Examples of use of this approach to build the models and the simulation software for the
scientific purposes can also be found. However, for such purposes, the option defined with
Eq. (2) seems to be used more frequently, where different levels of accuracy are used in practice.
Thus, some authors neglect selected terms of the imaginary forces. The importance of these
terms in the rail vehicle dynamics is comprehensively discussed by the author of the present
chapter in Ref. [4].
2. Equations of motion based on dynamics of relative motion approach
In his studies, the author of the present chapter himself practices and is a supporter of option
2 described earlier. This option defined with Eq. (2) exploits direct results of the dynamics of
relative motion. Both, the variables used and the equations of motion, are defined directly in
relation to moving coordinate systems in type A’ in Figure 1. In his studies, the author applied
a few formalisms of equation building. He applied them in both the traditional and numerical
approaches. In the first approach, equations of motion were derived on paper first and then
implemented in the simulation software in order to solve them numerically. In the second
approach, the AGEM was applied by the author to build and solve equations numerically.
Lagrange type II equations (e.g., see Ref. [5]) were in use in the traditional approach. In the
AGEM approach, the author exploited Kane’s equations as presented in Refs. [1, 2, 6]. Here,
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five examples of the equations valid in noninertial systems will be presented. These are matrix
equations for a single rigid body based on Newton and Euler equations; state–space form of
Newton–Euler equations for a single rigid body; state–space form of Newton–Euler equations
for the multibody system (MBS) with constraints; Kane’s equations in its general form; and
Huston’s form of Kane’s equation suitable in AGEM. Besides, the method valid for Kane’s
equations will be presented, which enables building the equations for the holonomic and
nonholonomic systems based on the equations for the free (unconstrained) system. Derivations
for all these equations can be found in Refs. [1, 2].
2.1. The Newton–Euler equations
Based on the fundamental kinematical relations for relative motion, relating absolute and
relative velocities and accelerations,
1 ( ) 2C C o C C C¢ ¢ ¢ ¢= + + ´ + ´ ´ + ´p a a r r ve w w w (4)
¢= +q w w (5)
'd d d d
dt dt dt dt
¢ ¢ ¢
¢ ¢= = + = + + ´ = + + ´εq w w wa w w e e w w (6)
and vectorial forms of Newton and Euler equations, the vectorial equations of relative motion
for translation and rotation of a single free rigid body can be obtained as those presented in
Refs. [7, 1, 2]. Based on these vectorial equations, their matrix forms can be recorded in several
ways as shown, e.g., in Refs. [1, 2, 8–10]. The forms as in Refs. [1, 2] are as follows:
1 1( 2 )C o C C C C Cm m¢ ¢ ¢ ¢= - + + + + = +a a r r v R Q R
) ) ) )e ww w (7)
2( ) C C¢ ¢= - - - + = +J J J J T Q T
) )e q q e ww (8)
The meanings of the denotations present in the above Eqns. (4–6) are as follows:pC, θ, α are
the absolute acceleration of body mass centre C, absolute angular velocity of body B, and
absolute angular acceleration of body B; r ′C  is the radius vector of C in O1xyz system; v ′C , a ′C
are the relative velocity and relative acceleration of C in relation to O1xyz; ω ′, ε ′ are the relative
angular velocity and relative angular acceleration of B; ao1, ω, ε are the absolute acceleration
of O1 origin (i.e., in relation to OXYZ), transportation angular velocity, and transportation
angular acceleration (i.e., of O1xyz in OXYZ). In Eqs. (7, 8), m, J are the mass and inertia tensor
(its matrix representation) of body B in relation to C; RC , TC  are the matrix of resultant external
forces acting on B and matrix of resultant external torques acting on B in relation to C; and Q1,
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Q2 are the matrices representing sums of the inertia terms. The remaining denotations are
matrices that have their counterparts in the vectors defined in Eqns. (4–6).
One should realize here that in order to express all matrices in Eqns. (7, 8) through their
elements selection of the vector bases im (m=1, 2, 3) for Eqns. (7) and (8) is necessary.
Equations (7, 8) can easily be recorded in one matrix equation:
II¢ = +Ix Q& L (9)
where





m é ùé ùé ù
= = = ê úê úê ú





and E is the unit matrix. Besides, for any vector c the denotation c
⌢
 represents the vector’s skew-
symmetric matrix, while generally the matrix I is not the symmetrical one.
On analyzing Eq. (10), the variables x′II and x′I (velocities and coordinates) are the same as those
in Newton and Euler equations. They define translation of the centre C and rotation of B around
C. In their case, the linear kinematical relation holds ẋI =  K(xI)xII.
It can be shown that the equation similar to Eq. (9) can be obtained when arbitrarily chosen set
of variables w′II and w′I are adopted. If matrix K is not singular then for variables
I WI I I I I I( , ); ( , ) ( , )¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢= = +x X w t x H w t w h w t& &
and linear kinematical relations
I I II( )¢ ¢ ¢=w G w w&
the equation can be written as follows:
1 1 1 1
II I I II II( ) ( )
- - - -¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢= = + = + = +x K x K Hw h K HG w K h w& & W V (12)
while the derivative equals
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II II II¢ ¢ ¢= + +x w w&& & &W W V (13)
After the introduction of Eq. (13) in (9), one gets
II
ˆˆ ˆ¢ = +Iw Q& L (14)
where
II
ˆˆ ˆ; [ ( )];¢= = - + =I I Q Q I w& &W W V L L (15)
As shown explicitly in Refs. [1, 2], the result represented by Eq. (14) can be generalized to the
case of constraint system with holonomic and nonholonomic constraints (e.g., see Ref. [7]).
Then it can be extended so that the inertia matrix becomes symmetrical one what enables to
get the corresponding inverse matrix and finally to solve the equations. This can be done
through the left-hand side multiplication of the equation by the transpose matrix ΩT. As a result
of the described operations, one arrives at
II¢ = + + zIw Q
(( ( (
& L L (16)
where
T T T ˆˆ ˆ ; ;= = =I I I Q Q
((
W W W W (17)
T T T T
I
ˆ ˆ; ( , )¢= = =z z w t
( (
L W L L W L W F (18)
In the equations above, t is the indicator of the dependence on time t; Φ, λ are the so-called
constraint matrix and column matrix of Lagrange’s multipliers (e.g., see Refs. [8, 1, 2]). If one
is going to solve Eq. (16) then all equations of constraints have to be added to the system of
equations to make it possible.
When one is not interested in values of the constraint (internal) forces Λ
⌣
z then it is reasonable
to express equations of motion for the reduced set of independent variables y'I and y'II. This
reduces the number of equations by the number of constraints. The relation at the velocity level
between maximum and reduced (minimum) set of the variables is represented through matrix
representation of explicit constraint equations at the velocity level:
II II¢ ¢= +w yj x (19)
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After Eq. (19) is exploited in Eq. (14), the state–space equation in the independent generalized
velocities takes the following form:




ˆˆ ˆ ˆ; [ ( )] ;¢= = - + =I I Q Q I y%% & %&j j j j x L j L (21)
Note that inertia matrix Ĩ is symmetrical due to the left-hand side multiplication by φT. The
kinematical relations corresponding to Eq. (20) in the linear matrix form can be expressed as
ẏ′I = ŶI(y
′
I)y′II. In case nonholonomic constraints exist in the system, they have to be provided
to make the solution of Eq. (20) possible.
The final Eqns. (16, 20) are valid for a single rigid body. It was shown in Ref. [8] for inertial
systems that forms valid for a single body can directly be generalized to any number of rigid
bodies. As in principle the structure of equations for noninertial systems differs in additional
inertia terms of correction character only (see, e.g., Eqns. (2, 3)), this result can be extended to
noninertial systems. In terms of the notation, it is trivial and means that Eqns. (16) and (20)
valid in noninertial systems remain unchanged for any number of rigid bodies.
2.2. Kane’s equations
Any of the formalisms of analytical mechanics valid in inertial systems can be adapted to
describe the relative motion in the noninertial system. The author of the chapter performed
such an adaptation for Kane’s equation. It was done in a formal manner, that is, corresponding
equations of relative motion were derived as shown in Refs. [6, 2, 1].
The partial velocities are fundamental to original Kane’s approach [11]. The corresponding
relative linear and angular partial velocities were introduced by the author as shown in Refs.
[6, 1, 2]. Let us introduce them for the simple nonholonomic system [11] of l degrees of freedom
composed of j (j=1,...,n) rigid bodies by defining linear v ′ j and angular ω ′ j relative velocities
of the mechanical system:
3
( )
1 1 1 1
l l l
j j j
j j jt j m jtm m
mj
u u v u v
u tr r r r rr r rr
¶ ¶
¶ ¶= = = =
¢ ¢ æ ö
¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢= + = + = +ç ÷ç ÷
è ø
å å å å
v r
v v v i (22)
3
( )
1 1 1 1
l l l
j j j
j j jt j m jtm m
mj
u u u
u tr r r r rr r rr
¶ ¶
w w
¶ ¶= = = =
¢ ¢ æ ö
¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢= + = + = +ç ÷ç ÷
è ø
å å å å i
w j
w w w (23)
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Note that inertia matrix Ĩ is symmetrical due to the left-hand side multiplication by φT. The
kinematical relations corresponding to Eq. (20) in the linear matrix form can be expressed as
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where v ′ jρ, ω ′ jρ, v ′ jt , ω ′ jt  are the functions of generalized coordinates q1,...,qk  and time t. At
the same time, v ′ jρ, ω ′ jρ are the ρth relative partial velocity of body Bj mass centre Cj (or any
point Pj) and ρth relative angular partial velocity of Bj in relation to A', respectively; v ′ jρm , ω ′ jρm
are the scalar components of v ′ jρ, ω ′ jρ, called coefficients of partial velocities; uρ is the quasi-
velocity (ρ =1,...,l) ; m is the indicator of unit vectors (base vectors) im( j) (m=1, 2, 3) defining axes
directions of reference systems, where v ′ j and ω ′ j are expressed (there is no need for im( j) to
have the same directions for translations and rotations and for all bodies Bj).
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Most of the denotations in Eq. (24) are as already defined. Here, the meanings in Eqns. (4–8)
are helpful. Note, however, that in Eq. (24) the j rigid bodies are described, while in Eqns. (4–
8) just one. Besides, subscript C was omitted in r ′C  resulting in r′Cj ≡ r′ j. The undefined is ϑ –
trace of J, that is, ϑ = J11 + J22 + J33. In addition, R j*, T j* are the inertia forces and torques, respec‐
tively, of motion in relation to noninertial systems of A' type; R j**, T j** are the resultant
imaginary forces and torques, respectively; while RCj ≡ R j and TCj ≡T j.
Equation (24) can be expressed in the shortened matrix form as follows [6, 2, 1]:
* ** 0 ( 1,..., )F F F lr r r r+ + = = (25)
where scalar components are defined with




j j j j jm j m jm j m
j
F R v Tr r r r rw
=
¢ ¢ ¢ ¢= × + × = +å R v T w (26)






j j j j jm j m jm j m
j
F R v Tr r r r rw
=
¢ ¢ ¢ ¢= × + × = +å R v T w (27)




j j j j jm j m jm j m
j
F R v Tr r r r rw
=
¢ ¢ ¢ ¢= × + × = +å R v T w (28)
In the above Eqns. (26–28), Fρ*, Fρ i Fρ** are the generalized inertia forces (relative to non-inertial
system(s)), generalized external forces (identical with those in inertial system(s)), and gener‐
alized imaginary forces; R jm* , R jm, R jm** , T jm* , T jm and T jm**  are the scalar components of resultant
forces and torques R j*, R j, R j**, T j*, T j and T j**. The final forms of Eqns. (26–28) exploit results
for inertial systems by Huston (e.g., see Refs. [12–14]). Also note that signs of sums over j and
m are omitted in these final forms. The original Huston’s convention is used here, in which
summations over repeated indices have to be performed instead.
Equations (24–28) are not useful in AGEM approach as they are too close to the vectorial origin
of Kane’s equations. Nevertheless, final forms of Eqns. (26–28) can be treated as the initial ones
for the process of deriving the useful form. The process is based on the Huston results [12–
14] for the inertial scleronomic systems and present author’s extensions [6, 2, 1] to non-inertial
and rheonomic systems. Consequently, invoking results from Refs. [6, 2, 1] one can write
( 1,..., )Θ u f lrp p r r= =& (29)
where
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The supplements to Eq. (29) are kinematical relations:
( , ) ( , ) ; ( 1 ), ( 1,..., )q P q t u p q t ,...,k ls sr r s s r= + = =& (33)
where in the above equations ersm, eswm are the permutation symbols; k is the number of
generalized coordinates of the nonholonomic system; Pσρ, pσ are the functional matrix and
vector (column matrix). Besides, the square bracket in Eq. (31) (being the extension to rheo‐
nomic systems) and pσ vanish for scleronomic systems.
Equations (24, 25, 29, 32, 33) serve nonholonomic, holonomic, and free systems. In Eqns. (25,
29, 32, 33), the difference between particular systems is taken into account by suitable values
of partial velocities’ coefficients v ′ jρm, ω ′ jρm. For holonomic systems l=k, while for free ones
l=k=6n. In addition, equations for free and holonomic systems and kinematical relations are
sufficient to be solved. For nonholonomic systems, equations of nonholonomic constraints
have to be provided additionally to get the solution.
It was shown by the author in Refs. [6, 2, 1] for the rail vehicle systems, taking account of their
moderate dimension, nonoccurrence of nonholonomic constraints, limited number of holo‐
nomic constraints, identical coordinates and transportation for each rigid body within vehicle
model, that it can be reasonable to make use of equations (or particular type of forces) for free












s s su A u C s k nr r
r =
= + = +å (35)
the following formula enables to build equations (or selected forces type) for constraint
nonholonomic system based on the equations (or selected forces type) for free system [6, 2, 1]:
6 6
1 1 1 1
( 1,..., )
n k k n
s s s s
s k l l s k
F F F A F B F A B lr r r r sr r sr
s s
r
= + = + = + = +
= + + + =å å å å% % % % (36)
If the system is holonomic then Eq. (34) vanishes, while Eq. (36) is reduced to just two first
addends. In Eqns. (34–36), the following so far undefined notations appear: uρ, uσ, us are the
independent, dependent through nonholonomic constraints, and dependent through holo‐
nomic constraints quasi-velocities, respectively; Asρ, Bσρ, Cs, and Dσ are the functional coeffi‐
cients depending on generalized coordinates q1,...,qk  and time t; and F , F̃  are the representations
of any type of generalized forces F *, F , F ** as defined in Eqns. (25–28) or of their sum for
constraint and free systems, respectively.
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2.3. Discussion of the equations
Taking account of Refs. [15, 16], both the Newton–Euler and Kane’s equations are those most
often used in AGEM. This is an interesting fact because major differences between both
approaches exist. Therefore, the equations are worthy of discussion in this context.
It can be seen in Section 2.1 that building Eq. (16) and (20) that represent receipt useful in AGEM
are operations on matrices. To perform these operations, the matrices have to be defined with
their components. To do this, one needs to adopt base vectors im( j) for the chosen reference
systems. Unfortunately, operation must be performed at the beginning of the equations
building, that is, jet in Eqns. (7, 8). Despite simple forms of Eqns. (16, 20), the method of
obtaining equations for a given mechanical system is not short. Every time one builds equa‐
tions, he has to choose vector bases, define matrices, and perform matrix calculations as
described in Eqns. (12, 13, 15, 17, 18, 19, 21). These calculations are multiple, often in each of
the mentioned equations. In the case of nonholonomic systems and interest in constraint forces,
Eq. (16) is used, which together with constraint equations form differential-algebraic equation
(DAEs) set. Such a set is difficult to solve in general case. On the other hand, when constraint
forces are of no interest then a reduced number of ordinary differential equation (ODE) set is
used (Eq. (20)).
Equations (29–33) form the receipt useful in AGEM of Kane’s equations. Their forms might
seem discouraging as they are complex, especially while comparing with Eqns. (16, 20). This
impression is misleading as equations possess serious advantages as well. The advantage is
the same form of either scalar (Eq. (24)) or matrix equations (Eqns. (29–33)) for free, holonomic,
and nonholonomic systems. The most distinguishing advantage of Kane’s equations, appear‐
ing just for this formalism, is the moment the components of vectors and tensors are defined
through the vector bases selection. This is done at the very end of the equations building. This
is possible since Eqns. (24, 29–33) originate directly from Eq. (24) based on vectors. Therefore,
Eqns. (24, 29–33) are valid for any vector basis. An additional advantage is the type of Kane’s
equations that are always ODEs.
3. Example objects, nominal models, and numerical models
3.1. The objects and their nominal models
Equations of motion of mechanical system are referred to as its mathematical model. In order
to make use of the general methods of building equations of motion as shown in Section 2, the
nominal model of particular vehicle (object) has to be first determined. In case of railway
vehicle, its nominal model projects its structure and selected physical features of the structure
elements. The nominal models of two example objects will be presented below. Both are of
British origin and possess relatively simple structure that is suitable for the basic character of
the author’s research. The first model [1, 5, 17] corresponds to 2-axle hsfv1 freight car and is
shown in Figure 2. The second one [1, 18] corresponds to 4-axle MKIII passenger car and is
shown in Figure 3.
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shown in Figure 2. The second one [1, 18] corresponds to 4-axle MKIII passenger car and is
shown in Figure 3.
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Figure 2. Nominal model of 2-axle freight car hsfv1 [1, 5, 17]
Figure 3. Nominal model of 4-axle passenger car MKIII [1, 18]
If the flexibility of track is going to be taken into consideration in the study, then some track
nominal models should be adopted. In case one considers low-frequency dynamics of the
vehicle motion (not more than 50 Hz) but not the higher-frequency phenomena in the track
itself, then it is reasonable to build the track model that is composed of rigid bodies. Then the
whole vehicle-track system model is a multibody model. Separate models for lateral (Figure
4) and vertical (Figure 5) directions as used by the author in his studies are presented below
[1, 5, 17, 18].
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Figure 4. Nominal model of track flexible laterally [1, 17, 18]
Figure 5. Nominal model of track flexible vertically [1, 17, 18]
The denotations used in Figures 2–5 are as follows: m is the mass; Jξ, Jη, Jζ are the inertia
moments in longitudinal, lateral, and vertical directions, respectively; k, c are the stiffness
and damping in the flexible elements in general; kz , cz , kp , cp are the stiffness and damping
in the flexible elements of primary and secondary suspension, respectively; x, y, z are the
linear displacements (coordinates) in longitudinal, lateral, and vertical directions, respective‐
ly (if used as indices, they indicate the corresponding directions); ϕ, χ, ψ are the rotations
(angular coordinates) around axes of longitudinal, lateral, and vertical directions, respective‐
ly (if used as indices, they indicate the corresponding rotations); 2a, 2b are the vehicle or bogie
base; h, rt  are the vertical dimensions and wheel rolling radius;  N, T, W  are the normal,
tangential,  and load forces in wheel/rail  contact, respectively; γ  is the contact angle. The
indices used indicate p as the passenger car body or right-hand side, l the left-hand side; b
the bogie or freight car body; and t the track. Values of the abovementioned parameters of
models can be found in Refs. [1, 5, 17].
The whole hsfv1 car-track system model has 18 degrees of freedom (DOFs). The whole MKIII
car-track model has as many as 38 degrees of freedom.
3.2. Numerical models
When mathematical models derived traditionally are available, based on general methods of
the equations building as described in Section 2 and adopted nominal models as, for example,
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those shown in Section 3.1, then they have to be converted to numerical models. When AGEM
approach is used to build the equations, based again on the results of Section 2 and Section
3.1, then equations automatically form the numerical model. The numerical models are
indispensable, since rail vehicle systems are multidimensional ones. In addition, their nonlin‐
ear versions are mainly used at present. The only way to solve dynamical differential equations
of motion of such systems is numerical integration. In order to do this, the numerical model
representing the mathematical model in a form understandable to computers must be built,
which means that the equations have to be coded in some of the programming languages. In
the case of this author, it is Fortran. Then, the equations are solved with use of one of the
numerical methods of equation integration. The author uses Gear’s method [19]. The software
containing traditionally derived equations of motion or generating the equations automatically
combined with the integration procedure is called the simulation software in railway vehicle
dynamics.
In order to make use of the procedure, shortly described above, three additional major elements
have to be provided. The first one is to adopt the model and then to build its numerical module
to take account of relative kinematics arising from description in moving coordinate systems.
Strictly speaking, the linear and angular velocities and accelerations of transportation,
represented with functions u(t), v(t), w(t) in Section 1.1 and with vectors ao1, ω, ε in Section 2,
have to be determined. The author of this paper worked out a general method of their
determination, which is a numerical calculation-oriented method [2, 1, 20]. Its generality arises
from any three-dimensional track shape acceptable in the method. The most important
requirement in the method is the description of the three-dimensional curve by parametric
equations, with its length as the parameter. In fact, the three-dimensional case corresponds to
transition curves (TCs) with the superelevation ramps, while circular (regular) curves (CC)
and straight track (ST) are two- and one-dimensional special cases, respectively. The compo‐
nents, expressed analytically, of the velocities and accelerations of transportation for several
types of TCs, CC, and ST can be found in Refs. [1, 20]. The sources for the algorithm to
numerically determine the components for polynomial TCs are Refs. [21, 1].
The next element is tangential contact forces calculation. These forces arise from wheel/rail
relative slip (creepage). Consequently, the longitudinal, lateral, and spin creepages are the
inputs in the existing methods of the tangential forces calculation. Generally, one can talk about
the exact and simplified numerical methods of nonlinear tangential contact forces calculation.
The problem with the exact methods, as, for example, Kalker’s CONTACT program [22], lies
in the very slow calculations for the simulation purposes of rail vehicle dynamics. Thus,
simplified methods are in use in the simulation programs (numerical models). One of them is
Kalker’s FASTSIM program [23]. This is just the software used by the present author in his
models and so in the studies. Usually, the adopted value of the friction coefficient, necessary
for the program to run, in the author’s studies is μ=0.3. Other possibilities of tangential contact
forces calculation are discussed in Refs. [24–27].
The last among three elements to be discussed is the problem of nonlinear contact geometry.
This author uses ArgeCare RSGEO program [28] to address this. The program resolves normal
contact problems and purely geometrical ones. As a result, contact areas become known and
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geometrical variables in the contact. The most important geometrical variables are instanta‐
neous contact angles, rolling radii, and contact point positions on the wheel and rail for any
lateral relative shift between wheel and rail. In addition, the program is capable of taking
account of the influence of wheelset yaw angle on the parameters. Both the left- and right-hand
side wheel and rail parameters are calculated in the same step. The results of ArgeCare RSGEO
program (the author uses) are tabulated before simulations for a given wheel and rail pair of
profiles as a function of the discrete lateral wheel/rail displacements and yaw angles. To get
the contact parameters for any relative displacement and yaw rotation between wheel and rail,
the tabulated data are linearly interpolated.
At the end, let us return to the issue already discussed at the beginning of Section 2. It is the
way in which the equations of motion in the simulation software (numerical model) are
introduced.  Here,  this  refers  to  the  traditionally  derived  and  automatically  generated
equations of motion (AGEM approach). Now, we will provide some references correspond‐
ing to both approaches. If  one is interested in samples of the equations traditionally de‐
rived by this author, then he could find them in Ref. [29]. If one is interested in details of the
package ULYSSES and its core program TITAN co-built by this author, then he can find them
in Refs. [1, 2,  6].  The software packages based on AGEM built by other authors are dis‐
cussed in Refs. [15, 16].
4. Example results of the selected simulation studies
The author of the present chapter has exploited simulation in his studies for more than 20
years. There is no possibility to refer to all of them. Readers interested in earlier applications
of simulation by the author can find reviews of the corresponding references in Ref. [20].
Similar review, however, also including current applications, is done in Ref. [1]. Total number
of all author’s applications runs to tens. Due to the limit of space, just two applications of
simulation used in currently studied problems will briefly be discussed in the following
sections. Their content will be focused more on the achievements, contributions, and final
results than on the details of the methods or procedures used in those studies. Interested
readers will be informed about the essential publications where the details can be found. These
publications can also be treated as a main base source for the results discussed further. The
secondary source is Ref. [1]. The applications in view concern the stability and kinematics
issues.
Two other applications extensively studied at present are connected with TC shape optimi‐
zation with the use of simulation and optimization methods as well as with dynamics of
railway vehicles in TCs at velocities around the critical vn. The example publications on these
problems are Refs. [21, 30] and [31, 32], respectively.
4.1. Results of simulation use in rail vehicle nonlinear lateral stability studies
The serious interest of the author on the stability problems started with reference [17]. The
most important results were presented many years later in Refs. [33, 34]. The fundamental
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reference to the methods used by this author, based on bifurcation approach and on usage of
the simulation, is [35]. Recently, the remarkable contributions have been by H. True and his
coauthors (e.g., see Refs. [36, 37]). Works by O. Polach (e.g., see Ref. [38]) are also interesting.
Much more comprehensive and detailed literature review can be found in Refs. [1, 33, 34].
The meaning of stability is fundamental in the discussed problem. This author could describe
its meaning in most of his works as follows. The used method of nonlinear lateral stability
analysis regards formal theory of stability. By contrast, it is not so formal as compared with
the methods based strictly on the theory. Instead, one finds the tool to be more practical. The
simplification is based on adoption of certain assumptions as well as on behavioral expecta‐
tions for the studied system. They arise from commonly existing knowledge about the systems
in the type of rail vehicle. Therefore, one can skip formal adoption of some solution as the
reference in the simplified approach. Moreover, he can skip introducing some perturbations
into the system to examine whether the new solution stays close enough (in narrow vicinity)
to the reference solution. Such a stay is required by the formal definition of the stability theory.
Taking account of that, bifurcation plot building for the system is the main task in the method.
However, formal verification whether the solutions enabling to build this plot are stable in
completely formal sense is not such a task. The assumption exists in the method that any typical
solution of rail vehicle system (either stationary or periodic) is stable. It might be accepted with
care basing on understanding that periodic solutions in rail vehicle dynamics are self-exciting
vibrations being governed through the wheel–rail tangential contact forces. Following that,
the theory of self-exciting vibrations can be useful in order to predict/expect typical periodic
behavior of the system. The adopted assumption enables to limit the number of simulations
for different initial conditions but the same given velocity. Such simplified approach is
described in Ref. [29]. In case of any doubts if obtained solution is stable or about the possibility
of multiple solutions existence, more formal check for the stability is a must. Then, reasonably
a denser sweeping over the initial conditions, to introduce the perturbation, is performed. Such
a more accurate approach is called the extended analysis and is described in Ref. [30].
The author has been especially interested in the stability of rail vehicles in a curved track from
the very beginning of his interest in stability problems. The studies were initiated as a result
of the observed periodic solutions in a circular curve of track. They appear for velocities v
greater than the nonlinear critical velocity vn, exactly as in a straight track. The only difference
relative to ST case is asymmetry of the results in relation to track centerline. Results of such
kind are shown in Figure 6. Based on that fundamental observation, the studies were carried
out focused on the influence of chosen factors on the stability in CC.
They involved curve radii R from the small to large ones and ST as well, where R=∞. The
principles of these nonlinear stability analyses were adopted from the analysis in a ST.
However, the important supplements to ST analysis were necessary. These supplements are
shown in Figure 7. They finally resulted in the formally presented method of the nonlinear
stability analysis in a curved track (CC).
It was successively improved for years and recently published in Refs. [33, 34]. The essence of
this method is included in Figure 8.
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The meaning of the symbols and acronyms present in Figure 8 is as follows: vc, vn, vs is the
linear critical velocity, nonlinear critical velocity, velocity of calculation stop due to unbounded
growth of the solution, respectively; sss, sps are the stable stationary and periodic solutions,
respectively; uss, ups are the unstable stationary and periodic solutions, respectively; SNB,
HSB are the saddle-node and Hopf’s bifurcation point, respectively. All these notions are well
known in the nonlinear stability studies in ST. The method consists in building a pair of
bifurcation plots as in Figures 8a and 8b based on the results of simulation as shown in Figures
8c and 8d and obtained subsequently for whole range of velocity of motion v and given curve
radius R. If one decides to include in both bifurcation plots results for whole range of R, then
one obtains complex bifurcation plots. Such a pair of the complex bifurcation plots was named
stability map in Ref. [39]. The example stability maps, as in Refs. [33, 1], are shown in Figures
9 and 10. Note that the unstable solutions are omitted in these figures as those are less important
because they are not observable in the real systems.
Figure 6. Stable stationary and periodic solutions for R=600 m and velocities v below and above vn [1]
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Figure 7. Supplements to the nonlinear lateral stability analysis in ST, necessary in CC analysis [33, 1]
Modeling, Simulation, and Results of Their Use in Railway Vehicle Dynamics Studies
http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/62105
183
Figure 9. Stability map for hsfv1 car for S1002/UIC60 wheel and rail profiles: (a) leading wheelset lateral displacements
ylw and (b) peak to peak values of displacements ylw
Figure 8. The essence of method of stability analysis in a CC, i.e., building the bifurcation plot [34, 1]
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Figure 9. Stability map for hsfv1 car for S1002/UIC60 wheel and rail profiles: (a) leading wheelset lateral displacements
ylw and (b) peak to peak values of displacements ylw
Figure 8. The essence of method of stability analysis in a CC, i.e., building the bifurcation plot [34, 1]
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Figure 10. Stability map for hsfv1 car for SZDwheel/R65 wheel and rail profiles: (a) leading wheelset lateral displace‐
ment absolute values ylw and (b) peak to peak values of displacements ylw
The influence of several factors on the stability was studied based on the stability map
technique. Among the factors studied are accuracy of wheelset’s angle of attack determination,
track superelevation, types of nominal wheel and rail profiles, type and value of the wheel and
rail wear, stiffness and damping values in suspension, type of vehicle (car and bogie), rail
inclination, way of mean rolling radius modeling, track gauge, and value of coefficient of
friction. Figures 9 and 10 can represent part of the results for one of the factors, namely the
wheel profile shape. Both maps were obtained for the same object, however, with different
nominal wheel profiles. One can observe significant differences between both maps. One
among the most important differences are nonlinear critical velocities vn of 43 and 24.1 m/s,
respectively. Another is the existence of quasi-static solutions for R<2150 m in Figure 10. This
can be easily recognized as no vibrations appear, resulting in p-t-p ylw=0, for such values of R
in Figure 10b. In Figure 9, vibrations appear for all R values represented there. More differences
are discussed in Refs. [33, 1].
The results in Figures 9 and 10 refer to 2-axle freight car hsfv1 of the model shown in Figure
2. Example results of stability studies for the model of MKIII passenger car shown in Figure
3 can be found in Ref. [18].
4.2. Use of the simulation in studying the influence of kinematics accuracy on vehicle
dynamics in a curved track at variable velocity
Use of Option 2 from Section 1.1 to build mathematical and numerical models of vehicle-track
systems by the present author, made it natural that he was always interested in the importance
of accurate modeling relative kinematics connected with description in moving reference
systems. This interest was amplified since an additional work is necessary as compared with
description in absolute reference systems. Besides, some of the authors neglect additional
terms (imaginary forces) in their equations of motion, without proper justification. Good
examples of such works might be provided in Refs. [3, 40–42]. Author of this book chapter
undertook two stage attempt to finally resolve the problem of particular inertia terms impor‐
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tance. The first one concerned vehicle motion with constant velocity. It finished with publica‐
tion [5]. The second attempt concerned the motion with variable velocity and finished with
publication [4]. Publication [4] is also verification of the results from [5], as motion with
constant velocity was just a special case in Ref. [4]. Therefore, Ref. [4] is the main source for
results forthcoming in the current section. These results were also published in Ref. [1]. Both
Refs. [4] and [1] present the issue in a comprehensive form. Here, only samples of the results
and most general conclusions will be represented.
The idea of the study was to compare the results for the vehicle model with all imaginary forces
included with those for the model in which the imaginary forces were omitted. In order to
precisely determine importance of particular terms types, the forces (and torques) were
selectively, rather than totally, omitted. Let us now recognize the generalized imaginary forces
according to Ref. [7]. Here, equation (24) will be useful. The forces’ terms are present in the
second line of this equation and the torques’ terms are present in the fourth line of it. Note that
all the terms are multiplied by the corresponding linear and angular partial velocities.
Therefore, we can refer directly to content of the square brackets in lines 2 and 4. Making use
of that idea, the 1st term in the square bracket in line 2 represents inertia forces of translation.
The 2nd term in line 2 and 1st one in line 4 form inertia forces of rotation. The 3rd term in line
2 and 2nd one in line 4 correspond to centrifugal forces of inertia. The 4th term in line 2 and
the 3rd in line 4 make gyroscopic forces. The abovementioned four categories of imaginary
forces’ terms appear in the equations as the terms’ components corresponding to the direction
a particular equation of motion describes. Finally, the omissions of all components for given
directions were performed. In fact, these were longitudinal, lateral, and vertical directions. At
the end, for the given direction, the analyses were performed to find the components of the
terms of particular (practical) importance among all.
The variable velocity was realized in the studies with use of the uniform variable motion. The
change in velocity is indirectly represented by the corresponding acceleration value a.
Consequently, negative values of acceleration a mean deceleration, corresponding to vehicle
braking, the positive values of a mean vehicle acceleration, corresponding to its speeding up,
while zero value of a means motion with constant velocity, that is, v=const. Different intensity
of braking or speeding up were realized with different acceleration values.
4.2.1. Scope of the studies and example results of simulation
Generally, the tests described in Ref. [4] represent seven different routes and two different
vehicles. The routes included radii R=300, 600, 1200, and 2000 m and were composed in
continuation either as ST, TC, and CC or as ST, TC, CC, TC, and ST. Thus, the entrance TCen
and exit TCex transition curves were considered. The TCs were of the 3rd degree parabola
type. Characterizing all the routes briefly, it has to be stated that their two general types existed.
The first type corresponded to real railway conditions. The second one represented the case
with unnaturally shortened TC in order to get stronger effects for research purposes. As
concerns the two vehicles used in Ref. [4], the first one was hsfv1 car described in Section 3.1.
Second was vehicle referred to as the 2-axle freight car in Ref. [5]. Both models have the same
structure as shown in Figure 2, and they are supplemented with the same track models from
Figures 3 and 4. This also results in the same number of DOFs for both of them. The major
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difference is that first model represents empty car, while the second one the laden car. The
other minor differences in the parameters (see [5]) are negligible, here.
Two types of simulation results are presented below. The first type is imaginary forces being
omitted in the study. They are a cause for the solution differences being of interest. The
imaginary forces are shown in Figures 11, 14, and 16. The second type of simulation results is
those representing the differences between solutions for the whole model and the model with
particular imaginary force omitted. They are represented with Figures 12, 13, 15, and 17.
Results for complete model are drawn with the solid line, while for the model with imaginary
torques omitted with the dashed line.
Just two routes appear in the mentioned figures. The route I is as follows: ST (l=10 m, H=0 m);
TCen (l=7 m, Rmin=300 m, Hmax=0.15 m); CC (l=30 m, R=300 m, H=0.15 m). Initial velocities for
route I were between v0=10.25 and 15.0 m/s, where the smallest value corresponded to a=0 m/s2
and the biggest one to a=6 m/s2. Route I includes TC with length unnaturally shortened for
research purposes. Route II is as follows: ST (l=10 m, H=0 m); TCen (l=102, 4 m, Rmin=600 m,
Hmax=0.128 m); CC (l=60 m, R=600 m, H=0.128 m); TCex (l=102.4 m, Rmin=600 m, Hmax=0.128 m);
ST (l=40 m, H=0 m). Initial velocities for the simulations were v0=19.91, 22.0, and 22.09 m/s. They
corresponded to a=2, 0, and −2 m/s2, respectively. Route II entirely corresponds to real railway
conditions. In the above given brackets, the denotations are l is denoted as the length of the track
section, R as the circular curve radius, and H as the circular curve superelevation. Values of the
corresponding accelerations are given directly in the figures in round brackets.
It is worth noting in Figure 11 that it includes the biggest values of the imaginary torque
obtained in the author’s studies. As is seen, it is the roll imaginary torque Pϕb of hsfv1 car body
related to longitudinal direction. Character of the torque changes is rectangular, that is,
nonzero values of the torque exist for TC only. Values of this torque depend strongly on value
of the acceleration a. The value is biggest for the biggest acceleration a=6 m/s2 and smallest as
well as equal to zero for a=0 m/s2. The last fact means no influence of this torque on motion
with constant velocity v=const. In the case of Figures 12 and 13, strong influence of omission
of torque Pϕb from Figure 11 can be observed. The two mostly influenced coordinates are
shown. They are roll ϕb and yaw ψb angles of hsfv1 car body, respectively. Note that the
influence on angle ψb (Figure 13) is approximately one order of magnitude smaller than on
angle ϕb (Figure 12).
Figure 11. Roll imaginary torque of hsfv1 car body on route I for different accelerations
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Figure 12. Roll angle of hsfv1car body on route I for different accelerations and roll imaginary torque of hsfv1car body
omitted
Figure 13. Yaw angle of hsfv1car body on route I for different accelerations and roll imaginary torque of hsfv1car body
omitted
Figure 14. Yaw imaginary torque of hsfv1 car body on route I for different accelerations
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Figure 12. Roll angle of hsfv1car body on route I for different accelerations and roll imaginary torque of hsfv1car body
omitted
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Figure 14. Yaw imaginary torque of hsfv1 car body on route I for different accelerations
Railway Research - Selected Topics on Development, Safety and Technology188
Figure 15. Yaw angle of hsfv1car body on route I for different accelerations and yaw imaginary torque of hsfv1car
body omitted
Figure 16. Roll imaginary torque of 2-axle freight car body on route II for different accelerations
Figure 17. Lateral displacement of 2-axle freight car body on route II for different accelerations and roll imaginary tor‐
que of 2-axle freight car body omitted
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In Figure 14, the value of the imaginary torque Pψb of hsfv1 car body, related to vertical
direction, is represented. Character of the torque changes corresponds to rectangle supple‐
mented with triangle. The rectangle part is independent of the acceleration a. Therefore, it
exists also for a=0 m/s2. Increase of the supplementary triangle part grows with increase of a.
Therefore, the torque value is biggest for the biggest acceleration a=6 m/s2 and smallest for a=0
m/s2. Overall, this means that in case of v=const. and a=0 m/s2 influence of Pψb omission exists;
however, for a>0, it is bigger. This is also the case in Figure 15 for ψb, where very strong influence
of the omission can be seen. The biggest influence for a=6 m/s2 is of the same order of magnitude
as in Figure 13 related to Pϕb omission. Therefore, it can be concluded that influences of Pϕb and
Pψb omissions on ψb values accumulate.
In Figure 16, the character of torque Pϕb for 2-axle freight car is in accordance with that in Figure
11. The difference exists, however, that results from route II configuration. One can observe
opposite signs of Pϕb for the entrance TC (TCen) and exit TC (TCex). The sign becomes also
opposite when opposite acceleration a sign is adopted. In Figure 16, this case corresponds to
a=2 m/s2 and a=−2 m/s2. In Figure 17, for 2-axle freight car very strong influence of Pϕb omission
on vehicle body lateral displacements yb can be observed. The changes in signs for yb corre‐
spond to those for the Pϕb described above provided one remembers that if Pϕb>0 then yb<0 and
vice versa.
4.2.2. General conclusions from the study
Except the important influences described in Section 4.2.1, some other important influences
were found and indicated in Ref. [4]. Therefore, except influences of Pϕb on ϕb, yb, and ψb, the
important influence on the wheelsets’ lateral displacements ylw and ytw exists. Except the
influence of Pψb on ψb, very serious influence on the wheelsets yaw angles ψlw and ψtw exists.
Assuming that lateral component (parallel to track plane in curved track) is known for its
importance, the vertical component (perpendicular to the track plane) was studied. It appeared
that the influence of this component omission on the results, especially vehicle body vertical
displacements zb, is also significant.
Conclusions from the studies, including track section, character of velocity, vehicle elements,
direction defining equation, and purpose of calculations, were summarized in table form in
Ref. [4]. Here, we present them in Table 1. This table is analogous to that in Ref. [4] in terms of
merits. Nevertheless, Table 1 is differently arranged.
Generally, the most important are longitudinal and vertical direction terms related to car body.
The influence of eventual term omission is particularly important in TCs. The centrifugal force
is important in both the TCs and the CC sections. The influence in TCs increases as compared
with CC when the vehicle moves with variable velocity. The stronger the change in velocity
(both accelerating and braking), the greater the influence. The last column represents a direct
recommendation of terms that should not be neglected.
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5. Concluding remarks
The author of this chapter has been involved in technological problems of railways for about
30 years. More precisely, his involvement concerns part of the railway system that are railway
vehicles. Within the railway vehicles, many areas of studies can be mentioned as, for example,
material issues, production technical issues, braking systems issues, traction systems issues,
construction issues, exploitation issues, control issues, safety systems issues, etc. The author
is interested in dynamics of vehicle motion with a special regard to the motion in curved
sections of the track. It is obvious that the chapter was devoted to these last aspects. The author
focused his efforts on giving the idea to the readers how important and powerful tools are
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Table 1. Importance and recommendations for imaginary forces omission in rail vehicle dynamics
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In Sections 1 and 2, the general methods of modeling dynamics in moving coordinate systems,
useful for multibody systems of rail vehicle type, were represented. The Newton–Euler and
Kane’s equations in the form suitable in AGEM approach were discussed. At the end of Section
2.2, the method profiled for rail vehicle systems was also presented. These methods help build
mathematical models of rail vehicle dynamics. In Section 3, example nominal models of rail
vehicles were introduced, as used by the author. In that section, the issue of building numerical
models corresponding to the mathematical ones was also discussed.
In Section 4, two examples of the author’s simulation studies, with use of the numerical models,
were discussed. The first example represented in Section 4.1 concerned the problem of rail
vehicle stability in a curved track. Due to the author’s systematic and consequent simulation
studies, the method was formulated suitable for rail vehicle nonlinear lateral stability studies
in a curved section of the track. The examples of the so-called stability map, being the most
important result in the studies, were shown and briefly commented on. The stability maps
approach was used by this author to study the influence of different factors on the results of
stability analysis in a curved track.
The second example is represented in Section 4.2. It was devoted to the use of the simulation
in studying the influence of kinematics accuracy on vehicle dynamics in a curved track at
variable velocities. In fact, both the constant and variable velocity cases were of interest. Due
to the consequent author’s interest in this issue, it appeared possible, based on the direct results
of simulation and equation terms analysis, to resolve the problem in full. The author presents
tabular conclusion of the results in Section 4.2.2. The table states precisely which imaginary
forces terms, in what conditions, and for which vehicle major elements (bodies) may have an
important influence on the simulation results. The last column states that imaginary force of
translation, imaginary torque of rotation, and centrifugal force should not be neglected in both
theoretical and practical analyses (calculation). The gyroscopic forces should not be neglected
in the theoretical issues as well.
Both described results of the simulation studies are original and important contributions to
the knowledge on rail vehicle dynamics. These contributions would not be possible without
the mathematical, nominal, and numerical models of vehicles build based on the modeling
methods discussed in the chapter. Therefore, it is hoped that the readers have obtained an idea
of the efficiency and importance of both the modeling and the simulation for the development
of contemporary rail vehicle dynamics, and thus the railways in general.
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